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Looking for the *Vinaya*: Monastic Discipline in the Practical Canons of the Theravāda*

Introduction

This paper introduces a new distinction between the 'formal' and the 'practical' canon, arguing that this distinction allows scholars of the Theravāda to write histories of Buddhist practice with greater precision. The merits of the distinction between the formal and the practical canon are explored through an examination of the way in which monks were taught about monastic discipline in medieval Sri Lanka. I show that until they became Theras few monks encountered the *Vinaya Piṭaka* (hereafter, *Vinaya*) in anything close to its full form. Instead, monks engaged ideas about monastic discipline through Pāli and local-language condensations of and commentaries on the *Vinaya*. Moreover, selected texts from the *Sutta Piṭaka* played a central role in drawing monks into a distinctive life of discipline. Monastic leaders in medieval Sri Lanka considered the *Anumāna*, *Dasadhamma* and (*Karaṇīya*)*metta Suttas* to be important resources for monastic education. Along with commentaries written in Pāli and Sinhala, these *suttas* were central monastic guidelines in the practical canons of medieval Sri Lankan Buddhist communities. Looking closely at these *suttas* and their commentaries, I explain that they were important texts for medieval Sri Lankan monks because they offered highly accessible accounts of monastic discipline. As such, they

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were particularly valuable during periods in which monastic leaders attempted to reorganize monastic institutions and establish clear guidelines for conduct within the saṃgha.

'Formal' and 'Practical' Canon

Until recently, studies of the Theravāda have emphasized the central place of Pāli, and particularly canonical Pāli texts, in discussions of Buddhist teachings and the ways in which Buddhists have encountered them. This focus on Pāli language and the Pāli Canon emerged through what Charles HALLISEY has described as “intercultural mimesis” (1995: 33). HALLISEY uses this term to refer to an elective affinity between Theravādin references to the authority of the *tipiṭaka* and the expectations of textual scholars and missionaries who encountered Theravādin cultures during the colonial period. Today, caught up in the important work of editing, translating and analyzing canonical Pāli texts and their commentaries, we have only begun to notice that the assimilation of and reflection on Buddhist ideas has in most times and places not occurred through exposure to the Pāli *tipiṭaka* in its entirety.¹ Rather, these processes have been characterized by an encounter with parts of the *tipiṭaka*, selected commentarial texts in both Pāli and local languages, and a rich array of non-*tipiṭaka* texts written in Pāli and local languages.² As HALLISEY notes in a brief but helpful discussion of Theravādin *Vinaya* literature, for instance, “the vast and intimidating literature associated with the *Vinaya*... makes relating the canonical *Vinaya* to actual practice in diverse contexts more complex than has generally been admitted by students of Buddhism” (1990, 207). In a similar vein, Steven COLLINS notes that “[t]he evidence suggests that both in so-called ‘popular’ prac-

1. Clearly, there are clearly exceptions, or near exceptions, such as the celebrated commentator Buddhaghosa, or a contemporary Thai monastic intellectual, Phra Prayudh Payutto (on whom see OLSON 1995).
2. The growing number of studies referring to manuscript evidence make a very important contribution to our recognition of this. See, for instance, SKILLING 1992 and VON HINÜBER 1996. In this regard, see also HALLISEY (1990, 1995) and note SCHOPEN’s comment on textual emphases in *Buddhist Studies*: “But notice too that this position, which gives overriding primacy to textual sources, does not even consider the possibility that the texts we are to study to arrive at a knowledge of ‘Buddhism’ may not even have been known to the vast majority of practicing Buddhists – both monks and laity” (1997, 2). HOLT (1996) argues that visual narratives were far more important than textual ones for lay Buddhists in late medieval Sri Lanka.

tice and in the monastic world, even among virtuosos, only parts of the canonical collection have ever been in wide currency, and that other texts have been known and used, sometimes much more widely" (1990: 103). COLLINS bases his statement in part on an important observation about text-based education in the Theravāda and other religious communities made by Charles KEYES, a portion of which I quote below:

The relevance of texts to religious dogma in the worldview of any people cannot be assumed simply because some set of texts has been recognized as belonging to a particular religious tradition... There is no single integrated textual tradition based on a "canon" to the exclusion of all other texts... The very size and complexity of a canon leads those who use it to give differential emphasis to its component texts. Moreover, even those for whom a defined set of scriptures exist will employ as sources of religious ideas many texts which do not belong to a canon. ... Moreover, for any particular temple monastery in Thailand or Laos, the collection of texts available to the people in the associated community are not exactly the same as those found in another temple monastery (1983: 272).

Building on KEYES' comments and a survey of manuscript catalogues, COLLINS notes that "[i]t might well be that the content of most smaller libraries is in effect a 'ritual canon'; that is, it contains the texts, canonical or otherwise, which are in actual use in ritual life in the area concerned" (1990: 104).³ In what follows I extend KEYES' argument against "a single integrated textual tradition based on a 'canon' to the exclusion of all other texts," with an obvious debt to the other scholars just cited, by developing a distinction between the 'formal' canon and the 'practical' canon and suggesting its uses as a tool for historians of Buddhism.⁴ I then apply it to the study of monastic disciplinary education in medieval Sri Lanka.

Rather than noting that the Theravāda has a canon – the *tipitaka* – and assuming that it is at once a locus of authority and a primary tool in Buddhist education, I suggest that we look for two types of canon in the Theravāda. The first is the canon as a concept, and as the ultimate locus of interpretive authority. This I call the 'formal' canon. This formal

3. This statement about contemporary textual use is in harmony with Peter SKILLING's observations of Buddhist textuality in earlier periods: "A distinguishing mark of the *raḁṣā* literature is that it was actually *used* – that is, memorized and recited for specific purposes – by both monks and lay followers, from a very early date. This is in contrast with the bulk of the canonical literature which would only have been studied by the assiduous [sic] few, mainly monk-scholars" (1992: 113).

4. An initial attempt to elaborate this distinction appears in BLACKBURN 1996.

canon, or the “very idea of the Pāli canon,” has a history, as Steven COLLINS (1990) has engagingly shown. Since the fifth century C. E. the formal canon has sometimes served as a point of reference in Buddhist discussions of monastic history and identity. It has also played an important role in what HALLISEY calls a “metaphysics of origins” in the Theravāda (HALLISEY 1995: 43). Here HALLISEY refers to a literary practice in which Theravādin authors regularly and formally defer authority to a Pāli canon even if they do not engage specific portions of the *tipiṭaka* in any sustained manner.

The second type of canon in the Theravāda is what I call the ‘practical’ canon.⁵ This may include portions of the *tipiṭaka* and commentaries which encompassed, and perhaps “filtered”⁶ these portions of the *tipiṭaka* to students. It may also include texts understood by their authors, readers and listeners as works about the Buddhist *dhamma*, consistent with but *perhaps not explicitly related to*, sections of the Pāli *tipiṭaka* and its commentaries. The practical canon thus refers to *the units of text actually employed in the practices of collecting manuscripts, copying them, reading them, commenting on them, listening to them, and preaching sermons based upon them that are understood by their users as part of a tipitaka-based tradition*. Note that COLLINS also uses the term “practical canon,” in a new application of the work (COLLINS 1990) from which I quoted above. For COLLINS the term has the following more general meaning: “works in actual use at any given places and times” (1998: 78).

Distinguishing between the practical and the formal canon is useful in at least three ways. First, it allows us to orient the study of Buddhist textual practice, and the study of Buddhist communities generally, towards accounts which attend closely to historical differences and regional particularity. If we map out the practical canons used in various times and places by Buddhist communities associated with the Theravāda we will gain a much more vivid and detailed understanding of how Buddhist identity was and is shaped through educational experiences.⁷

5. A term used also in BLACKBURN 1996: 90.

6. Here I am borrowing a phrase from CABEZÓN’s (1996: 2) discussion of the relations between Tibetan and Indian commentarial materials.

7. COLLINS states that “unfortunately, we will almost never have any real knowledge of what such a practical canon might have been in specific locales before recent times” (1998: 78). I am somewhat more optimistic about the possibility of mapping the practical canon (as I use the term) across time and space. This is

Second, we will be able to relate changes in textual practice to their historical context, exploring the reasons for specific patterns of textual composition and use. Third, separating the formal and the practical canon in our analysis gives scholars of the Theravāda a new way to look for, and at, the variety of ways in which textual authority is articulated within Theravāda Buddhism. In other words, if we explore the texts actually used in a particular time and place (the practical canon) *and* the ways in which Buddhist authors and commentators link these to the formal canon, we will be able to identify a set of textual strategies through which the formal canon is made relevant to textual production. Although I do not apply the practical-formal canon distinction to non-Theravādin contexts, I hope that colleagues working in these contexts will find it suggestive.

In the remainder of this paper I use the distinction between the formal and practical canon to frame a discussion of the ways Sri Lankan monks were educated about monastic discipline in two periods: the 12th-13th centuries and the 18th century. In doing so, I indicate that while the *Vinaya* remained important as part of the formal canon it was relatively unimportant as part of the practical canon. Further, I argue that certain *suttas* became an important part of the practical canon in these historical contexts because they provided an engaging way to introduce monks to disciplined conduct.

Monastic Discipline in the Practical Canons of the Theravāda

We know that a disciplined monastic life is central to the normative vision of the Theravāda and other Buddhist traditions. Such discipline is said to help monks on the path to liberation and to offer a compassionate example to lay Buddhists. As Richard GOMBRICH puts it, “we may say that living the life of the monk just as the *Vinaya* prescribes it is very close, as close as it is possible to get, to acting out in daily life the spiri-

clearly easier when, as for the 18th and 19th centuries, we have a plentiful manuscript record to work with which can often be read in relation to regional, if not temple, use (e.g. BLACKBURN (ms.)) but it is also possible for earlier periods with attention to the intertextual references visible in Buddhist texts and inscriptions. The fragmented understanding of ‘tradition’ that is likely to emerge from such studies of intertextuality may actually bring us closer to the textual experience of many Buddhists in the pre-printing era. See DAGENAIS 1994 for interesting observations in this regard.

tual goal of attaining nibbāna” (1988: 89).⁸ But how, in fact, have monks within the Theravāda been trained to learn a life of discipline?⁹ Textbook introductions to Theravāda Buddhism typically describe the *Vinaya* as the source through which monks learn about monastic discipline.¹⁰

Yet, when we look closely at evidence for monastic education in Sri Lanka during the 12th-13th centuries and the 18th century, we find that sustained and direct access to the *Vinaya* was quite uncommon.¹¹ How, then, were monks exposed to normative ideas about monastic discipline? Monks encountered these ideas partly through condensations of and commentaries on *parts* of the *Vinaya* which were written in Pāli and Sinhala because, as HALLISEY suggests,

Theravādins found the *Vinaya* both too little and too much. They found it too little in so far as the canonical text required elucidation and clarification, and as a result, massive commentaries and glossaries were written on it...They found it too much in so far as the size of the canonical *Vinaya* made it unwieldy [sic] and they consequently wrote diverse summaries and compendiums, including Buddhadatta's *Vinaya-vinicchaya* and Sāriputta's *Muttaka-Vinaya-Vinicchaya*. Such works were written to present the *Vinaya*'s practical message in a more manageable fashion. In a similar vein, handbooks like the *Khuddasikha*, *Mulasikha*, *Herāṇasikha*, and indeed the *katikāvatas* themselves [on which see below] were written to provide even more practical guidance (HALLISEY 1990: 207).

Strikingly, however, we also find that most monks were expected to learn a great deal about disciplined monasticism through a set of three *suttas* which they sometimes encountered with commentary written in Pāli and/or Sinhala.

The monastic regulations which I draw upon to describe those parts of the practical canon concerned with monastic discipline are known as *katikāvatas*. These are agreements on rules of conduct for monks, set forth by the most powerful monastic leader of the time at a convocation

8. See HOLT 1995 for a thoughtful study of the relationship between monastic discipline and soteriological goals.
9. I do not, of course, argue that all monks within the Theravāda (or any other tradition) are disciplined monks. Rather, I am concerned here with the ways in which a life of discipline is and was promoted as proper practice.
10. See, for instance, GOMBRICH 1988 and ROBINSON, JOHNSON *et al* 1997.
11. I have chosen to look at the Sri Lankan case in these periods because monastic regulations from that period provide a relatively rich picture of Buddhist monastic curriculum which has not yet been explored in any detail despite the 1971 Sinhala edition and English translation of these regulations by Nandasena RATNAPALA.

of the saṃgha held for the reorganization or “cleansing” (to adopt the perspective of the *katikāvatas* themselves) of the monastic community. The reorganizations which resulted in the *katikāvatas* I will be considering here all occurred with royal support, and the *katikāvatas* often bear the names of the kings reigning at the time of the convocation. The *katikāvatas* were written during periods of monastic reorganization when some members of the monastic leadership were concerned to address internal instability and were intended to be used regularly thereafter for the guidance of the saṃgha. Therefore, these regulations provide important and detailed evidence of the ways in which educational practices developed. Precisely because these works were written to respond to practical problems within the monastic community (which appear to have included slow-witted monks as well as monastic rivals), they give a remarkably frank view of educational limitations among monks, and indicate a “base-line” for acceptable monastic education.

The twelfth-century *Mahā Parākramabāhu Katikāvata* instructs novice monks to memorize a Sinhala prose extract from the *Vinaya* which contains guidelines for novice monks¹², as well as part of the *Pāṭimokkha* and the *Dasadhamma Sutta*. Monks in the first years after upasampadā, or higher ordination, were obliged to memorize “at least the *Khuddasikkhā* and the *Pāṭimokkha* from the *Vinaya* and the *Dasadhamma Sutta* and *Anumāna Sutta* from the *Suttas*” (RATNAPALA 1971: 38-9). They were also asked to memorize the *Mūlasikkhā* and the *Sikhavaḷaṅḍa-vinisa*. The *Khuddasikkhā* and *Mūlasikkhā* are verse summaries of the *Vinaya* written in Pāli. *Sikhavaḷaṅḍa-vinisa* is Sinhala prose translation of *Mūlasikkhā* accompanied by a Sinhala commentary (GODAKUMBURA 1955: 4; 16-8).

The *Daṃbadeṇi Katikāvata* set forth in 1266-7 under the authority of King Vijayabāhu III, describes a system of monastic education in more elaborate terms. Its detailed prescription of monastic educational attainments required for each rank in the monastic hierarchy directs our attention in important ways to the process by which monks learned about monastic discipline. These educational requirements indicate that the only monks expected to have a substantial direct knowledge of the *Vinaya*, apart from the *Pāṭimokkha*, were the monks eligible for Thera status. For all junior monks, encounters with the *Vinaya* were expected

12. Called *Heranaṣikhā*.

to proceed primarily through partial *Vinaya* commentaries and condensations using a combination of Pāli and Sinhala.

Newcomers to the saṅgha were expected to learn the Sinhala alphabet and to study a brief account of the Buddha's life. They were also supposed to study the *paritta* corpus and the *Dhammapada* (RATNAPALA 1971: 48). In order to be admitted as a novice, they had to be trained in the contents of the *katikāvatas* themselves (50). After becoming a novice, a monk was asked to memorize *Herāṇasikha* which is a Sinhala prose translation of part of the *Vinaya* containing rules for the acceptance of novices into the order (GODAKUMBURA 1955: 16-8). He was also charged to memorize training rules included in the *Pāṭimokkha* as well as meditation guidelines and accounts of virtuous conduct.¹³ At the time of upasampadā, the monk was to read the *katikāvata* itself, and be taught other sections of the *Vinaya* rules (RATNAPALA 1971: 50).¹⁴

The monk who had received upasampadā was expected to memorize *Mūlasikkhā* and the *katikāvatas*, as well as to learn the *Sikhavalaṇḍavinisa* fully by heart (50). In order to achieve the title of Nisrayamukta, or freed from the nissaya, a monk was to memorize the *Bhikkhu-* and *Bhikkhunī-* *Pāṭimokkhas* and *Khuddasikkhā*, as well as grammatical texts set by his teacher.¹⁵ He was also required to prepare for examination on portions of these works plus Buddhaghosa's commentary on the *Pāṭimokkha* (51).¹⁶

A student seeking the title of Thera was required to learn additional texts. It was only at this point in a monastic career that a student was expected to become familiar with substantial portions of the *Vinaya* itself. At this stage, the monk was told to study the *Bhikkhu-* and *Bhikkhunī-vibhaṅga*, as well as the *Khandakavatta* and one of the four nikāyas

13. The meditation guidelines were Kāgiyāsi (mindfulness of the body as described in the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta*) and Satara-kamaṭahan (the four objects of meditation described in the *Mahāsatipaṭṭhāna Sutta*). An account of virtuous conduct is listed as the Catupārisuddhi-sīla.
14. The Saṅghādisesa from the *Pāṭimokkha* and the Paṭiggahanasikhā from the Pācittiya.
15. And the *Artha-Saṅgraha*, perhaps a text on the *Abhidhamma*. See RATNAPALA (1971: 203, n. 24.3).
16. RATNAPALA later notes that the *Andhakavinda*, *Mahārāhulovāda*, *Ambaṭṭha*, *Tisso anumodanā*, and *Kammākammavinicchaya* were required study for the title of Nisrayamukta, but these are not mentioned in the *katikāvata* itself (1971: 290).

from the *Sutta Piṭaka* (51-52; 204; 290). The candidate was subject to examination on portions from these texts as well as from the *Vinaya*'s Pārājikā and Pācittiya rules (51-2).

We see that junior monks were not expected to study long sections of the *Vinaya*. They were, however, required to study specific parts of the *Sutta Piṭaka* and this is important to my argument here. When we look in the practical canons of medieval Sri Lanka for texts used to inculcate monastic discipline we find that particular *suttas* are consistently mentioned. The *Mahā Parākramabāhu Katikāvata* singles out the *Dasadhamma* and *Anumāna Suttas* for monastic study. It is clear that these *suttas* are understood as parts of an education in disciplined monasticism since the *katikāvata* mentions them in the same line as it mentions the study of selected monastic rules (RATNAPALA 1971: 38-9). The *Daṃbadeṇi Katikāvata* instructs monks to contemplate the *Anumāna* and *Dasadhamma Suttas* regularly: "All [monks] – the sthaviras, the newcomers and those at the middle level – should concentrate on the *Anumāna-sutta* and the *Dasadhamma-sutta* without distraction at least once a day" (RATNAPALA 1971: 52).¹⁷ Those preparing for the novitiate were told to study the *paritta* collection (*catubhāṇavāra*) which contains the *Dasadhamma* and (*Karaṇīya*)*metta Suttas* (48). All of these educational guidelines were carried over into the first *katikāvata* promulgated in the eighteenth century during the reign of King Kīrti Śrī Rājasimha (99, 101).

Looking at these monastic regulations teaches us two things of importance in our study of monastic discipline and the practical canons of the Sri Lankan Theravāda. First, partial, and often indirect, access to the *Vinaya* was the rule rather than the exception. Apart from the *Pāṭimokkha*, monks engaged the contents of the *Vinaya* through partial commentaries, condensations and the *katikāvatas* themselves until they reached the final levels of monastic training. Second, the *Vinaya* and its condensations and commentaries were not the only way in which monks were expected to learn about monastic discipline. Consistent references to certain *suttas*, including the *Anumāna* and *Dasadhamma Suttas* make it clear that these were understood as an important source of guidance. Below I explore the *suttas* used to teach monastic discipline which were part of the practical canon in the 12-13th centuries and the 18th century. In doing so, I suggest that these *suttas* were an important part of the

17. Unless otherwise noted, all translation are the author's own.

practical canon precisely because they provided vivid and highly accessible depictions of the monastic life.

The *katikāvatas*' indication that specific Pāli *suttas* were used to guide monastics in disciplined conduct is borne out by a series of letters written by the eighteenth-century monastic leader, Vālivīta Saraṇaṃkara. In letters of advice and exhortation written by Saraṇaṃkara to monks in Sri Lanka's southern region during his tenure as Saṃgharāja (leader of the monastic community), Saraṇaṃkara provides valuable evidence of the way monks were expected to learn monastic discipline.

In his letter written to Vaṭarakgodha Dhammapāla, head of the Mulgirigala lineage, in which he gives instructions for training the monks under Dhammapāla's guidance, Saraṇaṃkara indicates that certain aspects of monastic discipline are to be taught with reference to particular parts of the *Sutta Piṭaka*:

have them learn especially that the virtues of abstention from what is unskillful, contentment and non-covetousness as they are presented in the *Karaṇīyametta Sūtra*, in the *Dasadhamma Sūtra*, in the *Dharmadāyāda Sūtra*, in the *Mahārya-vaṃśa Sūtra* and in the *Yogīkathā* should be practiced, should be done repeatedly and should be fulfilled by those with the ideas of good people, who like discipline, who are afraid of saṃsāra, who are afraid of evil, and who have been born during a period characterized by a Buddha's birth (VĀCISSARA 1964: 215,).

This view is supported further by another letter of instruction sent by Saraṇaṃkara to his monastic followers in which he says,

... stick to the ascetic virtues such as non-covetousness and contentment expressed in sūtras like the *Dasadhamma Sūtra*, the *Karaṇīyametta Sūtra*, and the *Dharmadāyada Sūtra* (VĀCISSARA 1964: 212, emphasis added).

Here it is important to note that when Saraṇaṃkara wants to teach his students about the "ascetic virtues" he tells them to look at specific *suttas* rather than at the *Vinaya*.

If we wish to begin understanding the practices by which monks were trained in monastic discipline, we must look carefully at these *suttas* to see the ways in which their content entered into monastic exhortation and reflection. In what follows I look closely at three of the *suttas* consistently mentioned above: the *Anumāna Sutta*, the *Dasadhamma Sutta* and the *(Karaṇīya)metta Sutta*. The *Dasadhamma* and *(Karaṇīya) metta Suttas* are both included within the corpus of *paritta* texts (or, *caturbhāṇavāra*) which was referred to in the *katikāvatas* discussed above. The *katikāvatas* also make separate references to the *Anumāna* and

Dasadhmma Suttas. The (*Karaṇīya*)*metta* and *Dasadhmma Suttas* appear in the eighteenth-century monastic letters.

Three Suttas in the Practical Canon

Looking at these *suttas* as individual Pāli texts, and then as Pāli texts mediated by Pāli and Sinhala commentary, I will show why these *suttas* were selected to teach monks about disciplined conduct. We find that each of these three *suttas* provides a highly realistic depiction of monastic life which challenges the student-monk to monitor three aspects of his behavior – physical action, verbal action and mental action – and to attend closely to the demands of monastic authority.

The *Anumāna Sutta* appears in the *Majjhima Nikāya* (M.I.15), and presents instructions given by Mahā Moggallāna to a group of monks. Moggallāna describes two scenarios in which a monk is questioned by other monks about his discipline. In one case, we are told, the monk is stubborn, illspoken, impatient, and unresponsive to instruction. In the other, the monk is gentle, wellspoken, calm and responsive to instruction. The presence of certain qualities creates the first situation and their absence the second. These qualities are: being influenced by unskillful desires, being conceited and contemptuous of others, being overpowered by anger, acting with ill will about the cause of anger, clinging to the cause of anger, speaking angrily, blaming when blamed, refusing blame when blamed, returning blame when blamed, avoiding blame when blamed and creating discontent, failing to explain conduct when blamed, acting harshly and spitefully, being envious and avaricious, being crafty and deceitful, being harsh and proud, being wordly and obstinate, and finding renunciation difficult.

Moggallāna continues by saying that when one encounters someone else with the negative characteristics, one should not follow the instinctive impulse to mirror such undesirable behaviors, but should, instead, concentrate on behaving differently. Moreover, one should examine oneself with regard to these characteristics. If they exist, one should strive to eradicate these unskillful elements and, if not, one should live happily with the knowledge of their absence. The *sutta* ends with the following simile:

Just as a man or a woman or a youngster who likes pretty things reflects on his or her own image in a clean mirror or a clear bowl of water, sees a stain or blemish and tries to get rid of it, or sees no such thing and rejoices, so a reflective monk who sees that these unskillful elements are present in himself should strive

to get rid of them, and one who does not should live happily, working on the skillful elements day and night.

The *sutta* is striking for its enumeration of psychological states which impede personal liberation. The situations which Moggallāna describes also make a strong case for certain behaviors as necessary for the smooth functioning of a monastic community. In a community of monks including those at all levels of attainment, a monk is charged to heed criticism and to use the presence of unskilled companions to enhance rather than impede his own progress.

The *Dasadhamma Sutta*, found in the *Aṅguttara Nikāya* (A.V.48), pursues the question of reflective monastic conduct in an interactive, question-answer style. The *sutta* tells us that the Buddha preached its contents in order to instruct a company of monks in ten things "which should always be reflected upon by a monk." These ten reflections encompass a full range of mental and physical experience.

A monk should always reflect: "I look different." "My life is dependent on others." "I should maintain a different deportment." "Don't I censure my own mental conduct?" "Don't wise people who know me censure [faults in] ascetic practice?" "I will be separated from everything dear to me." "I am my own karma, an heir to karma, a source of karma, bound up with karma, a receptacle for karma. I inherit the karma I do." "How do I occupy myself, day and night?" "Do I delight in an empty place?" "Do I have extraordinary qualities? Am I distinguished by proper knowledge and vision? At death, questioned by ascetics, will I be flustered [by questions about my attainments]?"

The ten elements on which the monk is to reflect focus attention on several different but closely related aspects of monastic life: the physically distinctive appearance of a monk which identifies him as someone who has crossed a threshold from lay life, the external conduct of a monk and the monk's internal, psychological, development. The monk is asked to monitor his own behavior and to remain aware of collective opinion: the ten elements combined present a picture of ideal personal discipline within the monastic community. The monk's life is identified as at once markedly different from ("I look different. I should maintain a different deportment.") and intimately bound to ("My life is dependent on others.") a community of lay men and women.

The (*Karaṇīya*)*metta Sutta* from the *Khuddakapathā* (Khp.9) is a sermon reported to have been preached by the Buddha in order to protect monks meditating in the forest from disturbances by angry tree deities. While the second portion of the *sutta* provides a detailed account of *mettā bhavanā*, the Buddha's protective prescription for meditating

monks, the first portion describes the characteristics which are desirable for a monk on the path to *nibbāna*.

What should be done by one skilled in his own development who understands the peaceful foundation [of *nibbāna*] is this:

He should be able, upright, very resolute, gentle, of sweet speech and without pride,

content and easy to support, with few cares and few needs, wise and with calmed faculties, not bold, not attached to families,

and without an inferior act with regard to proper conduct because of which the wise should censure him.

These lines of the *sutta* present a picture of ideal behavior in which physical, verbal and mental conduct are careful and skilled. The *sutta* refers to physical actions such as modesty and the absence of acts which deserve censure. Verbal conduct – such as sweet speech – and mental conduct – resolution, humility, calmed faculties – are also identified as integral parts of progress along the path to *nibbāna*. Many of these aspects of behavior are appropriate to anyone, whether lay or monastic, engaged in Buddhist practice. However, the *sutta* also highlights aspects of conduct specifically appropriate to the monastic life: the monk, dependent on others for daily requirements, should be content and easily supported, with few cares and modest needs. Moreover the monk should not be bold or aggressive in his dealings with others, nor attached to the families which provide him sustenance.

The aspects of conduct presented by the *Anumāna*, *Dasadhamma* and the (*Karaṇīya*)*metta Suttas* made them a natural point of reference in the inculcation of monastic discipline. With their narrative dialogue and vivid imagery these *suttas* provide depictions of proper monastic life which are at once striking and accessible to study and recollection.

Three Suttas Plus Pāli Commentary in the Practical Canon of the 12-13th Centuries

The *katikāvatas* do not provide definitive evidence that monastic students in the 12th and 13th centuries were expected to encounter all of these *suttas* with commentaries. A reference in the *Daṃbadeṇi Katikāvata* to the study requirements for freedom from *nissaya* (RATNAPALA 1971: 51) indicates that such students were expected to know the required texts along with their *ṭikā* (which RATNAPALA takes to mean *aṭṭhakathā* and *ṭikā* (1971: 203)), but this may not have been expected at earlier stages of study.

In the case of the *Dasadhamma* and (*Karanīya*)*metta Suttas*, however, we have more reason to believe that even monastic students at an early stage in their careers studied *sutta* and commentary together. This is because these *suttas* are part of the *paritta* collection which became the object of detailed commentary in the thirteenth century. The first commentary on the *paritta* collection as a unit, *Sāratthasamuccaya*, was composed¹⁸ at roughly the same time as the *Daṃbadeṇi Katikāvata*. That *katikāvata* included the first explicit *katikāvata* references to study of the *paritta* collection. This suggests that the *paritta* collection entered educational practice in a more systematic way at that time and that at least some monastic students studied the *Dasadhamma* and (*Karanīya*)*metta Suttas* in tandem with their Pāli commentaries.

There is thus a strong possibility that the practical canon of the 12th-13th centuries included not only the *Dasadhamma* and (*Karanīya*)*metta Suttas* but also their Pāli commentaries. The attempt to understand how monks were disciplined during this time requires, then, that we look carefully at the ways in which the presence of commentarial elaborations may have altered the ways in which monks were taught about monastic norms. Below I offer a close reading of certain commentarial passages in order to show that study of these *suttas* along with their commentaries would have transformed these *suttas* into even more detailed and evocative presentations of monastic discipline, appropriate to even a beginner or to a recalcitrant monk.

It is important to keep in mind, however, that the impact of commentarial content on the student's learning experience was likely determined in part by the way in which the commentary was made available. When, as with the *Dasadhamma* and (*Karanīya*)*metta Suttas*, a commentary was included in the same anthology as the full Pāli *sutta* itself (as in *Sāratthasamuccaya*), and a reader could move easily between the *sutta*'s narrative and commentarial elaboration, commentarial content probably had a strong impact on the student's experience. If, however, as was more likely the case with the *Anumāna Sutta*, the student worked from separate manuscripts to study the full *sutta* and its commentary, it is possible that commentarial elaborations shaped monastic ideas of discipline much less because the movement between sources and the presence of only fragmentary *sutta* quotations in the commentary would have

18. Probably by a student of the monastic leader Vanaratana Ānanda (SANNASGALA 1964: 407).

weakened the association between any section of the *sutta* and its comment.

The commentary provided for the *Anumāna Sutta* in *Papañcasūdanī* elaborates several phrases from the *sutta* in ways which provide a more vivid depiction of the monastic institutional life to which the *sutta* responds and which deepen the connections between the *sutta*'s contents and meditative practice. The comment on the phrase “*apadakkhinaggāhī anusāsanim,*” for instance, proceeds:

someone who says, “Why do you talk to me? I know [the difference between what is] profitable and unprofitable, faulty and without fault, and proper and improper for oneself!” – this person doesn't respond to instruction appropriately; he responds inappropriately; therefore it says “*apadakkhinaggāhī*” (66).

The commentary goes on to introduce a gradual perspective on what it means to destroy unskillful characteristics, indicating the relevance of the *sutta* to a monk at any stage along the path (67). Significantly, the commentary adds the following conclusion:

The Elders called this very *sutta* the bhikkhu *Pāṭimokkha*. It should be reflected upon three times a day. In the morning, one sitting down in their own residence should reflect: “I possess these defilements [or] not.” If he sees that they exist, he should try to destroy them; if he doesn't see them he should be happy, [thinking] “I am someone who has renounced well.” Sitting down day or night after the meal this should be reflected upon. In the evening, sitting in one's own residence, it should be reflected upon. If not three times [a day] then it should be reflected upon twice. If not twice it should definitely be reflected upon once. They say: “it should not go unreflected.” (67).

Recall that one of the Buddha's admonitions to monks in the *Dasadhamma Sutta* asked them to reflect on the distinctiveness of their appearance. This admonition, already a spur to reflection on the significant differences between lay and monastic life, is extended by lines of Pāli commentary into an epitome of renunciation: “‘*vevaṇṇiyam*’ – that state of alteration of appearance, that state of unattractiveness, is a two-fold alteration of appearance: alteration of the appearance of the body and alteration of the appearance of the requisites” (SD: 23).¹⁹ The commentary explains that a monk has altered the appearance of his body by shaving, and that he has altered the appearance of his requisites by

19. I cite Pāli commentary for the *Dasadhamma* and (*Karanīya*)*metta Suttas* as it appears in *Sārāthadīpanī*, the 18th century bilingual commentary on the *catubhānavāra* discussed on page 22 and following.

giving up the comforts of lay life.²⁰ After enumerating these changes the commentary concludes, “pride and anger are abandoned by someone who reflects in this way” (SD: 23).

By linking a change in external appearance to mental refinement through the abandonment of psychological states like pride and anger, the commentary emphasizes that the distinctiveness extends from outward appearance to internal dispositions. Adopting a new appearance is only the first step, one intended to remind the monk of *why* he has renounced, i.e. to make more efficient progress along the path.

In the same *sutta*, the Pāli commentary on the reflection, “I should maintain a different deportment,” paints another evocative picture of the physical and psychological landscape to be traversed by a monk.

It should be reflected: “‘I should maintain a different deportment;’ this is walking conduct without a playful manner (stretching the neck and puffing out the chest like a householder). Thus a different conduct should be followed by me. Living with restrained walking, pleasantly, like a cart of water on uneven ground, looking ahead only a short distance, I should go about with a calm mind and calm faculties” (SD: 25).

Here a passage from the *Dasadhamma Sutta* becomes a guide for the most basic of daily activities – walking. The monks is reminded that he is expected not to play or flaunt his figure but, instead, to engage in quiet and careful contemplation.

Descriptions of monastic practice provided by the commentary extend to the details of collective ritual and education. Extending the reflection, “How do I occupy myself day and night?,” the Pāli commentary says: “[this] means for me the performance of practice and duties, or if not doing that then discussing the words of the Buddha, or if not doing that then concentrating the mind (SD: 27).” It is important to note that the commentarial additions often engage the reader/listener directly, with phrases like “[this] means for me,” “it should be understood” or “it should be reflected.” Thus, the interactive style of the *sutta* becomes

20. “Here, alteration of the appearance of the body means shaving [one’s] hair and beard. Previously, one dressed in various fine and pleasing clothes, ate different kinds of excellent tasty food in dishes of gold and silver, lay on beds in fine bedrooms, and used ghee, butter and so on as medicine. But after the time of renunciation clothes cut from old robes should be worn, and one should eat the mixed food provided by donors in iron and clay bowls. One should lie down on grass mats using the base of trees as seats and beds, or one should lie down on mats made of skin, and take medicine like cows’ urine. Thus, it is in this way that an alteration in the appearance of the requisites should be understood” (SD: 23).

even more forceful. As the commentary prods and interrogates the student the ideal acts and attitudes of day-to-day monastic life increasingly become a part of the student's reading and listening experience.

Pāli commentarial elaborations on the (*Karaṇīya*)*metta Sutta* also transform the *sutta*'s brief comments on monastic practice into a detailed depiction of ideal monastic discipline. Recall verse one of the *sutta*: "What should be done by one skilled in his own development who understands the peaceful foundation [of *nibbāna*] is this." The Pāli commentary on this verse begins with a limited explanation of each word, and an analysis of certain grammatical relationships. Then the commentary breaks into a detailed discussion of what should be done (*karaṇīyam*) and what should not be done. I quote this section of the Pāli commentary at length to show the detail with which the commentator describes desirable and undesirable action. Note that while the canonical Pāli verse speaks only of "what should be done," the commentary insistently emphasizes the negative actions which are to be avoided.

Here are the two trainings briefly: that which should be done with respect to the aim of development and that which should not be done with respect to the aim of development. That which should not be done includes failure with regard to *sīla*, failure with regard to philosophical views, failure with regard to morality and failure with regard to livelihood. By this is meant skill with respect to the aim of development. Here, someone who has gone forth in this *sāsana* and doesn't properly apply himself is called someone with broken *sīla*. He lives involved with the twenty-one-fold impropriety: [accepting] gifts of bamboo, leaves, flowers, fruits, toothpicks, mouth water, bath water, powder... [engaging in] flattery... acting as a messenger... recycling alms, [practicing] physiognomy and astrology, predicting auspicious sites, and acting in six-fold wrong conduct: having contact with courtesans, spinsters, young girls, nuns, eunuchs and taverns. And, living in contact with kings and royal ministers, with [non-Buddhist] teachers and [their] followers, having improper conduct with lay people who are without faith and happiness...who desire what's not worthwhile... or with such monks... and nuns....

But who, in this *sāsana*, renounces and applies himself abandoning impropriety, and wants to set himself up in the four pure *sīla* – using requisites with wisdom, purity of livelihood directed by energy, restraint of the faculties directed by mindfulness and restraint in the *Pāṭimokkha* directed by faith – this is someone who is skilled with respect to development... (SD: 59).

Here the commentary transforms a relatively enigmatic verse into a detailed account of proper and improper monastic life. In this section of the commentary impropriety is vividly depicted in connection with some of the most basic aspects of monastic life: accepting alms and interacting with lay people. The commentary then moves back to the positive pole,

describing the way in which a monk acts when he abandons improper conduct. The relatively straightforward list of desirable behaviors – the four pure *sīla* – merges into an evocative set of similes for a monk of pure conduct. These similes underscore the interdependent relationship between *sīla* and *paññā*, two aspects of practice which must be developed by a monk on the path to *nibbāna*.²¹

The Pāli commentary's thorough elaboration of the *sutta* continues in its treatment of verses two and three. See, for instance, the comment on the quality of being "upright" mentioned in verse two. The three aspects of conduct – physical, verbal and mental – which must be monitored by a monk seeking to refine himself are here connected to monastic practice through a discussion of three-fold "crookedness."

And for someone who is upright, not becoming self-satisfied with his own upright nature, he should be upright by acting well and by acting without laxity over and over again, as long as he lives. Or he [should be] upright by not deceiving [anyone], upright through honesty, or upright by destroying crookedness of body and speech, upright by destroying mental crookedness. Or upright by not pretending to have qualities which don't really exist, upright by not accepting gain because of such [really] nonexistent qualities... (SD: 60).

The commentary offers a realistic psychological portrayal of monastic life, stressing the challenges posed by a continued life of discipline and the temptation to seek benefits and status on account of one's superficial accomplishments.

This portion of the commentary draws attention to the individual psychological dimensions of monastic life. In contrast, the commentary on the phrase "of sweet speech" (also found in verse two of the *sutta*) highlights the collective and hierarchical practice of monasticism in ways reminiscent of the *Anumāna Sutta*. This is accomplished through an elaborate portrayal of a monk reprimanded by another member of the *saṅgha*. The commentary spells out the conduct characteristic of one with "sweet speech" with explicit references to the monastic context, focusing on the improper temptation to turn away from censure.

21. "Or, as it is said 'just as someone purifies a stained cloth with salt water, a mirror with ashes, gold with a furnace; so one spurs on *sīla* with knowledge,' one purifies *sīla* if one washes with the water of wisdom. Like a blue jay protecting [her] egg, a yak [its] tail, a woman her dear and only son, a one-eyed person that eye, thus one zealously guards one's collected *sīla*. Watching [that person] night and day one sees not even a minute fault. This is also someone skilled with respect to development" (SD: 59).

A person who responds to the admonition “this shouldn’t be done” by saying: “What have you seen? What have you heard? Who speaks of me?...” or who causes the [other person] discomfort by being silent, or who accepts the admonition but doesn’t follow it, is a long way from special attainments. But he who, when admonished, says “It is good, sir. It is well said. My fault is really difficult for [me] to see. Seeing me in a similar state again, advise me soon out of compassion. Your admonishment has been accepted.” ... is not at all far from special attainment (SD: 61-62).

Further commentary to this *sutta* offers guidance on another aspect of the monastic life, namely correct relations between monks and lay donors. The comment on the quality of being “easy to support,” from verse three, is a vivid and humorous depiction of lay-monastic dealings. Here the commentary explains, in no uncertain terms, that a monk must be modest in the demands placed on lay donors.

[This] means [one] is easily supported, it is said that [such a] one is easily cared for. A monk who fills his bowl with rice, meat, etc. while acting depressed and wearing a sad face because of what’s been given, and who blames the donors “Why has this been given as alms? Give it to the novices and the laity!” – that’s someone who’s a real burden! Seeing that, people far and wide shun [him] saying “A burdensome monk can’t be supported.” That monk who happily receives alms whether great or small, with a pleased face – that is someone who’s a slight burden. Seeing that, people are exceedingly faithful, agreeing “Our Sir is a slight burden; he is pleased with just a trifle. We will care for him indeed.” And they do so (SD: 62).

Note the way the commentator makes it clear that lay support is a resource which must not be squandered by poor conduct. Demanding too much of one’s patron is described as a certain way to lose lay support.

From this discussion of the *Anumāna*, *Dasadhamma* and (*Karanīya*) *metta Suttas*, it should be clear that Pāli commentarial responses to these texts significantly enhanced the potential of the *suttas* to serve as guiding sources when teaching monks about monastic discipline. In their uncommented form these *suttas* already served as important loci for normative visions of the monastic life. They were enriched by Pali commentary to serve as vivid depictions of an appropriately disciplined monasticism, and of the frailties and improprieties which so easily impede it. The practical canon of the 12-13th centuries included these texts as disciplinary works to be used in monastic education.

Three Suttas Plus Bilingual Commentary in the Practical Canon of the 18th Century

In the eighteenth century, new developments in Sri Lankan Buddhist textual practice framed these *suttas*, and many others, with a new layer of commentary, altering the contents of the practical canon. This change in commentarial practice in turn reshaped the potential impact of texts like the *Dasadhamma* and (*Karanīya*)*metta Suttas* on monastic students. Eighteenth-century Sri Lanka saw a renaissance in the production of Sinhala-language commentaries – called *sūtra sannayas* – on canonical Pāli *suttas*. The first of these new commentaries to be written took up the Pāli *paritta* collection, and therefore included the *Dasadhamma* and (*Karanīya*)*metta Suttas*. This commentary was written by a monastic leader named Vālivīṭṭa Saraṇaṃkara who initiated the formation of the Siyam Nikāya, one of the monastic orders in contemporary Sri Lanka. This commentary, called *Sārāṛthadīpanī*, was written as a bilingual commentary. Taking canonical Pāli *suttas* as the root texts, Saraṇaṃkara drew also on previous Pāli commentarial traditions to create his work.²² In *Sārāṛthadīpanī*, Saraṇaṃkara reproduced the canonical Pāli texts from the *catubhāṇavāra*, section by section, providing a brief Sinhala gloss for each word or phrase. In addition, he added narrative detail to nearly every section of the *sutta* in question. In some cases this detail, which uses Pāli *and* Sinhala, was added within the briefer glossing; more often it followed the initial brief gloss for the section under comment. Such elaborations were typically presented first in Sinhala. In some cases this Sinhala comment clearly drew on previous Pāli commentarial writings, often presenting a slightly enlarged or more elaborate version of this Pāli commentary. From there, Saraṇaṃkara's commentary sometimes introduced portions of the Pāli commentary directly. When this occurred it created an element of commentarial repetition. *Sārāṛthadīpanī*'s readers and listeners therefore encountered *suttas* like the *Dasadhamma* and (*Karanīya*)*metta Suttas* through three textual

22. It is not completely clear whether Saraṇaṃkara relied only upon the thirteenth-century *Sāratthasamuccaya* or also on portions of fifth-century Pāli commentary for the separate nikāyas. However, close similarities between *Sāratthasamuccaya* and *Sārāṛthadīpanī* in the contents of the sections which connect *suttas* within the *paritta* collection, as well as Saraṇaṃkara's introductory reference to a previous commentary on the *catubhāṇavāra*, suggest that Saraṇaṃkara drew substantially on *Sāratthasamuccaya* in his composition of *Sārāṛthadīpanī*.

voices: canonical *sutta*, Pāli comment, and Sinhala comment based partly on Pāli comment. The dominant commentarial voice in *Sārārthadīpanī* is clearly Saraṇaṃkara's Sinhala-language commentarial voice. It is this voice which most clearly articulates the unity of the work as an anthology, creating interpretive links between *suttas* and between the Sinhala and Pāli commentarial voices on these *suttas*.

Since Saraṇaṃkara led a reorganization of Buddhist monastic institutions and established a new curriculum in which his own works played a role (BLACKBURN 1997), it is very likely that many 18th-century monastics studied the *Dasadhamma* and (*Karaṇīya*)*metta Suttas* with this bilingual commentarial guide. We do not yet have evidence of bilingual commentary for the *Anumāna Sutta*, though of course much Sri Lankan manuscript evidence remains unexamined. There are no references to a *sūtra sannaya* for this *sutta* in K. D. SOMADASA's catalogue for the British Library's Nevill Collection (1995), or in his catalogue of temple manuscript collections (1959/1964). The bilingual character of *Sārārthadīpanī* poses further questions as we attempt to understand the guides to monastic discipline present in the practical canon of 18th-century Sri Lanka. How might the bilingual presentation of the *Dasadhamma* and (*Karaṇīya*)*metta Suttas* have altered the ways in which monastic readers and listeners encountered them?²³

Composition of bilingual commentary for *suttas* such as the *Dasadhamma* and (*Karaṇīya*)*metta Suttas* altered the ways in which these *suttas* could be used in monastic training. This occurred in two ways. First, through detailed and systematic translations of *suttas* and Pāli commentary, bilingual commentaries gave students access to the descriptions of monastic discipline found in Pāli sources. Monastic students who read the *suttas* with the help of bilingual commentary encountered models of monastic life taken from Pāli texts at the same time as they unraveled Pāli grammatical structures and enlarged their Pāli vocabulary. Second, the combination of Pāli *sutta* and Pāli commentary framed and elaborated by Sinhala commentary often created an intensely repeti-

23. K. D. SOMADASA's list of manuscripts held in Sri Lankan temple collections (1959/1964) shows that a substantial number of single *suttas*, as well as collections of *paritta* texts, circulated with Sinhala commentary. In addition selections from the *paritta* corpus are likely to have been included, possibly with some type of commentary, in many of the popular *baṇa daham pot* used to train novice monks. We do not yet have detailed studies of *baṇa daham pot* to confirm this. I do not discuss uses of Sinhala-only commentary in this study.

tive exposure to images of monastic discipline for students whose skill in Pāli and literary Sinhala was great enough to assure a fluid movement through the bilingual text.

This last point is particularly important in our attempt to understand how bilingual commentary on the (*Karaṇīya*)*metta* and *Dasadhamma Suttas* altered their didactic possibilities. We see most clearly the repetitive power of bilingual commentary in longer commentarial sections such as the one reproduced just below. This section comes from *Sārārthadīpanī*'s commentary on the first lines of the (*Karaṇīya*)*metta Sutta* (a longer section is included in the Appendix). The Sinhala commentary remains in plain text while the Pāli commentary is italicized.

In this regard, someone going forth in the *sāsana* wants to establish himself in pure *sīla*, leaving aside the twenty-one inappropriate actions, such as giving gifts which have been censured by the Buddha. [The four pure *sīla* are listed and described]... Further, a person who purifies [himself] having cleaned the stains of *sīla* with the water of wisdom is said to be someone who purifies *sīla* because of proper wisdom in this way: as one purifies gold by burning because of [bringing it] near a flame, or purifies clothes with water and ash which is said to be acidic, and who protects his own *sīla* very zealously like an insect protecting its egg, like an animal protecting its grass, like a mother protecting her only son, like someone protecting his sole eye; he reflects day and night and does not show even a small fault. This is someone who is skilled with respect to aims. Further, someone who has established *sīla* which is not scattered, who understands the means of discarding the *kleśas*, and who produces meditative attainment; that is considered someone skilled with respect to aims. Someone, having come out of that attainment and reaching arahatship after becoming concentrated by [reflecting] on the impermanence of the elements; that person is the chief of those who develop themselves. Such renunciators, because of establishing unscattered *sīla*, who have been praised because [they have] accepted the route to the destruction of the *kleśas* to that extent, they are also skilled with respect to aims. Here, in order to show what's intended, such as [that] they are clever with respect to development, with respect to increasing [their attainment] or [that] they are skilled with respect to aims,

[... a similar section of Pāli commentary is then introduced which concludes with what follows here]

But who, in this sāsana, renounces and applies himself, abandons impropriety, desiring to be established in the four pure sīla [which are listed and elaborated in the same terms as the comment above in Sinhala]... This is someone skilled with respect to aims. Or, saying, "just as someone purifies a stained cloth with salt water, a mirror with ashes, gold with a furnace, so one spurs sīla with knowledge," one purifies sīla if one washes with the water of wisdom. Like a blue jay protecting her egg, a yak its tail, a woman with a single son her dear and only son, a one-eyed person that eye; thus one zealously guards one's collected elements of sīla. Watching day and night one sees not even a minute fault. That is also someone skilled with respect to aims.

Moreover, one who grasps the way to removing the support of the defilements through the focused attention to sīla, grasps that which is a preparation for meditation, and produces meditative attainments; this is also someone skilled with respect to aims. Further, one who comes out from an attainment and again comes into contact with [other] activities and reaches arahatship; that is the pinnacle of those skilled with respect to aims. Thus, these [people] – praised because they pay attention to these restraints, focused on sīla to this extent, and able to understand to this extent the way to remove the support of the defilements – are skilled with respect to aims. They are meant as “skilled with respect to aims” in this sense (SD: 57-9).

Note that the commentary in Pāli and Sinhala is nearly identical, and that this provides double exposure to the similes. These similes emphasize that a monk’s constant attention to the purification of *sīla* through wisdom establishes him as “someone who is “skilled with respect to aims.” In addition, the bilingual commentary insists that practitioners at several levels of development can be considered “skilled with respect to aims.” The beginner who guards his *sīla* carefully is described through the similes. Someone who has achieved greater command over conduct, understands the way to eradicate the defilements and who achieves some meditative attainments is also lauded. Finally, the monk who moves from temporary meditative attainments to arahatship is described as “the chief of those who develop themselves.” Commented upon in this way the (*Karaṇīya*)*metta Sutta* provides a comprehensive and emphatic account of the goals and strategies of monastic practice, linking the distinctive *sīla* of monastic life to the cultivation of wisdom and meditation. It is important to note the power of the similes in suggesting the psychological intensity with which a monk must guard his *sīla*, a precious resource on the path to liberation.

Conclusion

I have suggested a new set of concepts for the study of Theravāda Buddhism: the ‘formal’ canon and the ‘practical’ canon. By formal canon I mean the Pāli canon as the ultimate locus of interpretive authority in the Theravāda. Practical canon refers to the collection of texts used in a particular time and place. The practical canon may include portions of the *tipitaka* with their commentaries as well as texts understood by their authors and audience as consistent with, but perhaps not explicitly related to, the *tipitaka* and its commentaries.

The essay argued that distinguishing between the formal and the practical canon will allow us to attend more closely to regional and historical

differences in studies of Theravādin communities. Providing greater precision as we explore the ways in which Buddhist identity was, and is, shaped by encounters with texts, the distinction between the practical and formal canon also provides a framework within which to seek historical reasons for the patterns of textual composition apparent in the practical canons. Finally, this distinction between two types of canon in studies of the Theravāda offers a way to look more closely at how textual authority is articulated and used by Buddhist communities whose practical canons may differ in significant ways.

The remainder of the essay applied these two views of canon to the study of monastic disciplinary education in medieval Sri Lanka. I showed that although there is no displacement of the *Vinaya* as part of the formal canon, it is clear the *Vinaya* was far less important than we have assumed in the Sri Lankan practical canons of 12-13th and 18th centuries. Until reaching the highest stage in their education monks were not expected to engage much of the *Vinaya* directly. Instead monks studied condensations and commentaries written for parts of the *Vinaya* that were often written in Sinhala rather than in Pāli. Nor were *Vinaya*-based texts the primary means through which monks were taught about disciplined conduct and the collective responsibilities of the saṃgha. Three *suttas* – the *Anumāna*, *Dasadhamma* and (*Karaṇīya*)*metta Suttas* – were used for this purpose.

I have argued that these *suttas* were used precisely because they provided vivid and engaging accounts of proper and improper conduct. Moreover, the power of these *suttas* as didactic tools was greatly enhanced by the commentaries – in Pāli and Sinhala – which often accompanied them. These commentaries include elaborate depictions of appropriate and inappropriate behaviors. In such depictions similes as well as simple descriptive prose is used to show the importance of simultaneously cultivating control over mental, verbal and physical comportment. The commentaries also emphasize the responsibilities of monks within the saṃgha and, especially, the ways in which a monk should acquiesce to reprimand by others.

It is no accident that these *suttas* and their commentaries were an important part of the practical canon in Sri Lanka during the 12-13th and the 18th centuries. We know from the *katikāvatas* themselves as well as from other literary and epigraphic sources that these were periods in which the Sri Lankan monastic community was restructured under authorities who sought to regulate the standards of monastic

conduct and to establish a new power structure for the saṃgha.²⁴ In such moments of heightened attention to the distinctive qualities of monastic life and the need to instill discipline, the *suttas* examined above became important didactic tools. These texts provided depictions of desirable and undesirable conduct in which complex ideas about the relationship between mental development and outward action, as well as about a monk's responsibilities to the collective, were set out in accessible and often humorous terms.

Appendix

Example of repetitive exposure to images of monastic discipline provided by *Sārāṛthadīpanī*'s bilingual commentary on the (*Karaṇīya*) *metta Sutta* (the Pāli commentary is italicized and the Sinhala commentary remains in plain text):

“Santapadaṃ,” for the foundation of nirvāṇa which is called the peaceful foundation; “abhisamecca,” having arrived at (by investigation); “yaṃkaraṇīyaṃ,” that which should be done (by one who wants to live in this way); “atthakusalena,” with cleverness regarding what should be developed (for oneself); “taṃkaraṇīyaṃ,” that which should be done.

Here, where it says “that which should be done,” it includes what should be done and what shouldn't be done. In brief, the three-fold training is to be done. The destruction of *sīla*, the destruction of right views, the destruction of [good] conduct and livelihood, etc. should not be done. Similarly, where it says, “by one who is skilled with respect to what should be done for the development of oneself,” it means [both] a person who is not clever with respect to what is done for the development of oneself and a person who is clever with respect to self development. Here, if a person doesn't engage himself in the conduct of the *sāsana* properly, going forth in this *sāsana*, he is someone with broken *sīla* and he lives with the twenty-one inappropriate acts. [The acts are listed; see above, p.17-18, for an abridged account.]... A monk of that sort, because he is engaged in so much activity which is harmful to himself, should be understood as someone skilled in what is useless.

In this regard, someone going forth in the *sāsana* wants to establish himself in the pure *sīla*, leaving aside the twenty-one inappropriate actions, such as giving gifts, which have been censured by the Buddha. [The four pure *sīla* are listed and described.]... Further, a person who purifies [himself] having cleaned the stains of *sīla* with the water of wisdom is said to be someone who purifies *sīla* because of proper wisdom in this way: as one purifies gold by burning because of [bringing it] near a flame, or purifies clothes with water and ash which is said to be acidic, and who protects his own *sīla* very zealously like an insect protecting

24. In this regard see, for instance: BLACKBURN 1996, DEWARAJA 1988, GUNAWARDHANA 1979, RATNAPALA 1971 and SANNASGALA 1964.

its egg, like an animal protecting its grass, like a mother protecting her only son, like someone protecting his sole eye; he reflects day and night and does not show even a small fault. This is someone who is skilled with respect to aims. Further, someone who has established *sīla* which is not scattered, who understands the means of discarding the *kleśas*, and who produces a meditative attainment; that is considered someone skilled with respect to aims. Someone, having come out of that attainment and reaching arahatship after becoming concentrated by [reflecting] on the impermanence of the elements; that person is the chief of those who develop themselves. Such renunciators, because of establishing unscattered *sīla*, who have been praised because [they have] accepted the route to the destruction of the *kleśas* to that extent, they are also skilled with respect to aims. Here, in order to show what's intended, such as [that] they are clever with respect to development, with respect to increasing [their attainment] or [that] they are skilled with respect to aims,

*There, this is the word explanation for the first verse, which says "karaṇīya-matthakusalena." "Karaṇīyaṃ" means "to be done" or "worth doing." "Attho" means "attho." This is the word explanation. It is said that "attho" is said because it brings all that which is a benefit for oneself. Because it brings [that] it should be approached. It is said that "atthakusalena" means through skill with respect to aims. "Yaṃ" is an indefinite derivative. "Taṃ" is a definite one. Both "yaṃ" and "taṃ" are accusative derivative words. "Santamaṃ padamaṃ" is accusative speech. There, "santamaṃ" refers to its character and "padamaṃ" is because it should be attained. It is an expression for nibbāna. ["abhisamecca" is omitted in this version but followed by its gloss] means "having understood." [Word commentary on the second verse follows before the first verse is elaborated further.] ... Here are the two trainings, briefly: that which should be done with respect to aims and that which should not be done with respect to aims. That which should not be done includes failure with regard to *sīla*, failure with regard to views, failure with regard to conduct, failure with regard to livelihood. This refers to skill with respect to aims. Here, someone who, goes forth in this *sāsana* but doesn't properly apply himself is called someone with broken *sīla*. He lives depending on the twenty-one-fold impropriety, that is: [as above, p. 17-8]... This sort of company is not skilled with respect to aims.*

*But who, in this *sāsana*, renounces and applies himself, abandons impropriety, desiring to be established in the four pure *sīla* [which are listed and elaborated in the same terms as the comment above in Sinhala]... This is someone skilled with respect to aims. Or, saying, "just as someone purifies a stained cloth with salt water, a mirror with ashes, gold with a furnace, so one spurs *sīla* with knowledge," one purifies *sīla* if one washes with the water of wisdom. Like a blue jay protecting her egg, a yak its tail, a woman with a single son her dear and only son, a one-eyed person that eye; thus one zealously guards one's collected elements of *sīla*. Watching day and night one sees not even a minute fault. That is also someone skilled with respect to aims.*

*Moreover, one who grasps the way to removing the support of the defilements through the focused attention to *sīla*, grasps that which is a preparation for*

meditation, and produces meditative attainments; this is also someone skilled with respect to aims. Further, one who comes out from an attainment and again comes into contact with [other] activities and reaches arahatship; that is the pinnacle of those skilled with respect to aims. Thus, these [people] – praised because they pay attention to these restraints, focused on *sīla* to this extent, and able to understand to this extent the way to remove the support of the defilements – are skilled with respect to aims. They are meant as “skilled with respect to aims” in this sense (SD: 57-9).

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DONALD K. SWEARER

The Bangkok Conference on Buddhist Studies

An international conference on the state of the field of Buddhist studies during the past twenty-five years was held at Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand, from December 16-18, 1997. The Center was founded in 1992 with the purpose of stimulating research in various aspects of Buddhism – textual, doctrinal, and empirical. To promote these goals both nationally and internationally the Center publishes a journal, *Phutasāsanasu'ksā* (Buddhist Studies), offers lecture series in both English and Thai, and has been instrumental in founding an M.A. in Buddhist Studies at Chulalongkorn University open to international and Thai students.

The conference was organized by Dr. Wit Wisadavet, Director of the University's Center for Buddhist Studies. Eleven countries were represented – Canada, England, France, Germany, India, Japan, Korea, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and the United States. Conference papers were presented by Bruce Matthews, Acadia University; Richard Gombrich, Oxford University; Louis Gabaude, École Française d'Extrême-Orient; Eli Franco, Hamburg University; Sanghasena Singh, University of Delhi; Kiyotaka Kimura, Tokyo University; Jae-ryong Shim, Seoul National University; Than Thun, Yangon University; Asanga Tilakaratne, Post-Graduate Institute of Pali and Buddhist Studies; Somparn Promta, Chulalongkorn University; and Frank E. Reynolds, University of Chicago. Yijie Tang, Beijing University, who prepared a conference paper, was unable to attend. Although the conference had broad international representation, greater attention was given to Indic, Theravāda, South and Southeast Asian Buddhist traditions with particular attention to textual studies as stipulated in the conference guidelines. While scholars from some countries, for example, Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria, were not represented at the conference, Buddhist studies in these countries were included in the papers prepared by Gabaude and Franco. For various circumstantial reasons, several nations, notably Australia, New Zealand, Italy, and Russia, were absent. For this reason the forthcoming volume of conference proceedings

represents a selective rather than an inclusive review of the state of Buddhist studies internationally.

Each conference paper included substantial information regarding the state of Buddhist studies in that country. The Center will publish the proceedings in Thailand, and plans are underway to establish a web site where they will also be made available. Collectively the papers constitute an important body of bibliographic and descriptive information. They also reveal substantive disagreement regarding the nature and method of Buddhist studies among different countries. Three different approaches to the study of Buddhism defined the conference debates: (1) the study of Buddhism as an empirical, objective, critical, scientific field of inquiry grounded in the texts, languages, and traditions of a particular, historical field of study, especially the history of ideas; (2) Buddhist studies as an examination of Buddhist texts and traditions by adherents of the tradition or scholars who approach the study of Buddhism primarily from the perspective of its normative truth claims; (3) Buddhist studies as a dynamic, methodologically eclectic, and context-sensitive field that includes descriptive, analytical, and comparative approaches to a broad range of subjects including texts and rituals and with increasing attention being given to the non-elite or popular lived/living tradition. The conference presentations and discussions demonstrated that the differences among these approaches are not absolute and frequently intersect both within and among particular countries. To the degree that each of these orientations to the study of Buddhism was represented by the conference presentations, the first is most closely identified with the academic traditions of England and Germany, the second with the Buddhist countries of Asia, and the third with the United States and Canada. The French speaking world has had a strong tradition of historical and textual studies and the work of Paul Mus, in particular, has had a strong influence on the Chicago school of the history of religions. It should be emphasized that these distinctions are fluid and imprecise, for example, Japan and Sri Lanka have adopted the European and British tradition of Buddhist studies, thereby problematizing any facile characterization of the study of Buddhism either in general or within a particular country. Obviously, like any field of inquiry, Buddhist Studies is not static. It continues to evolve with new historical data as well as the development of new methodologies including the important impact of computer technology. Several of the conferees voiced their deep concern about the increasing threat to historical evidence including both texts and

artifacts, and the negative impact of an increasingly commercialized global ethos on support for Buddhist studies.

The following papers by Eli Franco and Frank E. Reynolds each offer a valuable survey of the development of Buddhist studies over the past twenty-five years in Germany and the United States, respectively. Omitted from Franco's paper is an appended extensive bibliography that will be included in the published volume. Among the many excellent papers that will constitute the conference proceedings, the two included here offer an insight into differing approaches to the field of Buddhist studies debated at the conference.

ELI FRANCO

Buddhist Studies in Germany and Austria 1971-1996*

with a contribution on East Asian Buddhism by Michael Friedrich

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II. BUDDHIST STUDIES IN AUSTRIA

[III. APPENDICES]

* I would like to thank my friends Lore Sander, Burkhard Quessel and Helmut Tauscher for reading the chapters on the Turfan discoveries, Tibetan Buddhism and Buddhist studies in Austria respectively, and my wife Karin Preisendanz for reading the entire manuscript with her usual thoroughness. Their helpful comments have significantly improved this survey in various ways. I would also like to express my gratitude to Prof. Ronald Emmerick for some references to works that were not available to me, to Anne MacDonald for additional information on the NGMPP and for improving my English, to Prof. Donald Swearer for making valuable suggestions on different aspects of the paper, and to Prof. Michael Friedrich for taking precious time from his busy schedule to contribute the section on East Asian Buddhism.

I. BUDDHIST STUDIES IN GERMANY

0. Preliminary remarks

Before beginning with the actual survey I would like to make three preliminary remarks. First, in presenting this survey to you I am aware above all of its shortcomings. Due to the enormous number of publications, scholarly and popular, that deal with Buddhism in one way or another, I did not dare even to aspire to completeness, and I had to apply very rigid criteria as to what to include and what to exclude. The most problematic and arbitrary limitation that I imposed upon myself was to confine this survey, by and large, to books and monographs. I would be the last to dispute that certain scholarly articles are far more important than some books, or that certain books advance our knowledge of Buddhism even less than a mediocre article. Nevertheless, I hope that this necessary limitation will not diminish the general value of this survey. Furthermore, the *Verzeichnis lieferbarer Bücher*, the German equivalent of *Books in Print*, lists some 600 books under the topic of Buddhism. Even when one deletes the translations (most of them from English, almost none from other European languages) from this list and disregards publications prior to 1971, one is still confronted with hundreds of books on Buddhism that were published in Germany in the last 25 years. Obviously, I could not include them all in this survey, and I had to limit myself to what I consider to be the most important publications. Consequently, even though I have tried to be impartial in my evaluations, an element of subjectivity in the choice of books included in and excluded from this survey could not be entirely avoided. To compensate for this inevitable state of affairs, I include as an appendix a bibliographical list, imperfect though it is, of current books in print on Buddhism.

Second, a few words are necessary to define of the scope of this survey. Because the title of this representation was given as "Buddhist Studies in Germany" rather than "in the German language" or "by Germans" the work of German citizens who are working in non-German countries has been excluded from this survey; on the other hand studies authored by non-German citizens who conducted their research in Germany, notably Japanese scholars who completed their Dr. phil. dissertations at German universities, have been included. I must add that it was not possible to investigate the citizenship of every author mentioned here, and it is therefore quite possible that some of the authors who are

referred to in the bibliographical lists are in fact Swiss or Austrian, especially in the case of popular and comparative works that are listed below in the appendix.¹ Let me assure you that such an erroneous inclusion has no political ideology of *Anschluss* behind it.

Third, my perspective has been throughout Indo-centric. This is no doubt partly a reflection of my own interests and of my perception of the role of Indian Buddhist texts as most central to the history of Buddhism, but it also reflects the division of labour within German academic structures. Buddhist studies in Germany are mainly conducted in institutes for Indology, unlike, for instance, North American universities where departments of South Asian studies are rare and more oriented towards contemporary studies, and where most scholars of Buddhism are employed by departments of religious studies. This Indo-centrism, however, is balanced by Michael FRIEDRICH's contribution on East Asian Buddhism.

1. *Generalia*

a. *Bibliographies*

It may be useful to begin with general tools of research such as bibliographies, dictionaries and catalogues. To my knowledge there are five German bibliographies concerned with Buddhist studies. The first one was published in 1916 by Hans Ludwig HELD. It contains 2544 entries, and even though it is clearly out of date it is an indispensable source for the history of Buddhist scholarship.²

Another more recent bibliography by Roland KRETSCHMER dates from 1988, but unfortunately it has only 400 entries and is of rather poor quality.³ For instance, prominent scholars like Lambert SCHMITHAUSEN and Heinz BECHERT are not even mentioned in it.

1. [For reasons of space the appendices to this survey are not reprinted below. They will be published in the proceedings of the conference.]
2. Cf. H. L. HELD: *Deutsche Bibliographie des Buddhismus. Eine Übersicht über deutschsprachliche buddhistische und buddhologische Buchwerke, Abhandlungen, Vorträge, Aufsätze, Erwähnungen, Hinweise und Rezensionen mit ausschliesslicher Berücksichtigung des Buddhismus als Religionswissenschaft.* München/Leipzig 1916.
3. Cf. R. KRETSCHMER: *Bibliographischer Führer durch die Buddhismus-Literatur.* 1. Lieferung: Buddhismus als Philosophie und Religion. Wolfenbüttel 1988.

More useful is GRÖNBOLD's bibliography of the Buddhist canon.⁴ The bibliography is divided into five sections: 1) editions of Buddhist canons; 2) old catalogues of the canon; 3) modern catalogues of the canon; 4) catalogues of the Tibetan Bon canon; 5) secondary literature. The bibliography is especially good for the Tibetan canons, but somewhat limited for the Chinese canon. Peter PFANDT compiled an extensive bibliography of Mahāyāna texts translated into European languages which is quite thorough and very useful.⁵ Of interest is also the bio-bibliography of German Buddhists compiled by Hellmuth HECKER. It contains biographical data of prominent Austrian and German Buddhists such as Georg GRIMM, NYANATILOKA, Lama GOVINDA, Karl NEUMANN, etc., together with lists of their publications and many references to book-reviews of their works.⁶

b. Dictionaries

Two dictionaries concerned with Buddhist texts are currently being compiled in Germany and both are based on the Turfan discoveries (cf. below); the one deals with the Sanskrit manuscripts, the other with those in Uigur. The *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden* was conceived by Ernst WALDSCHMIDT and is being edited by Heinz BECHERT. The pace of publication of this dictionary has been considerably accelerated in recent years, and although only nine fascicles covering lemmata beginning with the vowels and *k* have been published, it is planned to be completed by the year 2010.⁷ The dictionary contains the complete vocabulary and detailed quotations of all the published Turfan texts with the exception of scientific literature (gram-

4. Cf. G. GRÖNBOLD: *Der buddhistische Kanon. Eine Bibliographie*. Wiesbaden 1984.
5. Cf. P. PFANDT: *Mahāyāna Texts translated into Western Languages*. Köln 1986.
6. Cf. H. HECKER: *Lebensbilder deutscher Buddhisten. Ein bio-bibliographisches Handbuch*. Band I: Die Gründer. Band II: Die Nachfolger. Konstanz 1990 [21996], 1992. [The second volume could not be consulted.] On Buddhism in Germany cf. also K.-J. NOTZ: *Der Buddhismus in Deutschland in seinen Selbstdarstellungen: eine religionswissenschaftliche Untersuchung zur religiösen Akkulturationsproblematik*. Frankfurt am Main / New York 1984.
7. Cf. *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden*. Begonnen von Ernst Waldschmidt. Herausgegeben von der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen unter der Leitung von Heinz Bechert. Göttingen 1973-.

mar, metrics, astronomy, medicine), *Mahāyānasūtras*, *kāvya* and drama. It is thus an extremely important tool for the study of the phraseology of Buddhist Sanskrit as used in the canonical texts of the Sarvāstivāda school.⁸ Most of the canonical texts found in Turfan belong to that school. The dictionary is so detailed that, except in the case of extremely common words like *bhagavat* and *bhikṣu* or *atra* and *atha*, it can also be used as a concordance. So far eight fascicles have appeared totaling more than 500 pages.

Klaus Michael RÖHRBORN of the University of Göttingen is engaged in compiling an Uigur-German dictionary of which five fascicles have appeared so far.⁹ The dictionary will be a thesaurus of all published Uigur manuscripts and blockprints. In addition, the fragments of Xuanzang's (Hsüan-tsang's) biography and of the *Maitrisimit* are also being taken into account systematically, as are occasionally fragments of the *Suvarṇaprabhāsaśūtra*. The dictionary contains a very exhaustive bibliography of both primary texts and of secondary literature that deals with Uigur texts. The bibliography is updated in every new fascicle. The importance of Old Turkish literature for the study of Buddhism in Central Asia cannot be overemphasized. Furthermore, the Uigur texts are often unique, that is, they conserve works, or fragments of works, that are not available in other languages of Buddhism, either because they are lost or because Turkish Buddhism went its own way.

In this connection one should also mention the *Critical Pāli Dictionary*. Even though it is published by the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters, I feel justified to mention it here because prominent German scholars have worked as editors-in-chief of this invaluable project, namely, Ludwig ALSDORF and Oskar VON HINÜBER, the latter now serving as co-editor-in-chief together with Ole PIND. One may add that the second volume comprises materials collected by Wilhelm GEIGER. The last instalment of this monumental work was published in 1994 and reached compounds starting with *kambu-*.

8. The texts of the Sarvāstivāda school were completely ignored by EDGERTON in his Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit dictionary and grammar because morphologically their language does not differ from correct classical Sanskrit. Yet in their syntax and style these texts are very close to and reflect the Middle Indic of the original canonical texts from which they were translated.
9. Cf. K. RÖHRBORN: *Uigurisches Wörterbuch. Sprachmaterial der vorislamischen türkischen Texte aus Zentralasien*. Fasc. 1-5 [a-ämgaklik]. Wiesbaden 1977-1994.

Of negligible importance is a Sanskrit-German dictionary by Klaus MYLIUS.¹⁰ It is of rather mediocre quality and hardly ever used. No independent lexicographical work seems to have been done by MYLIUS who merely compiled and translated into German selective entries and materials from other Sanskrit dictionaries.

c. Organs of publication

One of the conspicuous characteristics of scholarly German publications in general and of Buddhological publications in particular is that practically all books are published in series. In some series like "Indica et Tibetica" all publications are relevant to Buddhist studies. In the majority of the series, however, this is not the case.¹¹ The following are the most important series in which Buddhist studies form an essential part:

10. Cf. K. MYLIUS: *Wörterbuch Sanskrit-Deutsch*. Leipzig 1975. This dictionary was reprinted after the German unification and it is now sold, for an exorbitant price, as a Langenscheidt dictionary.
11. Of varying relevance are the following series:
 - Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, philosophisch-historische Klasse*
 - Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien*
 - Asiatische Forschungen*
 - Beiträge zur Zentralasienforschung*
 - Berliner Turfantexte*
 - Frankfurter Chinastudien*
 - Freiburger Beiträge zur Indologie*
 - Göttinger Asiatische Forschungen*
 - Indian Philology and South Asian Studies*
 - Indica et Tibetica*
 - Marburger Studien zur Afrika- und Asienkunde*
 - Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens*
 - Monumenta Serica Monograph Series (Steyler Verlag)*
 - Münchener Ostasiatische Studien*
 - Opera Sinologica*
 - Religionswissenschaft (Peter Lang)*
 - Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden, Beihefte*
 - Schriften des Instituts für Asienkunde Hamburg*
 - Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, philosophisch-historische Klasse, Neue Folge*
 - Studia Tibetica*
 - Studien zur Japanologie*
 - Studies in Oriental Religions*
 - Studia Tibetica, Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften*

- 1) "Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien" (Steiner, 47 volumes): This is one of the oldest Indological series, published by the Institut für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens und Tibets, Universität Hamburg. The Buddhist studies published in this series over the last 25 years are all outstanding dissertations prepared under the guidance of Lambert SCHMITHAUSEN; they deal with Yogācāra, Abhidharma and *pramāṇa* texts.
- 2) "Asiatische Forschungen" (Harrassowitz, 130 volumes): This is a monograph series on the history, culture and languages of the people of East and Central Asia published by the University of Bonn. It contains important studies on Mongolian and Turkic Buddhism and occasionally on Tibetan Buddhism as well.
- 3) "Indica et Tibetica" (30 volumes): This series is published privately by Michael HAHN; it contains much of his own work and that of his students as well as important contributions by scholars such as Johannes SCHNEIDER, Adelheid METTE, J.W. DE JONG, etc.
- 4) "Freiburger Beiträge zur Indologie" (Harrassowitz, 27 volumes): The Buddhist studies in this series deal with Aśoka's rock-edicts, the *Śrāmaṇyaphalasūtra*, *śikṣāsamuccaya*, and the so-called Tibetan book of the dead.
- 5) "Monographien zur indischen Archäologie, Kunst und Philologie" (published by the Stiftung Ernst Waldschmidt; volumes 1-6 by Steiner, later volumes by Dietrich REIMER, Berlin): This series was established in 1979; it contains some reprint volumes of papers by Heinrich LÜDERS, Ernst WALDSCHMIDT and Helmut HOFFMANN as well as the more recent work by Petra KIEFFER-PÜLZ on *sīmā*, Leo BOTH's translation and study of the *Kapīśāvadāna*, and Ute HÜSKEN's study of the monastic rules of the Theravāda nuns.
- 6) "Münchener Ostasiatische Studien" (Steiner, 73 volumes): The Buddhist studies in this series deal with Chinese and Japanese Buddhism.

Veröffentlichungen des Seminars für Indologie und Buddhismuskunde der Universität Göttingen

Veröffentlichungen der Societas Uralo-Altaica

Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland

Vinaya Forschungen / Vinaya research (hrsg.: Studienstiftung für Tibetischen Buddhismus)

- 7) "Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden, Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen" (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 13 volumes): As its name indicates, the series contains editions, translations and studies of Sanskrit texts discovered at Turfan.
- 8) "Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur des alten Orients, Berliner Turfantexte" (Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 19 volumes): This series contains important results of the Turfan-research conducted in the D.D.R. ("East Germany"), notably, several monographs by Peter ZIEME on Uigur Buddhist texts.
- 9) "Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies" (Steiner, 5 volumes): This is a relatively new series published by the Institut für Kultur und Geschichte Indiens und Tibets, Universität Hamburg; it was established in 1989 by David SEYFORTH RUEGG.
- 10) "Veröffentlichungen der Societas Uralo-Altaica" (Harrassowitz, 45 volumes; edited by Wolfgang VEENKER and Klaus RÖHRBORN): Some volumes in this series, mostly by RÖHRBORN himself or edited by him, deal with Turkic Buddhism. Of special interest is a five-volume study of the life and work of Xuanzang in which the Old Turkic translation of his biography is used.
- 11) "Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, Supplementbände" (Steiner, 35 volumes): This series consists of supplementary volumes to the Catalogue of Oriental Manuscripts in Germany. (On the Catalogue itself, cf. below.) Among the volumes published in this important and prestigious series quite a few are relevant to Buddhist studies, notably Lore Sander's work on palæography, Klaus JANERT's study of Aśoka's inscriptions,¹² and Ronald EMMERICK's edition and translation of the medical text *Siddhasāra* by Ravigupta.¹³ Klaus WILLE has studied the manuscript tradition of the *Vinayavastu* of the Mūlasarvāstivāda (cf. below).

12. K.L. JANERT: *Abstände und Schlussvokalverzeichnungen in Aśoka-Inschriften*. 1972 (= vol. 10 in the series).

13. Ronald E. EMMERICK: *The Siddhasāra of Ravigupta*. Vol. 1: The Sanskrit text. Vol. 2: The Tibetan version with facing English translation. 1980-1982 (= vols 23.1-2 in the series).

d. Periodicals

There is no scholarly journal in Germany that is devoted exclusively to Buddhist studies, and there are only two Indological journals in which articles on Buddhism appear frequently: *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik*, edited by Albrecht WEZLER *et al.*, and *Berliner Indologische Studien*, published by the Institute for Indian Philology and Art History of the Free University, Berlin (both published by the Dr. Inge Wezler Verlag). To these one should add the *Orientalistische Literaturzeitung* that is well-known mainly for its book reviews. Important papers on Buddhism appear regularly in the Austrian journal *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* (formerly *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens*) established by Erich FRAUWALLNER and later on edited by Gerhard OBERHAMMER.

e. Catalogues

Under the auspices of the German Oriental Society (Deutsche Morgenländische Gesellschaft) Wolfgang VOIGT established the renowned series of catalogues under the title *Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland* (Catalogue of the Oriental Manuscripts in Germany). The current general editor is Hartmut-Ortwin FEISTEL from the State Library in Berlin; the series is commissioned by the Academy of Sciences in Göttingen. To date oriental manuscripts in more than 30 languages have been catalogued or are in the process of being catalogued. Among the materials that are relevant to Buddhist studies one may mention Indian manuscripts in 12 volumes (though only few Buddhist texts are catalogued in them) (vol. 2.1-12), Thai manuscripts (9.1-2), Sanskrit texts from the Turfan discoveries (10.1-7), Tibetan manuscripts (vol. 11.1-11), Old Turkic (vol. 13.9-10), Singhalese (vol. 22.1-3), Burmese (vol. 23.1-3), Laotian (vol. 32), and Nepalese manuscripts (vol. 33.1).

The Sanskrit dictionary of the Sanskrit texts discovered at Turfan also has supplementary volumes (Beihefte) which contain the series "New Discoveries and New Editions" with contributions by Jens-Uwe HARTMANN, Claus VOGEL, Klaus WILLE, Bhikkhu PĀSĀDIKA, and others. Beiheft 5 contains a catalogue of the Göttingen collection of prints of the Sanskrit manuscripts photographed by Rāhula SĀNKRṬYĀYANA during his 1934-1938 Tibet expeditions, compiled by Frank BANDURSKI.¹⁴

14. Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden, Beiheft 5, *Untersuchungen zur buddhistischen Literatur*. Göttingen 1994.

David JACKSON's handlist of the Tibetan texts in the collection of the Bihar Research Society, Patna, appeared as volume 2 of "Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies."

Two important catalogues were reprinted as part of the "Nepal Research Centre Publications": Hari Prasād Śāstrī's catalogue of the Durbar Library, supplemented by a concordance to the microfilms of the NGMPP, and the Bendall catalogue of the Buddhist manuscripts at Cambridge.

f. *The Nepal Research Centre and The Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project*¹⁵

The Nepal Research Centre, established in 1959, is the oldest German cooperative project on Nepalese soil. A large number of projects were undertaken under the auspices of the NRC in the last 25 years; perhaps the most important of these is the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project (NGMPP). This is a joint venture of the Nepalese government and the German Oriental Society and it is designed to preserve on microfilm Nepal's extraordinary wealth of manuscripts and historical documents. To date, about 170,000 manuscripts comprising nearly 5,000,000 folios have been microfilmed throughout Nepal. Of each original negative film two positive copies are made, the one kept in the National Archives, Kathmandu, the other in the State Library at Berlin. Thus, many texts have become available for the first time outside a rather limited area of dissemination. In the Sanskrit section 113,000 manuscripts were microfilmed and are now in the process of being catalogued in Hamburg. Nearly all genres of Hindu and Buddhist literature are represented in these manuscripts. Among the important Buddhist Sanskrit manuscripts that have been identified so far one can mention several manuscripts of the *Mahāvastu* and the *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti as well as many manuscripts of narrative and poetical works by Āryaśūra, Gopadatta, Haribhaṭṭa, Ratnākaraśānti and Harṣadeva; the latter have been studied and some of them published by Michael HAHN at the University of Marburg. Christoph CÜPPERS has prepared an exemplary edition of the ninth chapter of the *Samādhirājasūtra* on the

15. The following information is taken, sometimes verbatim, from: K.-D. MATHES, *Nepal Research Centre, An Updated Report on its Activities (1960-1997)*, Kathmandu 1997, and A. Wezler, "Geisteswissenschaftliche Forschung in Nepal," *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 136.1 (1986): *2*-*14*.

basis of twelve Nepalese manuscripts. In the area of Buddhist medical texts, five of the six manuscripts used by EMMERICK for the edition of the *Siddhasāra* by Ravigupta were microfilmed by the NGMPP. A considerable number of Buddhist tantric texts have also been microfilmed, but I am not aware of any publications on them. The manuscripts in Tibetan language constitute the second major focus of the NGMPP. Thousands of manuscripts from all over Nepal, sometimes from most inaccessible regions, are being microfilmed and are also in the process of being catalogued.

The NRC is responsible for several series of publications: 1) "Nepal Research Centre Publications" (NRCP), edited by Albrecht WEZLER. 2) *Journal of the Nepal Research Centre* (JNRC), also edited by WEZLER; various volumes of this journal include the *Nepalese National Bibliography* of 1980-89. 3) "Publications of the Nepal German Manuscript Preservation Project," in cooperation with the National Archives, Kathmandu, edited by WEZLER. 4) "Nepalica," edited by Bernhard KÖLVER and Siegfried LIENHARD.

2. Pāli and canonical Buddhism

Pāli language studies in Germany are associated above all with the name Oskar VON HINÜBER of the University of Freiburg. In the last ten years alone he has published, in addition to a considerable number of scholarly papers, no less than seven monographs. In his magisterial survey of older Middle Indic languages (Pāli and Prākṛt) he succeeds, on some 200 dense pages, not only to summarize the new results of research in this area in the 70-80 years since PISCHEL and GEIGER wrote their grammars, but also to provide an introduction to the questions and problems of the historical grammar of these languages.¹⁶ Next VON HINÜBER published in quick succession five monographs in the transactions of the Academy of Sciences and Literature [Akademie der Wissenschaften und Literatur] at Mainz, three of which form the series "Investigations towards the Linguistic History and Palæography of Pāli" [Untersuchungen zur Sprachgeschichte und Handschriftenkunde des Pāli]. In the *Linguistic History of Pāli as Mirrored in the Tradition of South-East Asian Manuscripts*,¹⁷ VON HINÜBER shows that in some cases the Thai

16. Cf. O. VON HINÜBER: *Das ältere Mittelindisch im Überblick*. Wien 1986.

17. Cf. O. VON HINÜBER: *Die Sprachgeschichte des Pāli im Spiegel der südostasiatischen Handschriftenüberlieferung*. Untersuchungen zur Sprachgeschichte und Handschriftenkunde des Pāli I. Mainz/Stuttgart 1988.

manuscripts preserve better readings than the Śrī Laṅkan and Burmese manuscripts. Since Pāli as we know it today is a rather late product of the 12th century, it is of crucial importance to obtain the earliest possible manuscripts, especially those that were not “modernized,” in order to grasp the historical development of the language and to gain a better understanding of the texts. In *The Oldest Pāli Manuscript*¹⁸ VON HINÜBER makes available a facsimile and a transliteration of, accompanied by a long introduction to, four folios of the *Vinayaṭṭaka* discovered by Cecil BENDALL which comprise and remain the only Indian Pāli manuscript. In his investigation into the orality of Middle Indic texts, VON HINÜBER identifies colloquial remnants in the Pāli canon and draws conclusions from them about the early language of the Buddhists. Of special interest is his suggestion that *māyā* is not the personal name of the Buddha’s mother, but a colloquial form of “mother” (i.e., *māyā* derived from *mātā*). Thus, the personal name of the Buddha’s mother, just as that of his stepmother, has not been transmitted to us.¹⁹

In *The Beginning of Writing and Early Literacy in India*, VON HINÜBER also examines the implications of these two factors for the transmission of the Buddhist canon. For instance, he affirms that with the exception of the long forgotten Indus Valley script, writing was unknown in India prior to Aśoka’s time and consequently, that those parts of the canon where writing is mentioned must be of relatively late origin.²⁰ In *Development of Language and Cultural History*, VON HINÜBER investigates two aspects of the material culture of early Buddhist

18. Mainz/Stuttgart 1991 [=Untersuchungen zur Sprachgeschichte und Handschriftenkunde des Pāli II].

19. Cf. O. VON HINÜBER: *Untersuchungen zur Mündlichkeit früher mittelindischer Texte der Buddhisten*. (Untersuchungen zur Sprachgeschichte und Handschriftenkunde des Pāli III). Mainz/Stuttgart 1994. On the Buddha’s mother’s name, cf. pp. 13-14.

We are not in a better position in respect to the name of the wife of the Buddha; in the entire *Nikāya/Āgama* corpus the name Yaśodharā is mentioned only in a single *sūtra* of unknown sectarian origin, and only in its Chinese translation; the parallel passage in Pāli mentions neither Yaśodharā, nor Rāhula’s mother. Cf. A. BAREAU: “Un personnage bien mystérieux: l’épouse du Bouddha,” in *Recherche sur la Biographie du Bouddha dans les Sūtraṭṭaka et les Vinayaṭṭaka anciens*. III. Articles complémentaires, Paris 1995, pp. 119-147.

20. Cf. O. VON HINÜBER: *Der Beginn der Schrift und frühe Schriftlichkeit in Indien*. Mainz/Stuttgart 1989. On this topic cf. also the exhaustive survey by H. FALK: *Schrift im alten Indien. Ein Forschungsbericht mit Anmerkungen*. Tübingen 1993.

monasteries, the one concerning doors, locks, bolts and keys, the other begging bowls and staffs.²¹

While VON HINÜBER's object of study is primarily the Pāli language and his chief tool of investigation is Middle Indic philology, a different approach was applied by the analytical philosopher Claus OETKE. OETKE's *"Ich" und das Ich* is perhaps the single most important contribution to the interpretation of the Weltanschauung of canonical Buddhism. DE JONG, who is usually quite reserved in his praise, called this study the most important book ever published on the controversy about an *ātman*.²² OETKE provides a thorough analysis of previous research which brings to light the enormous diversity of scholarly opinions on the subject. As a result of this analysis, it becomes clear that most, if not all, scholars who have written on the subject have reached their respective, sometimes diametrically opposed, theories through failing to make the most basic of distinctions, such as between the concept of a person (sometimes termed *pudgala*, but also referred to by the word *ātman* without metaphysical implications) and a permanent substantial self or soul (also termed *ātman*, but in relationship to brahmanical or other metaphysical speculations). The assumption, advanced again and again, that the canonical texts betray the radical negation of a subject of experience, etc., is highly improbable, and as far as the oldest parts of the canon are concerned, it is without any basis. There is no evidence against the acceptance of a "common-sense" "psycho-physical" subject, which can be subsumed under the concepts of man, person, living being, etc.; in other words, even a complete negation of a metaphysical *ātman* would not imply the negation of such a subject. There is no indication that the canonical authors considered everyday statements involving the personal pronoun "I" to be problematic, let alone false; such statements do not involve, as was thought by later Buddhists, any profound error. On the other hand, the assumptions that the Buddha accepted a "meta-empirical" *ātman* (V. PÉREZ-REMON) or an Upaniṣadic *ātman* (K. BHATTACHARYA) are equally unfounded. Although there are passages where the absolute cessation of the Tathāgata, or of a liberated monk, after death is clearly denied, this too does not imply that the Buddha accepted the reality of an *ātman* because nowhere are these

21. Cf. O. VON HINÜBER: *Sprachentwicklung und Kulturgeschichte. Ein Beitrag zur materiellen Kultur des buddhistischen Klosterlebens*. Mainz / Stuttgart 1992.

22. Cf. *III*, 1991, p. 147.

statements applied to the *ātman*; they only refer to a liberated monk or to the Tathāgata. Nor is it said anywhere that the *ātman* cannot be grasped, but only that the Tathāgata, etc., cannot be grasped.²³

The most prominent historian of early Buddhism is undoubtedly Heinz BECHERT, perhaps the most prolific writer among German Buddhist scholars. Many of his articles, however, have appeared in little-known journals and other organs of publication, and it is extremely difficult to keep track of his entire work. Fortunately, a complete bibliography of his writings has been published recently.²⁴ Therefore, I mention here only his monumental study on Buddhism, state and society in the Theravāda countries.²⁵

In addition to his numerous publications, BECHERT has organized four conferences that have become milestones in the historical research on early Buddhism. The topics of these conferences were: Buddhism in Ceylon and studies on religious syncretism in Buddhist countries,²⁶ the language of the earliest Buddhist tradition,²⁷ the school affiliation of works belonging to Hīnayāna literature,²⁸ and the dating of the historical Buddha.²⁹ The publications of the proceedings of these conferences

23. Cf. C. OETKE: *"Ich" und das Ich: Analytische Untersuchungen zur buddhistisch-brahmanischen Ātmankontroverse*. Stuttgart 1988.
24. For a bibliography up to 1992 (containing 305 items and 108 book reviews) cf. B. GRÜNENDAHL, J.-U. HARTMANN and P. KIEFFER-PÜLZ (eds): *Studien zur Indologie und Buddhismuskunde*. Festgabe des Seminars für Indologie und Buddhismuskunde für Professor Dr. Heinz Bechert zum 60. Geburtstag am 26. Juni 1992. Bonn 1993, pp. 3-51. For a continuation of this bibliography up to 1997 cf. P. KIEFFER-PÜLZ and J.-U. HARTMANN (eds): *Bauddhavidyāsudhā-karaḥ. Studies in Honour of Heinz Bechert on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday*. Swisttal- Odendorf 1997, pp. 17-24.
25. Cf. H. BECHERT: *Buddhismus, Staat und Gesellschaft in den Ländern des Theravāda-Buddhismus*. 3 vols. Frankfurt a. M./Berlin 1966-1973.
26. Cf. H. BECHERT (ed.): *Buddhism in Ceylon and Studies on Religious Syncretism in Buddhist Countries*. Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung I. Göttingen 1978.
27. Cf. H. BECHERT (ed.): *Die Sprache der ältesten buddhistischen Überlieferung / The Language of the Earliest Buddhist Tradition*. Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung II. Göttingen 1980.
28. Cf. H. BECHERT (ed.): *Zur Schulzugehörigkeit von Werken der Hīnayāna-Literatur*. Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung III. 2 vols. Göttingen 1985-1987.
29. Cf. H. BECHERT (ed.): *The Dating of the Historical Buddha / Die Datierung des historischen Buddha*. Symposien zur Buddhismusforschung IV. Vol. 1 and 2, Göttingen 1991-1992, vol. 3 in preparation. For an Indian reprint of some of the

contain important contributions by leading scholars from all over the world. (For BECHERT's work cf. also the section on the Turfan discoveries.)

BECHERT's former student Petra KIEFFER-PÜLZ studied the *vinaya* rules that deal with the boundaries of the community of monks (*sīmā*). These rules are particularly important for the ordination of monks because unless ten monks can be found in the area of a community (or five in the neighbouring community) new monks cannot be ordained. KIEFFER-PÜLZ's study contains three parts; the one deals with the Pāli Vinaya, the other with the later Pāli commentatorial tradition (*Vinaya-ṭīkāś*), the third with the *Poṣadhavastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādinaya*.³⁰ BECHERT's assistant, Ute HÜSKEN, published her dissertation on the monastic rules of Theravāda nuns, which unfortunately was not available to me.³¹

From 1972-1974 the German Research Council (DFG) funded a project to set up a microfilm collection of manuscripts representing the Northern Thai indigenous tradition. Some 1000 manuscripts from 95 monastic, as well as private, libraries were microfilmed. A preliminary handlist of the texts contained in the microfilm collection was prepared by Harald HUNDIUS, Passau, and is available upon request from the author. The microfilms are available in the National Library, Bangkok, Chulalongkorn University (Department of History), Chiang Mai University (Department of Thai), and in Germany at the Universities of Kiel and of Göttingen. As indicated by its title, the project focuses on indigenous Northern Thai literature; nevertheless forty-eight Pāli texts have been included in the collection because of their exceptional value. Some of these manuscripts represent the oldest manuscripts of Thailand and Southeast Asia, others represent Pāli works of Southeast Asian origin including works that have been composed by scholars of Lan Na. A number of manuscripts were microfilmed because of their rarity or because they contain previously unknown texts. Out of the forty-eight, eighteen short texts were identified as belonging to the category of texts

papers cf. H. BECHERT (ed.): *When Did the Buddha Live? The Controversy on the Dating of the Historical Buddha*. Delhi 1995.

30. Cf. P. KIEFFER-PÜLZ: *Die Sīmā. Vorschriften zur Regelung der buddhistischen Gemeindegrenze in älteren buddhistischen Texten*. Berlin 1992. For the *Poṣadhavastu* cf. also the study by HU-VON HINÜBER mentioned below.
31. Cf. U. HÜSKEN: *Die Vorschriften für die buddhistische Nonnengemeinde im Vinaya-Pitaka der Theravādin*. Reimer 1977.

used in Buddhist ritual and ceremonies (*suut mon*), and can be found virtually in each and every monastery in the North. The colophons of the other thirty texts have been translated and studied by Harald HUNDIUS.³²

3. *The Turfan discoveries in Sanskrit and Central Asian languages*

Between 1902-1914 four German (or more precisely, Prussian) expeditions, under the directorship of Albert GRÜNWEDEL and Albert VON LE COQ, were sent to the Central Asian Silk Road in the area called Eastern Turkestan and Chinese Turkestan. A fifth expedition was already in the planning stages when World War I broke out and brought with it the termination of German activities in that part of the world.³³ As is well known, the expeditions were extremely successful and returned with rich booty, including most beautiful murals removed from cave walls in their entirety; many of them, however, were destroyed by Allied bombing during World War II. Some of the surviving works were removed from the German collection and transported mainly to the U.S.S.R., but also to the U.S.A., as *Beutekunst*. The German expeditions were also successful in recovering large quantities of manuscripts and block-prints, usually fragmentary or incomplete, in various Central Asian languages such as Uigur (Old Turkic) and Tocharian, as well as in Sanskrit.

The first study based on the "Turfan discoveries"³⁴ was published already in 1904 by Richard PISCHEL, who is remembered today above all through his grammar of the Prakṛt languages, which although somewhat outdated, has not been superseded. This first publication was entitled "Fragments of the Sanskrit Canon of the Buddhists from Idyikutšari" ("Bruch stücke des Sanskritkanons der Buddhisten aus Idyikutšari"). Later it was established that the Sanskrit canon referred to in this title is that of the Sarvāstivāda, and indeed almost all the "Turfan canonical

32. Cf. H. HUNDIUS: "The Colophons of 30 Pāli manuscripts from Northern Thailand." *Journal of the Pāli Text Society* XIV, 1990: 1-174. The information above is taken, partly verbatim, from pp. 15, 20 of this paper.

33. The best popular introduction to the Indo-British, Russian, Japanese, German, Swedish and American expeditions to the Silk Road can be found in P. HOPKIRK: *Foreign Devils on the Silk Road*. London 1980.

34. This is a common but not entirely accurate designation, for none of the discoveries was actually made in Turfan itself; it would be more accurate speak of the these discoveries as mainly made on the Northern Silk Road not too far from Turfan.

texts" identified so far belong to the Sarvāstivāda school. A few fragments from the Dharmaguptaka canon were identified by Ernst WALDSCHMIDT.³⁵ It is now generally assumed that there were three successive phases of Buddhist missionary activity in Central Asia: The oldest one carried out by Dharmaguptaka monks, who were followed by Sarvāstivādins, who were, in their turn, succeeded by Mūlasarvāstivādins.³⁶

Since then a considerable number of excellent scholars have worked with the Turfan materials e.g., Dieter SCHLINGLOFF, outside Germany better known by his monumental study of the Ajanta paintings, Herbert HÄRTEL, primarily known as an archæologist and art historian, Heinz BECHERT, who also manages the project of cataloguing the manuscripts, and Lore SANDER, whose palæographical study forms the standard work in this field;³⁷ one should also not forget the important contributions of non-German scholars such as Junkichi IMANISHI and Fumio ENOMOTO. Since PISCHEL published his above-mentioned paper the number of publications dealing directly with the Turfan Sanskrit manuscripts has grown to well over a hundred. A list of these publications up to 1991 was compiled by different scholars who contributed to various volumes of the catalogue of the Sanskrit manuscripts from the Turfan discoveries. As is well known, the two most important scholars who dominated this field for the better part of this century are Heinrich LÜDERS and Ernst WALDSCHMIDT. An excellent general survey of this vast and fascinating field of studies was prepared by Lore SANDER for the *Encyclopedia of Buddhism*;³⁸ unfortunately, however, this survey ends practically where ours begins.

More than a thousand Sanskrit texts, or fragments of texts, have been identified so far. It is impossible to mention them all by name here.³⁹

35. Cf. E. WALDSCHMIDT: *Sanskrihandschriften aus den Turfanfunden*. Vol. 1, Wiesbaden 1965, catalogue no. 656; cf. also E. WALDSCHMIDT: *Drei Fragmente buddhistischer Sūtras aus den Turfanhandschriften*, Göttingen 1968, pp. 3-16.
36. Cf. Ch. WILLEMEN, D. DESSEIN & C. COX: *Sarvāstivāda Buddhist Scholasticism*. Leiden/New York/Köln 1998, p. 126. The above statement, however, is perhaps too sweeping, and one also has to differentiate between the Buddhist missionary activity on the Northern and on the Southern Silk Roads.
37. Cf. L. SANDER: *Paläographisches zu den Sanskrihandschriften der Berliner Turfansammlung*. Wiesbaden 1968.
38. Cf. *Encyclopedia of Buddhism*, ed. by J. DHIRASEKERA, vol. VI, [Colombo] 1979, pp. 52-75, s.v. "Buddhist Literature in Central Asia."
39. Complete lists of the identified texts can be found in the respective volumes of the *Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland*. Vols 10.1-7.

All I can note here is that a large portion of manuscripts belongs to the Vinaya of the Sarvāstivāda, but that there are also *sūtras*, narrative texts (*avadānas*), Abhidharma and philosophical texts, ritual texts (*raṅṅas*, *dhāraṅīs*, *mantras*), Mahāyānasūtras, poetic texts, plays, and grammatical and medical texts. A number of manuscripts belong to the Kuṣāṅa period (1st-3rd century), i.e., these fragmentary manuscripts are considerably older than Indian manuscripts.

Although numerous papers dealing with the Turfan texts have been published over the last 25 years, I know of only three monographs that belong to this period, excepting, of course, the seven volumes of the catalogue and the fascicles of the dictionary. BECHERT studied the so-called Marburg fragments of the *Saddharmapūṅḍarīkasūtra*. He re-establishes that the *Sdhp.* has only two, not three, recensions (Nepalese-Kashmirian and Central Asian) by showing that the Gilgit manuscripts represent an earlier stage of the Nepalese recension. He also discovered that five incomplete Central Asian manuscripts belonged to a single manuscript, different portions of which were sold by the locals to the Russian, English, German and Japanese expeditions.⁴⁰ Another important conclusion of this study is that the *Saddharmapūṅḍarīka* was originally a Middle Indic text, but that the original was transmitted orally and a process of Sanskritisation had started already with the first redaction. The study also contains strong criticism of Franklin EDGERTON's conception of so-called Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit as forming a dialectal unity; furthermore, BECHERT points out that EDGERTON's grammar and dictionary do not account for the special language and history of the *Sdhp.*⁴¹

Jens-Uwe HARTMANN prepared an excellent edition of the Sanskrit fragments of the *Varṅārḥavarṅastotra* of the popular poet Māṅṅceta, accompanied by an edition of the Tibetan translation and a careful and reliable translation. HARTMANN was able to use 73 new fragments and thus improve significantly upon previous work by Sh. BAILEY, PAULY, COUVREUR, etc.⁴² Klaus SCHMIDT reconstructed the badly corrupt final

40. 1) The Kashgar manuscript in the collection of Petrovsky; 2) four leaves edited by Lüders; 3) The Marburg fragments; 4) a manuscript in the British Museum; 5) six leaves in the Otani collection.

41. Cf. H. BECHERT: *Über die 'Marburger Fragmente' des Saddharmapūṅḍarīka*, mit einem Beitrag von Jongchay Rinpoche. Ernst Waldschmidt zum 75. Geburtstag am 15.7.1972. Göttingen 1972.

42. Cf. J.-U. HARTMANN: *Das Varṅārḥavarṅastotra des Māṅṅceta*. Göttingen 1987.

portion (15 verses) of the *Prātimokṣasūtra* of the Sarvāstivādins on the basis of Sanskrit and Tokharian manuscripts.⁴³

Although it is outside the scope of this survey, I would also like to point out the work of Georg VON SIMSON (Oslo) who edited the fragments of the *Prātimokṣasūtra* of the Sarvāstivādins on the basis of transcriptions prepared by Else LÜDERS and Herbert HÄRTEL.⁴⁴

Further, one has to mention here the outstanding contributions of Klaus WILLE and Haiyan HU-VON HINÜBER, even though they are based on the Gilgit manuscripts (in contradistinction to the Turfan manuscripts). WILLE's study of the manuscripts of the *Vinayavastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivādavinaya*⁴⁵ contains a very useful detailed description of the Gilgit manuscripts of the *Vinayavastu* that are dispersed all over the world. Wille also discovered and edited new fragments and prepared a survey of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda* fragments discovered at Turfan. HU-VON HINÜBER provides us with a reliable critical edition and careful translation of the Sanskrit text (and of the Tibetan translation for the missing portions) of the *Poṣadhavastu* of the Vinaya of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda* school. The edition and translation are preceded by a very learned investigation into the special characteristics of the language and terminology of the *Poṣadhavastu*.⁴⁶

A note on Buddhist texts in Central Asian languages

Of course the Turfan discoveries include manuscripts not only in Sanskrit but also in Chinese, Tibetan, Mongolian and various Central Asian languages such as Uigur. Most of the Buddhist Uigur texts were discovered by the Turfan expeditions. Among studies in this field one should note, in addition to the Uigur-German dictionary mentioned above, several works on the famous Maitreya text *Maitrisimit* that was translated into Uigur from Tocharian. Annemarie VON GABAIN, the 'mother-

43. Cf. K.T. SCHMIDT: *Der Schlussteil des Prātimokṣasūtra der Sarvāstivādins: Text in Sanskrit und Tocharisch A verglichen mit den Parallelversionen anderer Schulen*. Göttingen 1989.

44. Cf. *Prātimokṣasūtra der Sarvāstivādins. Nach Vorarbeiten von Else Lüders und Herbert Härtel herausgegeben von Georg von Simson*. Teil I. Göttingen 1986.

45. Cf. K. WILLE: *Die handschriftliche Überlieferung des Vinayavastu der Mūlasarvāstivādins*. Stuttgart 1990.

46. Cf. H. HU-VON HINÜBER: *Das Poṣadhavastu. Vorschriften für die buddhistische Beichtfeier im Vinaya der Mūlasarvāstivādins*. Reinbeck 1994.

figure' of Old Turkic studies in Germany,⁴⁷ has published a facsimile edition of this text, which is, surprisingly enough, attributed to the Vai-bhāṣika school in the colophon.⁴⁸ Şinasi TEKIN transliterated and translated the text.⁴⁹ Jens Peter LAUT's study of early Turkic Buddhism and its literary monuments also centers on it.⁵⁰ Finally, the first five chapters of the Hami version (found not in Turfan, but in Sängim and Murtuq) of the *Maitrisimit* were edited and translated by GENG Shimin and Hans-Joachim KLIMKEIT.⁵¹

Over the last decade the German Research Council has financed a major project on the life and work of Xuanzang (600-664) on the basis of his most important Chinese biography *Cien zhuan* as well as its Old Turkic translation. So far five volumes have appeared as the outcome of this project.⁵² The biography was translated into Old Turkic approximately in the 10th century, and the Turkic text is used for clarification of problematic passages in the Chinese original.

An important centre for Uigur studies has been the Central Institute for Ancient History and Archæology of the (East) German Academy of Sciences (Zentralinstitut für alte Geschichte und Archäologie, Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin). After World War II most of the ca. 8,000 Turkic fragments of the Turfan collection came to be held

47. Cf. P. ZIEME: "Annemarie v. Gabain und die Turfanforschung," in *Turfan, Khotan und Dunhuan*. Vorträge der Tagung 'Annemarie v. Gabain und die Turfanforschung,' veranstaltet von der Berlin-Brandenburgischen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Berlin (9.-12.12.1994), ed. R.E. Emmerick, W. Sundermann, I. Warnke and P. Zieme, Berlin 1996.
48. Cf. A. V. GABAIN: *Maitrisimit. Faksimile der alttürkischen Version eines Werkes der buddhistischen Vaibhāṣika-Schule*. Wiesbaden 1957.
49. Cf. Ş. TEKIN: *Maitrisimit nom bitig. Die uigurische Übersetzung eines Werkes der buddhistischen Vaibhāṣika-Schule*. Teil 1: Transliteration, Übersetzung, Anmerkungen; Teil 2: Analytischer und rückläufiger Index. Berlin 1980.
50. Cf. J.P. LAUT: *Der frühe türkische Buddhismus und seine literarischen Denkmäler*. Wiesbaden 1986.
51. Cf. G. SHIMIN and H.-J. KLIMKEIT: *Das Zusammentreffen mit Maitreya. Die ersten fünf Kapitel der Hami-Version der Maitrisimit*. Teil I: Text, Übersetzung und Kommentar. Teil II: Faksimiles und Indices. Wiesbaden 1988.
52. Cf. A. L. MAYER and K. RÖHRBORN: *Xuanzangs Leben und Werk*. 5 vols. Wiesbaden 1991-1996. [I could consult only three of these volumes.]

For a further "by-product" of this project cf. FRANKENHAUSER's study of the introduction of Buddhist logic to China.

in East Berlin,⁵³ and the series published by the above mentioned Institute (Schriften zur Geschichte und Kultur des alten Orients, Berliner Turfantexte) contains some important studies of Turkic Buddhism that are based on materials from the Turfan collection. The central figure in these studies is Peter ZIEME, who in addition to his own independent publications,⁵⁴ also collaborated with Georg HAZAI on the edition and the translation of "Jin'gangjing and the Gāthās of Master Fu"⁵⁵ and with György KARA (from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) on Uigur translations of the "Deep Way" by Sa skya paṇḍita and the *Mañjuśrī-nāmasaṃgīti*.⁵⁶ The collaboration between the East German and the Hungarian Academies of Sciences made possible another joint publication by ZIEME and KARA concerned with Naropa's teachings in Uigur translations from the Tibetan.⁵⁷ Dieter MAUE has recently edited and transliterated Old Turkic documents in Brāhmī and Tibetan script.⁵⁸

Among collective works one should note the lectures presented at the Hamburg Symposium on the languages of Buddhism in Central Asia,⁵⁹ and the volume edited by LAUT and RÖHRBORN on narrative literature

53. Cf. P. ZIEME: "Die Turfan-Sammlung der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Die türkischen Texte," in *Orientalistische Bibliotheken und Sammlungen, Deutsche Staatsbibliothek*, Berlin 1970, pp. 39-53.
54. Cf. P. ZIEME: *Zur buddhistischen Stabreimdichtung der Uiguren*. Berlin 1985 (Habilitationsschrift). Cf. also his *Altun-Yaruq Sudur. Vorworte und das erste Buch. Edition und Übersetzung der alttürkischen Version des Goldglanzsūtra*. Turnhout (Belgium) 1996. ZIEME's work is not limited to Buddhist studies alone; cf. his *Manichäisch-türkische Texte*. Berlin 1975.
55. Cf. G. HAZAI and P. ZIEME: *Fragmente der uigurischen Version des "Jin'gangjing mit den Gāthās des Meister Fu," nebst einem Anhang von T. Inokuchi*. Berlin 1971.
56. Cf. G. KARA and P. ZIEME: *Die uigurischen Übersetzungen des Guruyogas 'Tiefer Weg' von Sa-skya Paṇḍita und der Mañjuśrīnāmasaṃgīti*. Berlin 1977.
57. Cf. P. ZIEME und G. KARA: *Ein uigurisches Totenbuch: Naropas Lehre in uigurischer Übersetzung von vier tibetischen Traktaten nach der Sammelhandschrift aus Dunhuang, British Museum Or. 8212 (109)*. Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica 22. Budapest 1978. Cf. also G. KARA: *Fragmente tantrischer Werke in uigurischer Übersetzung, mit 82 Faksimiles auf 49 Tafeln*. Berlin 1976.
58. Cf. D. MAUE: *Alttürkische Handschriften Teil I. Dokumente in brāhmī und tibetischer Schrift*. Stuttgart 1996.
59. Cf. K. RÖHRBORN and W. VEENKER (eds.): *Sprachen des Buddhismus in Zentralasien: Vorträge des Hamburger Symposions vom 2. Juli bis 5. Juli 1981*. Wiesbaden 1983.

and hagiography in the Turkic tradition.⁶⁰ Japanese studies on Turkic Buddhism have gained in importance since World War II; a useful guide to this literature has been provided by LAUT and RÖHRBORN.⁶¹

As for the Iranian Central Asian languages, the authority in this area is Ronald EMMERICK at the University of Hamburg. A complete bibliography of his publications up to 1993 can be found in the appendix to his own *A Guide to the Literature of Khotan*.⁶² In the course of his research on the Khōtanese fragments of the *Suvarṇaprabhāsottamasūtra* he also prepared a translation of the Sanskrit text.⁶³ For Iranian studies one should further mention the work of David Neil MACKENZIE. A complete bibliography of his publications up to 1991 has been compiled in his felicitation volume.⁶⁴

David UTZ has published a very useful survey of Buddhist Sogdian studies.⁶⁵ He points out that between 1942 and 1974 no work was done in Sogdian studies and that most of the material in the Turfan collection remains unpublished.⁶⁶ Most of the Sogdian texts were translated from the Chinese, probably in the 7th and 8th centuries during the T'ang domination of Central Asia, and they reflect the unsettled condition of the Chinese canon in this period.

A survey of Tocharian studies has been provided by Werner THOMAS.⁶⁷

4. Abhidharma

Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* (*bhāṣya*) naturally occupies a very central position in Abhidharma studies. Bhikkhu PĀSĀDIKA studied

60. Cf. J.P. LAUT, and K. RÖHRBORN (eds.): *Buddhistische Erzählliteratur und Hagiographie in türkischer Überlieferung*. Wiesbaden 1990.

61. Cf. J.P. LAUT and K. RÖHRBORN: *Der türkische Buddhismus in der japanischen Forschung*. Wiesbaden 1988.

62. R. EMMERICK: *A Guide to the Literature of Khotan*, 2nd revised and enlarged edition. Tokyo 1992, pp. 53-61.

63. Cf. R.E. EMMERICK: *The Sūtra of Golden Light*, 3rd revised ed., Oxford 1996.

64. Cf. *Corolla Iranica. Papers in honour of Prof. Dr. David Neil MacKenzie on the occasion of his 65th birthday on April 8th, 1991*, ed. R.E. EMMERICK and D. WEBER. Frankfurt, Bern, New York, Paris 1991, pp. vii-xviii.

65. Cf. D.A. UTZ: *A Survey of Buddhist Sogdian Studies*. Tokyo 1980.

66. Cf. *op. cit.*, p. 6.

67. Cf. W. THOMAS: *Die Erforschung des Tocharischen (1960-1984)*. Wiesbaden 1984. Unfortunately, this work is not available to me.

some 536 canonical quotations in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* and demonstrated with a high degree of probability that the texts quoted by Vasubandhu belong to the Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda traditions.⁶⁸

Yoshihito MUROJI prepared a precise edition and translation of two chapters, the *Samskāravibhaṅga* and the *Vijñānavibhaṅga*, of the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* of Vasubandhu. In his book he also investigates the introduction of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* into Vasubandhu's "system" and appends parallel passages from one Tibetan and two Chinese translations of the *Karmasiddhi* dealing with the nature of the body and *karman* as well as with the meaning of the words designating them.⁶⁹

In this connection I would also like to draw attention to the useful work by Marek MEJOR on the commentaries of the *Abhidharmakośa* preserved in the Tanjur; MEJOR conducted his research partly in Bonn and Hamburg, in part also in Budapest, Oxford, Cambridge and London.⁷⁰

For the earlier period, prior to Vasubandhu, mention must be made of the recent valuable study of momentariness by Alexander VON ROSPATT.⁷¹ Although this doctrine has often been the object of study in its forms posterior to Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa*, especially as it is presented in the late *pramāṇa* texts dating from the 7th to the 11th centuries, its form and development before Vasubandhu have not been the focus of significant work since de LA VALLÉE POUSSIN collected the relevant materials in 1937.⁷² VON ROSPATT enlarged the scope of the enquiry, notably, by a thorough investigation of early Yogācāra sources. He also translated two long sections on *anityatā* and the proof of momentariness from the fourth chapter of the *Hsien-yang shêng-chiao*

68. Cf. Bhikkhu PĀSĀDIKA: *Kanonische Zitate im Abhidharmakośabhāṣya des Vasubandhu*. Göttingen 1989.

69. Cf. Y.G. MUROJI: *Vasubandhus Interpretation des Pratītyasamutpāda*. Stuttgart 1993.

70. Cf. M. MEJOR: *Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa and the Commentaries Preserved in the Tanjur*. Stuttgart 1991.

71. Cf. A. VON ROSPATT: *The Buddhist Doctrine of Momentariness. A Survey of the Origins and Early Phase of this Doctrine up to Vasubandhu*. Stuttgart 1995.

72. Cf. L. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN: "Document de l'Abhidharma: La Controverse du Temps. III: Notes sur le moment (*kṣaṇa*) des Vaibhāṣikas et des Sautrāntikas." *Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques* V, 1937, pp. 134-158.

lun attributed to Asaṅga. After examining several hypotheses for the origin of the doctrine of momentariness, VON ROSPATT rejects the suppositions that the concept of the momentariness of matter was derived from that of the momentariness of mind and that the driving force behind this doctrine was a spiritual practice such as *smṛtyupasthāna*. The most likely hypothesis, according to VON ROSPATT, is that the doctrine of the momentariness of matter follows from the denial of substance.

Siglinde DIETZ edited the fragments of the Gilgit manuscript of the *Dharmaskandha*, one of the seven early Abhidharma works that formed the *Abhidharmapiṭaka* of the Sarvāstivāda. Most of the fragments deal with the twelve members of *pratītyasamutpāda*. DIETZ describes the manuscript from a palaeographical point of view, points out the grammatical peculiarities of the text in declension, conjugation, compounds and syntax, analyses the structure of the work and identifies quotations of the text in later Abhidharma works.⁷³

5. Narrative and poetic literature

Research in narrative literature is conducted primarily by Michael HAHN.⁷⁴ Among his numerous studies in this area, one may mention his edition, in collaboration with Gudrun BÜHNEMANN, of the *Mahaj-jātakamālā*.⁷⁵ The *MJM* is one of the longest texts in the corpus of Buddhist literature; it consists of 9277 stanzas in 50 chapters. Unfortunately, some parts of the text are missing. Had the manuscripts been complete, the text would have contained 11,000 stanzas. The main sources of this compilation are the *Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka*, the *Jātakamālās* of Āryaśūra, Haribhatta and Gopadatta, and the *Subhāṣitaratnakaraṇḍaka-*

73. Cf. S. DIETZ: *Fragmente des Dharmaskandha. Ein Abhidharma-Text in Sanskrit aus Gilgit*. Göttingen 1984.

74. Beside being the foremost authority on Buddhist narrative and gnomic literature in Germany, HAHN is also the author of the most successful textbook for the study of classical Tibetan. Cf. M. HAHN: *Lehrbuch der klassischen tibetischen Schriftsprache*. 5. verbesserte Auflage. Bonn 1985. First published in 1971. The revision of this popular primer is unfortunately not as thorough as it should have been, and important problems raised in discussions of the book were not taken into account. In the preface, HAHN announces his intention to address these problems in a forthcoming English translation.

75. Cf. M. HAHN: *Der grosse Legendenkranz (Mahaj-jātakamālā). Eine mittelalterliche buddhistische Legendensammlung aus Nepal*. Nach Vorarbeiten von Gudrun Bühnemann und Michael Hahn herausgegeben und eingeleitet von Michael Hahn. Wiebaden 1985.

kathā. In his learned introduction, HAHN places the *MJM* in the context of Buddhist narrative literature, summarizes the contents of the text, and describes the development of Buddhist literature from the 1st to the 11th centuries. Of particular importance are his notes on Haribhaṭṭa and Gopadatta which were the object of a separate earlier study.⁷⁶

HAHN also edited and translated the *Lokānanda* of Candragomin.⁷⁷ The *Lokānanda* is a stage adaptation of the popular legend of Prince Mañicūḍa; with the notable exception of Harṣadeva's *Nāgānanda* it is the only complete, i.e., not fragmentary, Indian Buddhist drama to have survived, albeit only in Tibetan (and Mongolian) translation. HAHN argues for the identity of Candragomin the dramatist with the author of *Cāndravyākaraṇa* and *Śiṣyalekha*. This supposition has recently been criticized by Thomas OBERLIES in his study of the *Cāndravyākaraṇa*.⁷⁸

HAHN also edited the Tibetan text and translated the *Prajñāśataka* attributed to Nāgārjuna.⁷⁹ In an earlier study, Hahn demonstrated that this text had exercised a strong influence on Sa skya paṇḍita when he composed the *Subhāṣitaratnanidhi*. In the introduction HAHN argues in detail, against LINDTNER's view, that the author of the *Prajñāśataka* is identical with Nāgārjuna the Mādhyamika, on the basis of certain similarities of the text with the *Suḥrillekha* and the *Ratnāvalī*. However, because the attribution of these two works to Nāgārjuna is also doubtful a definitive conclusion regarding this issue is not possible (cf. also the Madhyamaka section below).

6. Epistolary literature

Epistolary literature is a relatively minor genre of Buddhist literature, and it is not surprising that only one important work can be pointed out

76. Cf. M. HAHN: *Haribhaṭṭa and Gopadatta: Two Authors in the Succession of Āryaśūra. On the Rediscovery of their Jātakamālās*. Tokyo 1977.

77. Cf. M. HAHN: *Candragomin's Lokānandanāṭaka. Nach dem tibetischen Tanjur herausgegeben und übersetzt. Ein Beitrag zur klassischen indischen Schauspiel-dichtung*. Wiesbaden 1974.

78. Cf. T. OBERLIES: *Studie zum Cāndravyākaraṇa. Eine kritische Bearbeitung von Candra IV.4.5-148 und V.2*. Stuttgart 1989. Cf. also HAHN's thoughtful reply, which raises important methodological issues, in "Über den indirekten Beweis bei literaturhistorischen Fragestellungen." *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 36 (1992): 91-103.

79. Cf. M. HAHN: *Hundert Strophen von der Lebensklugheit. Nāgārjunas Prajñāśataka*. Bonn 1990.

in this area, namely, DIETZ's *Die buddhistische Briefliteratur Indiens*.⁸⁰ This is an important contribution to the genre of Indian literature known as *lekha*. Of the twelve surviving letters, only one *lekha* is preserved in the original Sanskrit, namely, Candragomin's *Śisyalekha*, and remains unedited; the others are all available in Tibetan translations, and one also exists in Chinese, namely, Nāgārjuna's *Suhrllekha*. DIETZ edited and translated nine letters in this book. Editions and translations of the remaining three are currently under preparation either by DIETZ herself or by Michael HAHN, her doctoral supervisor. In her introduction DIETZ discusses the development of the *lekha* genre in India and Tibet. Without the original Sanskrit being available, the vocabulary of the Tibetan translations is sometimes very difficult to grasp, and in some cases Dietz uses the Mongolian translation of the Tanjur to elucidate the meaning of Tibetan words.

7. *Madhyamaka*

Madhyamaka studies are relatively neglected in Germany. If we disregard the few years that David SEYFORTH RUEGG spent in Hamburg, Max WALLESER seems to have been the last Madhyamaka specialist in Germany before Félix ERB. Nevertheless, some important work has been accomplished in this area as well, notably, HAHN's edition of the *Ratnāvalī*.⁸¹ Out of some 500 verses almost 300 (exactly 298 $\frac{3}{4}$) are extant in the original Sanskrit. The question of the authorship of this text is not yet settled. In spite of LINDTNER's view to the contrary,⁸² there is no compelling reason to accept the attribution of this work to Nāgārjuna; many scholars have voiced serious doubts as to whether this work could have been written by the author of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. HAHN's student Yokihiko OKADA edited the Tibetan translation of the commentary *Ratnāvalīṭīkā* by Ajitamitra.⁸³ Bhikkhu PĀSĀDIKA prepared a critical edition of the Tibetan translation of the *Sūtrasamuccaya*⁸⁴ which he claims to be an authentic work by the author of the

80. S. DIETZ: *Die buddhistische Briefliteratur Indiens. Nach dem tibetischen Tanjur herausgegeben, übersetzt und erläutert*. Wiesbaden 1984.

81. Cf. M. HAHN: *Nāgārjuna's Ratnāvalī*. Vol. I: The basic texts (Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese). Bonn 1982.

82. Cf. Ch. LINDTNER: *Nāgārjuniana*, repr. Delhi 1987, pp. 163-169.

83. Cf. Y. OKADA: *Die Ratnāvalīṭīkā des Ajitamitra*. Bonn 1990.

84. Cf. Bhikkhu PĀSĀDIKA: *Nāgārjuna's Sūtrasamuccaya: A Critical Edition of the Mdo Kun Las Btus Pa*. København 1989.

Mūlamadhyamakakārikā; he promises to discuss this and other topics in a forthcoming study.

The only Madhyamaka philologist who is currently active in Germany is Félix ERB who specializes in the works of Candrakīrti. Even though he has been working in this field for many years his first publication appeared only this year (1997). It consists of an edition and translation of Candrakīrti's extremely difficult commentary on the first 14 verses of Nāgārjuna's *Śūnyatāsaptati*.⁸⁵

However, the most important contribution to the interpretation of Nāgārjuna's thought is a series of articles by Claus OETKE in which he proposes a new interpretation of Nāgārjuna's philosophy. For lack of a better term one may call it a nihilist interpretation. However, this interpretation is not a revival of older nihilist interpretations like the one proposed by de LA VALLÉE POUSSIN. Rather, OETKE's new interpretation of Nāgārjuna's philosophy rests above all on a rigorous new analysis of the "mechanism" of Nāgārjuna's proofs of non-existence.⁸⁶

85. Cf. F. ERB: *Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti. Candrakīrtis Kommentar zu den "Siebzig Versen über die Leerheit" des Nāgārjuna [Kārikās 1-14]*. Stuttgart 1997. In this connection I also want to point out ERB's Dr. phil. thesis: *Die Śūnyatāsaptati des Nāgārjuna und die Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti [Verse 1-32]*. Hamburg 1990. This dissertation has not been commercially published and thus cannot be purchased, but according to the academic regulations for unpublished dissertations 175 copies were delivered to the Faculty of Oriental Studies for the purpose of distribution.

86. So far the following articles have been published:

- 1) "Die metaphysische Lehre Nāgārjunas," *Conceptus*, Jahrgang XXII, Nr. 56 (1988): 47-64.
- 2) "Rationalismus und Mystik in der Philosophie Nāgārjunas," *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 15 (1989): 1-39.
- 3) "On some non-formal aspects of the proofs of the Madhyamakakārikās," in *Earliest Buddhism and Madhyamaka*, ed. D. SEYFORTH RUEGG and L. SCHMITHAUSEN, Leiden 1990, pp. 91-109.
- 4) "Remarks on the interpretation of Nāgārjuna's philosophy," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 19 (1991): 315-323.
- 5) "Pragmatic Implications and Text-Interpretation. (The Alleged Logical Error of the Negation of the Antecedent in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā)," *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 16 (1992): 185-233.
- 6) "'Nihilist' and 'non-nihilist' interpretations of Madhyamaka" (Review article of T.E. WOOD, *Nāgārjunian Disputations. A Philosophical Journey through an Indian Looking-Glass*. Honolulu 1994), *Acta Orientalia* 57 (1996): 57-104.

Strictly speaking, only the first two or three papers should count as part of German Buddhist studies; the rest should be considered as Swedish studies since OETKE's appointment to the Chair of Indology at the University of Stockholm.

In this connection one may also mention that a large number of additional manuscripts of Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* was found recently in Nepal; these manuscripts have been microfilmed and are available through the Nepal German Manuscript Preservation Project. Anne MACDONALD at the University of Hamburg is currently preparing a new edition and translation of the crucial first chapter of the *Prasannapadā* on the basis of these and further manuscripts.

8. *Yogācāra*

The absolute authority on *Yogācāra* texts is Lambert SCHMITHAUSEN, who is undoubtedly one of the greatest Buddhist scholars of this century. He has a vast and detailed knowledge of Buddhist texts in all the major Buddhist languages (Sanskrit, Pāli, Tibetan, Mongolian, Chinese and Japanese), as well as of modern Buddhist scholarship. SCHMITHAUSEN has written important studies – his papers often constituting small monographs – on canonical Buddhism, Aśokan inscriptions, Abhidharma, Mahāyānasūtras and *pramāṇa*-literature. His specialty, however, is the *Yogācāra* school. Soon after completing his Dr. phil. thesis on the theory of error in Indian philosophy, which centers on Maṇḍanamiśra's *Vibhramaviveka*,⁸⁷ SCHMITHAUSEN shifted his focus of interest to early *Yogācāra*. His first major publication in this field was an edition and thoroughly annotated translation of the so-called *Nirvāṇa*-section of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* with extracts from Tao Lan's commentary *Yü-ch'ieh-shih-ti-lun-chi*. In his major work, *Ālayavijñāna*,⁸⁸ SCHMITHAUSEN attempted to determine the reasons for the assumption of the existence of an *ālayavijñāna* by *Yogācāra* authors. He advances the hypothesis that the *ālayavijñāna* was postulated in order to account for the re-emergence of consciousness after states such as *nirodha-samāpatti* in which consciousness seems to be interrupted. *Ālayavijñāna* in the "Initial Passage" (SCHMITHAUSEN's term for the passage in the *Yogācārabhūmi* which he takes to represent the literary and conceptual starting point of the *ālayavijñāna* theory) would thus mean "the mind [that is characterized by] sticking [in the material sense

87. Cf. L. SCHMITHAUSEN: *Maṇḍanamiśra's Vibhramavivekaḥ*. Wien 1965. Apart from an edition and translation of this difficult and partly corrupt text, the book contains a superb study of the theory of error in Indian philosophy from its very beginning in the philosophical *sūtras* until the post-Maṇḍana period.

88. Cf. L. SCHMITHAUSEN: *Ālayavijñāna. On the Origin and Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy*. 2 vols. Tokyo 1987.

faculties].” SCHMITHAUSEN also discerned a strong Sāṅkhya influence in the choice of the term *ālaya* for this form of the unconscious mind: *ālaya* and *pravṛtti* are analogous to *pralaya* and *vṛtti*. The *ālayavijñāna* was then used to solve further problems. It was identified with *vijñāna*, the third member of *pratītyasamutpāda*, and connected to the theory of *karman*; thus it became “the mind to which [all (polluted) dharmas] stick [as its effects]” or “the mind which sticks [to all (polluted) dharmas as their cause].”⁸⁹ Consequently, the *ālayavijñāna* was devalued and associated with notions such as “badness” (*daṣṭhulya*).

After the completion of *Ālayavijñāna*, SCHMITHAUSEN merged his scholarship with his increasing concern about the large-scale and systematic destruction of the environment. He published two monographs and a large number of papers on Buddhism and nature, in the hope that Buddhist ethics and *Weltanschauung* might provide an alternative to the ruthless exploitation of plants, living beings and the environment in general by the human species.⁹⁰

SCHMITHAUSEN’s investigations into early Yogācāra were continued by his student Hidenori SAKUMA who wrote his dissertation on the concept of *āśrayaparivṛtti* in the *Yogācārabhūmi*.⁹¹ SAKUMA showed that the “transformation of the base” is interpreted in certain sections as a psychological transformation due to which the “base” becomes free from “badness” and filled with “ease” (*praśrabdhi*); in other sections “badness” stands in opposition to power or control (*vaśitā*), and in still others “badness” is opposed to wisdom (*vidyādhātu*).

The latest important contribution to Yogācāra studies is by Klaus-Dieter MATHES with his study of the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*.⁹² MATHES edited and translated this important text together with Vasubandhu’s *Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavṛtti* and the modern Tibetan commentary by Mi pham ’jam dbyaṅs nam rgyal rgya mtsho (1846-1912).

89. Cf. L. SCHMITHAUSEN: *Ālayavijñāna*, §3.13.8.

90. Cf. L. SCHMITHAUSEN: *Buddhism and Nature*. Tokyo 1991. – *The Problem of the Sentience of Plants in Earliest Buddhism*. Tokyo 1991. Cf. also *Buddhism and Nature. Proceedings of an International Symposium on the Occasion of EXPO 1990*. Tokyo 1991.

91. Cf. H.S. SAKUMA: *Die Āśrayaparivṛtti-Theorie in der Yogācārabhūmi*. Stuttgart 1990.

92. Cf. K.-D. MATHES: *Unterscheidung der Gegebenheiten von ihrem wahren Wesen (Dharmadharmatāvibhāga)*. Swisttal-Odendorf 1996.

9. *Pramāṇa*

Immodest as this may sound, I believe that I am currently the only “German scholar” who specializes in Buddhist philosophy.⁹³ Although Lambert SCHMITHAUSEN is one of the foremost specialists also in this field, he has not been actively engaged in *pramāṇa* studies for many years now. SCHMITHAUSEN’s vast knowledge, philosophical acumen and scrupulousness are reflected in one of the first dissertations he supervised, that of Takashi IWATA.⁹⁴ In this thesis IWATA studied the well-known argument for idealism: Because an object, such as a blue color, and its cognition are always perceived together, the object and its cognition are not different from each other. IWATA presented with great care and precision the different interpretations of this argument by all the important logicians from Dharmakīrti onwards (Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Dharmottara, Kamalaśīla, Prajñākaragupta, Ratnākaraśānti, Jitāri, etc.) as well as the ramifications this argument has for crucial issues such as the distinction between a means of knowledge and its result (*pramāṇa* and *pramāṇaphala*), and the controversy whether a cognition has a form of its own or not (*sākāra-* vs. *nirākāravijñānavāda*). IWATA’s superb study has been hitherto almost completely ignored, and I am glad to have this opportunity to draw attention to it. More recently, Iwata published a monograph on the technical terms *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya* which reflect different employments of *reductio ad absurdum*.⁹⁵ IWATA is also engaged in a translation of the third chapter of Dharmakīrti’s *Pramāṇaviniścaya*; he has already published two instalments in the *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens*. One hopes, however, that the pace of publication of this important work will be accelerated in the future.

93. I use “philosophy” here in the technical sense as equivalent to *pramāṇaśāstra*. Some scholars may wish to consider Abhidharma or Yogācāra texts as philosophical texts. I cannot enter into this topic here; I merely want to make clear how I use the word “philosophy” in the present context.

94. Although IWATA’s dissertation was submitted in 1979, it was published only in 1991; cf. T. IWATA: *Sahopalambhaniyama: Struktur und Entwicklung des Schlusses von der Tatsache, dass Erkenntnis und Gegenstand ausschliesslich zusammen wahrgenommen werden, auf deren Nichtverschiedenheit*. 2 Vols. Stuttgart 1991.

95. Cf. T. IWATA: *Prasaṅga und Prasaṅgaviparyaya bei Dharmakīrti und seinen Kommentatoren*. Wien 1993.

In this connection mention must be made of two studies by Claus OETKE of the theory of inference, one concerning the doctrine of *trairūpya*, the other – which is quite unreadable – the *sattvānumāna*.⁹⁶ However, according to the criteria adopted here, these should count as Swedish publications.

Finally, my own research on Buddhist philosophy is mainly contained in two books. The first is a study of the sceptical Cārvāka philosopher Jayarāśi, and about half of it is devoted to his devastating criticism of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti; the second is concerned primarily with the proofs of rebirth adduced by Dharmakīrti and Prajñākaragupta.⁹⁷ In the post-Dharmakīrti period there were two towering figures in Buddhist philosophy: Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta. While Dharmottara's work has received much attention in Western scholarship from early on and several of his works have been translated into various European languages, namely, *Apoḥaprakaraṇa*, *Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi*, *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, *Paralokasiddhi* and *Laghuprāmāṇyaparīkṣā*, Prajñākaragupta's work has been hitherto almost completely ignored. In fact, my above-mentioned book contains the first attempt to translate and study in detail a part of his writings. Motoi ONO, who studied in Vienna, translated Prajñākaragupta's comments on *Pramāṇavārttika* 2.1-6. His dissertation is due to appear soon in the "Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde."

10. Tibetan Buddhism⁹⁸

Tibetan studies throughout the world have undergone great changes during the last 25 years.⁹⁹ Tibetan Buddhism is no longer studied as a mere tool for a better understanding of Indian Buddhism, but in its own

96. Cf. C. OETKE: *Bemerkungen zur buddhistischen Doktrin der Momentanheit des Seienden. Dharmakīrtis sattvānumānam*. Wien 1993. – *Studies on the Doctrine of trairūpya*. Wien 1994.

97. Cf. E. FRANCO: *Perception, Knowledge and Disbelief. A Study of Jayarāśi's Scepticism*. Stuttgart 1987, Delhi 21994. – *Dharmakīrti on Compassion and Rebirth*. Wien 1997.

98. No attempt has been made here to impose consistency in the transliteration of Tibetan names and terms; the transliterations below follows the usage of the respective authors.

99. One may obtain a reliable notion of current trends in Tibetan studies from the *Proceedings of the 7th Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Graz 1995*, eds. H. Krasser, T. Much, E. Steinkellner and H. Tauscher, Wien 1997.

right and as part of Tibetan civilisation. The changing perception of Tibetan Buddhism is also reflected in the choice of texts studied. Less attention is paid to canonical Tibetan texts while indigenous Tibetan writers increasingly occupy the center of the stage. One also notices an increase in historical studies at the expense of philosophical and religious studies. This shift of perspective is clearly reflected in the work of Dieter SCHUH who for many years has been the most prominent Tibetologist in Germany. Among his many accomplishments, one may first note his ground-breaking volume on the different systems of the Tibetan calendar,¹⁰⁰ which remains the standard work on this technical subject. He also continued the work begun by Manfred TAUBE of cataloguing Tibetan manuscripts in German libraries.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, SCHUH has accomplished the formidable task of publishing historical and diplomatic documents (Urkunden) that are crucial for our understanding of Tibetan history.¹⁰² SCHUH also edits a series on oral

100. Cf. D. SCHUH: *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der tibetischen Kalenderrechnung*. Wiesbaden 1973.

101. Cf. D. SCHUH: *Tibetische Handschriften und Blockdrucke sowie Tonbandaufnahmen tibetischer Erzählungen*. Teil 5 (= Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, Band XI.5). Wiesbaden, 1973. – *Tibetische Handschriften und Blockdrucke*. Teil 6. *Gesammelte Werke des Koṅ-sprul Blo-gros mtha'-yas*. (= Verzeichnis der orientalischen Handschriften in Deutschland, Band XI.6). Wiesbaden 1976.

The first four volumes by M. TAUBE deal with Tibetan manuscripts in what used to be the German Democratic Republic (DDR), i.e., in Altenburg, Dresden, Berlin, Halle and Herrnhut. Cf. also vol. 7 by F. Wilhelm and Jampa LOSANG PANGLUNG (1979); vol. 8 and 9 by D. SCHUH (1981, 1985); vol. 10 and 11 by P. SCHWIEGER (1990, 1995). For SCHWIEGER's work cf. also P. SCHWIEGER: *Ein tibetisches Wunschgebet um Wiedergeburt in der Sukhāvātī*. St. Augustin 1978.

102. Cf. D. SCHUH: *Erlasse und Sendschreiben mongolischer Herrscher für tibetische Geistliche. Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der Urkunden des tibetischen Mittelalters und ihrer Diplomatie*. St. Augustin 1977. – *Urkunden und Sendschreiben aus Zentraltibet, Ladakh und Zanskar*. Teil I: Faksimiles. St. Augustin 1976. – and L.S. DAGYAB: *Urkunden, Erlasse und Sendschreiben aus dem Besitz sikkimesischer Adelshäuser und des Klosters Phodang*. St. Augustin 1978. – and J.K. PHUKHANG: *Urkunden und Sendschreiben aus Zentraltibet, Ladakh und Zanskar*. Teil II: Edition der Texte. St. Augustin 1979. – *Grundlagen tibetischer Siegelkunde. Eine Untersuchung über tibetische Siegelaufschriften in 'Phags-pa-Schrift*. St. Augustin 1981. – *Das Archiv des Klosters bKra-šis-bsam-gtan-glin von sKyid-groñ*. Teil I: Urkunden zur Klosterordnung, grundlegende Rechtsdokumente und demographisch bedeutsame Dokumente,

narrative literature in various Tibetan dialects to which he contributed the first volume.¹⁰³ Each volume is dedicated to a different dialect and contains also a sketch of the particular features of the dialect.

SCHUH's work may be contrasted with that of Helmut EIMER which is exemplary for the way philologists with a Sanskrit background approach Tibetan studies. EIMER began to study the history of the transmission of the Kanjur at a time when "Kanjurology" as an area of study did not yet exist. However, with the continuing discovery of old Kanjurs, such as most recently the one in Tabo (cf. the survey on Austrian Buddhism below), Kanjur studies have become one of the most pressing tasks for "emancipated"¹⁰⁴ Tibetan philology, and EIMER's numerous meticulous studies make him an authority in this area.¹⁰⁵ Before he made Kanjur studies his area of specialisation, EIMER contributed several volumes on the life of Atiśa (982-1054), who played a key role in the revival of Buddhism in Tibet in the 11th century. His disciple 'Brom-ston rGyal-ba'i byuñ-gnas (1005-1064) was the founder of the bKa'-gdams-pa school; this school was perceived by Tsoñ-kha-pa to have been renewed by himself as the new bKa'-gdams-pa school, later called Ge-lugs-pa school, that by the 17th century, under the leadership of the Dalai lamas, became the dominant spiritual and political factor of Lamaist Buddhism.¹⁰⁶ Incidentally, EIMER has argued that the correct spelling is

Findbücher. St. Augustin 1988. The above volumes were published in the series Monumenta Tibetica Historica. Abteilung III: Diplomata et Epistolae. Vols. 1-6.

103. Cf. D. SCHUH: *Märchen, Sagen und Schwänke vom Dach der Welt*. St. Augustin 1982. To date 12 volumes appeared in the series "Beiträge zur tibetischen Erzählforschung" authored by M. KRETSCHMAR, S. HERMANN, P. SCHWIEGER, M. CAUSEMANN and others.
104. This adjective is used by STEINKELLNER in his preface to the collection of EIMER's papers. [I am not quite sure what it means.] Cf. H. EIMER: *Ein Jahrzehnt Studien zur Überlieferung des tibetischen Kanjur*. Wien 1992.
105. For a complete list of EIMER's publications cf. M. HAHN et al. (eds.): *Suhrlekhāḥ*. Festgabe für Helmut Eimer. Swisttal-Odendorf 1996, pp. XIII-XXIII.
106. Cf. H. EIMER: *Berichte über das Leben des Atiśa (Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna)*. Eine Untersuchung der Quellen. Wiesbaden 1977. – *Bodhipathapradīpa: Ein Lehrgedicht des Atiśa (Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna) in der tibetischen Überlieferung*. Wiesbaden 1978 This is a companion volume to the earlier *Berichte*; it contains a critical edition and translation of the Bpp.; cf. also H. EIMER: *rNam thar rgyas pa, Materialien zu einer Biographie des Atiśa (Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna)*. 2 vols. Wiesbaden 1979.

Atiśa, and not Atīśa, because the name must be derived from Sanskrit *atiśaya*.

The University of Bonn, to which SCHUH and EIMER are affiliated, is the largest center for Tibetan studies in Germany and also responsible for the particular German scholarship which combines Tibetology with Mongolian and Central Asian studies. Even though the towering achievements of Annemarie VON GABAIN and Walther HEISSIG are not recent enough to be included in this survey, their influence and the direction they gave to scholarship of this type are still very powerful and noticeable. Rudolf KASCHEWSKY wrote his dissertation on the life of Tson-kha-pa under HEISSIG's supervision.¹⁰⁷ KASCHEWSKY also co-authored with Pema TSERING a translation and study of a Buddhist play from north-eastern Nepal, and an episode from the Gesar Epic.¹⁰⁸ Other outstanding dissertations from the Bonn school include that of Karl-Heinz EVERDING on the "existence-line" of the Mongolian Tulkus called lCañ skya Qutuqtus,¹⁰⁹ and that of Karénina KOLLMAR PAULENZ on the relatively small and little-known gCod-school of Tibetan Buddhism, both supervised by Klaus SAGASTER. SAGASTER is also the editor of a monumental series on iconography and symbolism of Tibetan Buddhism.¹¹⁰ Five volumes have appeared so far in this series. The iconographical descriptions use a scheme of 23 (in vol. 5 only 19) cate-

107. Cf. R. KASCHEWSKY: *Das Leben des lamaistischen Heiligen Tshongkapa Blo-bzan-grags-pa* (1357-1419), dargestellt und erläutert anhand seiner Vita "Quellort allen Glückes". 2 Vols. Wiesbaden 1971.
108. Cf. R. KASCHEWSKY and P. TSERING: *Das Leben der Himmelsfee 'Gro-bzañ-mo. Ein buddhistisches Theaterstück*. Wien 1975. – *Die Eroberung der Burg von Sum-pa*. 2 vols. Wiesbaden 1987.
109. Cf. K.-H. EVERDING: *Die Präexistenzen der lCañ skya Qutuqtus. Untersuchungen zur Konstruktion und historischen Entwicklung einer lamaistischen Existenzlinie*. Wiesbaden 1988.
110. Cf. *Ikongraphie und Symbolik des tibetischen Buddhismus*. Ed. K. SAGASTER. Asiatische Forschungen 77a 77b [1983], 78 [1983], 96 [1987], 99 [1986], 114 [1991]. Wiesbaden. Vol. 1a-b by Loden Sherap DAGYAB and and Namgyal Gonpo RONGE describes the *sādhanas* from the collection of Ba-ri Brgya-rtsa. Vol. 2 by Ursula TOYKA-FUONG provides a detailed description and photographs (in black and white) of the sculptures of the important collection of Werner Schulemann in the Museum of East Asian Art in Köln (63 items). Vol. 3, also by TOKYA-FUONG, describes the sculptures of the collection of Ernst Senner (105 sculptures). Vol. 4 by DAGYAB deals with the *sādhanas* of the collection of Snar-thañ Brgya-rtsa and vol. 5, also by DAGYAB, presents the *sādhanas* of the collection of Sgrubs-thabs 'Dod-jo.

gories, such as gender, appearance, head, face, hair, eyes, mouth, arms, gesture, attributes, legs, position, jewellery, costume, basis and company. This series constitutes an courageous attempt to find a path through the jungle of Tibetan iconography.¹¹¹

Next to Bonn, a few professorships for Tibetan studies have recently been established in Hamburg, Leipzig and Berlin. The first appointee at Hamburg was Gedün LODRÖ who unfortunately died just a few weeks after the beginning of the appointment. David SEYFORTH RUEGG became his successor in this position. RUEGG remained in Hamburg only for a short period between 1984-1990. During this time he delivered and published his brilliant Jordan lectures.¹¹² In this set of five lectures, RUEGG undertook a "topological" study of a pair of opposing and complementary themes for which he uses the etic terms "nature" and "nurture." These etic terms are specified and illuminated by a rich variety of emic terms such as *tathāgatagarbha*, *śūnyatā*, and above all, *krama* and *yaugapadya*, with special reference to the Great Debate at bSam yas.

RUEGG's successor, David JACKSON, is one of the most prolific and versatile writers in Tibetan scholarship. In the last twenty years he has published more than thirty scholarly papers and no less than ten books.¹¹³ His most recent book is a major study of the history of Tibetan

111. For the overall plan for this project cf. K. SAGASTER and L.S. DAGYAB, "Zum Plan einer Sammlung von Materialien zur tibetischen Ikonographie. *Zentralasiatische Studien* 12 (1978): 359-411.
112. Cf. D. SEYFORTH RUEGG, *Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective. On the Transmission and Reception of Buddhism in India and Tibet*. [Reprint] Delhi 1992.
113. Cf. D.P. JACKSON, *Gateway to the Temple. Manual of Tibetan Monastic Customs, Art, Building and Celebrations. Text and translation of bsTan 'dzin mkho deb of Chogay Trichen Rinpoche*. Kathmandu 1979.
 - *The Mollas of Mustang. Historical, Religious and Oratorical Traditions of the Nepalese-Tibetan Borderland*. Dharmasala 1984.
 - *Tibetan Thangka Painting Methods and Materials*. London 1985. Rev. Ausg. 1988. [with J. A. Jackson]
 - *The Entrance Gate for the Wise (Section III). Sa-skyā Paṇḍita on Indian and Tibetan Traditions of Pramāṇa and Philosophical Debate*. 2 parts. Wien 1987.
 - *Rong-ston on the Prajñāpāramitā Philosophy of Abhisamayālamkāra. His Subcommentary on Haribhadra's 'Sphuṭārthā'. A Facsimile Reproduction of the Earliest Known Blockprint Edition from an Exemplar Preserved in the Tibet House Library, New Delhi*. Kyoto 1988 [together with S. ONODA].
 - *The "Miscellaneous Series" of Tibetan Texts in the Bihar Research Society*,

painting. In this pioneering work, JACKSON presented for the first time many historical documents that provide invaluable information on individual Tibetan painters from the 12th to the 20th century as well as on different styles of painting. JACKSON naturally focuses on central (and Central) Tibet, but also adds informative notes on regional styles such as those of Amdo, Khams, Bhutan, Ladakh, etc. JACKSON is a phenomenally broad reader and has an exquisite control over a wide variety of sources. Although he is primarily an historian, he also accomplished important work in the field of *pramāṇa* in which he continued and partly superseded earlier pioneering studies by Leonard VAN DER KUIJP.

VAN DER KUIJP, now a professor at Harvard, was the first scholar to devote a book-length study to the so-called New Epistemology of Tibet (*tshad ma gsar ma* as opposed to *tshad ma rnying ma* of the 10th and 11th century).¹¹⁴ It consists of four extremely informative essays on the leading figures of the period between the 11th and the 13th century, namely, Rngog lo tsā ba blo ldan śes rab, Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, Sa skya paṇḍita and Go ram pa. In presenting the life and work of these seminal figures, VAN DER KUIJP relates the story of how the old epistemology based on *Pramāṇaviniścaya* commentaries was swept aside by Sa skya paṇḍita's shift of attention to the *Pramāṇavārttika*. Further salient work in Hamburg was accomplished by Franz-Karl EHRHARD, whose study of a rDzogs-chen collection of poems is of special interest also for its methodological reflections on the way of approaching and interpreting such texts. In his notes EHRHARD attempts to combine philological and hermeneutical approaches with literary criticism.¹¹⁵

Patna. A Handlist. Stuttgart 1989.

– *The Early Abbots of 'Phan-po Na-lendra. The Vicissitudes of a Great Tibetan Monastery in the 15th Century.* Wien 1989.

– *Two Biographies of Śākyaśrībhadrā. The Eulogy by Khro-phu lo-tśā-ba and its Commentary by bSod-nams-dpal-bzang-po. Text and Variants from Two Rare Exemplars in the Bihar Research Society, Patna.* Stuttgart 1990.

– *Enlightenment by a Single Means. Tibetan Controversies on the "Self-Sufficient White Remedy"* (dkar po chig thub). Wien 1994.

– *A History of Tibetan Painting. The Great Painters and their Traditions.* Wien 1996.

114. L.W.J. VAN DER KUIJP: *Contributions to the Development of Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century.* Wiesbaden 1983.

115. Cf. F.-K. EHRHARD: "Flügel schläge des Garuda." *Literar- und ideengeschichtliche Bemerkungen zu einer Liedersammlung des rDzog-chen.* Stuttgart 1990.

Jens-Uwe HARTMANN and Per SÖRENSEN were appointed professors of Tibetology in 1995 at the Universities of Leipzig and Berlin (Humboldt-Universität) respectively. HARTMANN is a specialist in the Turfan manuscripts and has written an important monograph on Mātr̥ceta (cf. the section on the Turfan discoveries above). Among SÖRENSEN's publications in the period for which he would count as a German Tibetologist, one should mention his translation of the important popular chronicle *rGyal-rab gsal-ba'i me-long* compiled by Bla-ma dam-pa bSod-nams rgyal-mtshan, which begins with the genesis of the universe and ends at the time of Atiśa.¹¹⁶ Another important and rare chronicle, the *Me-tog Phren-ba* by Nel-pa Paṇḍita, which quotes long passages from older, otherwise unknown texts, and which is particularly informative for the early period of the spread of Buddhism in Tibet, was edited with facsimiles of the manuscript and translated by Helga UEBACH.¹¹⁷

As is clear from the above, the emphasis in Tibetan studies during the last 25 years has not been on canonical Tibetan sources. However, to conclude I may mention two important studies of the language of canonical translations into Tibetan, both of which supplement the earlier achievement of the Norwegian scholar Nils SIMONSSON.¹¹⁸ Heinz ZIMMERMANN investigated the factors that are responsible for "mistaken" translations from Sanskrit to Tibetan.¹¹⁹ He also analyses the structure of the Tibetan sentence and thus deals with a relatively neglected aspect of Tibetan grammar. He distinguishes between two fundamental structures: fan structure (Fächerstruktur) and circular structure (Ringstruktur), and shows how complicated sentences can be constructed by

116. Cf. P.K. SÖRENSEN: *Tibetan Buddhist Historiography. The Mirror Illuminating the Royal Genealogies. An Annotated Translation of the XIVth Century Tibetan Chronicle: rGyal-rabs gsal-ba'i me-long*. Wiesbaden 1994.
117. Cf. H. UEBACH: *Nel-pa Paṇḍitas Chronik Me-tog phren-ba: Handschrift der Library of Tibetan Works and Archives. Tibetischer Text in Faksimile, Transkription und Übersetzung*. München 1987.
118. Cf. N. SIMONSSON: *Indo-tibetische Studien. Die Methoden der tibetischen Übersetzer, untersucht im Hinblick auf die Bedeutung ihrer Übersetzungen für die Sanskritphilologie*. Upsala 1957.
119. Cf. H. ZIMMERMANN: *Die Subhāṣita-ratna-karaṇḍaka-kathā (dem Āryaśūra zugeschrieben) und ihre tibetische Übersetzung. Ein Vergleich zur Darlegung der Irrtumsrisiken bei der Auswertung tibetischer Übersetzungen*. Wiesbaden 1975.

means of these minimal elements.¹²⁰ OETKE, on the other hand, studied translations of the *Suvarṇaprabhāsa-sūtra* from Chinese to Tibetan and in this connection made essential observations on the use of auxiliary verbs in classical Tibetan.¹²¹

11. *East Asian Buddhism* (contributed by Michael FRIEDRICH¹²²)

Because there is not a single permanent position designated for the study of East Asian Buddhism at academic institutions in the German-speaking world, research in this area is not conducted in a systematic manner.¹²³ The bulk of the contributions is constituted by Dr. phil. dissertations in Sinology, Japanology or religious studies motivated by individual interests, and by-products of the research project on the life and work of Xuanzang directed by Klaus RÖHRBORN at the University of Göttingen. Furthermore, exhibitions of East Asian Buddhist art regularly result in major catalogues. Occasionally, one finds important articles in the main scholarly journals concerned with Asian studies, but their number still reflects the wide-spread lack of interest in Buddhism in East Asian studies. In view of the contemporary relevance of Buddhism in the area this situation is untenable. It is to be hoped that recent innovations such as an interdisciplinary M.A. course in Buddhist studies (including East and Southeast Asian studies) at the University of Hamburg will establish a foundation to be built upon in the future.

Even if one disregards popular works and translations from other European languages as well as contributions to the "Christian-Buddhist dialogue" and publications by East Asian Buddhist communities or networks in the West, the following account is still far from complete and, due to unsatisfactory research tools, to some extent incidental. In those cases where I have not been able to consult a work I just provide the bibliographical information.

120. Cf. H. ZIMMERMANN: *Wortlaut und Sprachstruktur im Tibetischen*. Wiesbaden 1979.

121. Cf. C. OETKE: *Die aus dem Chinesischen übersetzten tibetischen Versionen des Suvarṇaprabhāsa-sūtra. Philologische und linguistische Beiträge zur klassifizierenden Charakterisierung übersetzter Texte*. Wiesbaden 1977.

122. I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Herbert Worm and Jörg Plassen, M.A., both Hamburg, for providing some helpful information.

123. For earlier achievements of German-language research on East Asian Buddhism one may consult the bibliographies cited in section I.1.a. of this survey.

a. *Generalia*

The majority of studies concerns China and Japan; Korea is – as always – under-represented although her importance in linking these two cultures and in the innovation of Buddhism is commonly acknowledged.¹²⁴ There are no bibliographies specialized in German-language studies on East Asian Buddhism. Students have to rely on the bibliographical tools generally in use in East Asian studies.¹²⁵ After HACKMANN's manuscript of a Chinese-Sanskrit-German Dictionary (certainly superior to that by SOOTHILL and HODOUS) was published by Johannes NOBEL¹²⁶ no further lexicographical projects were undertaken, but some of the monographs on texts translated from Indian languages into Chinese contain useful glossaries.¹²⁷ There is no academic German-language journal devoted solely to East Asian Buddhism, though occasionally

124. The best introduction to Korean Buddhism is still to be found in Fr. VOS: *Die Religionen Koreas*. Stuttgart 1977. Furthermore, two dissertations are helpful: U. WISSINGER: *Geschichte und Religion Koreas im Spannungsfeld der großen Religionen und Reiche Ostasiens. Schamanistische, buddhistische, taoistische und konfuzianistische Grundlagen für die soziale und kulturelle Entwicklung des Landes*. Unpublished Dr. theol. diss. Freie Universität Berlin; Sang-Woo HAN (Regensburg): *Die Suche nach dem Himmel im Denken Koreas. Eine religionswissenschaftliche und -philosophische Untersuchung zur Hermeneutik des Menschen zwischen Himmel und Erde*. Frankfurt am Main 1987.
125. Besides the *Bibliography of Asian Studies*, published yearly by the Association for Asian Studies in Ann Arbor, and the *Annual Bibliography of Oriental Studies (Tōyōgaku bunken rokumoku)*, published by the Institute for Research in the Humanities of Kyoto University, the following tools are useful for Chinese Buddhism: L.G. THOMPSON: *Chinese Religions in Western Languages. A Comprehensive and Classified Bibliography of Publications in English, French, and German through 1980*. Tucson 1985; L.G. THOMPSON and G. SEAMAN (eds): *Chinese Religions. Publications in Western Languages 1981 through 1990*, Ann Arbor 1993; for Japanese Buddhism cf. S. FORMANEK and P. GETREUER: *Verzeichnis des deutschsprachigen Japan-Schrifttums 1980-1987*. Wien 1989; P. GETREUER: *Verzeichnis des deutschsprachigen Japan-Schrifttums 1988-1989*. Wien 1991; K. KLEIBER: *Verzeichnis des deutschsprachigen Japan-Schrifttums 1990-1991*. Wien 1995.
126. H. HACKMANN: *Erklärendes Wörterbuch zum chinesischen Buddhismus Chinesisch-Sanskrit-Deutsch*. Ed. J. Nobel. Leiden [?1960].
127. E.g., K. MEISIG: *Das Śrāmanyaphala-Sūtra. Synoptische Übersetzung und Glossar der chinesischen Fassungen verglichen mit dem Sanskrit und Pāli*. Wiesbaden 1987.

related articles are published in the major European series.¹²⁸ Gerhard SCHMITT has published a catalogue of Chinese Buddhist text fragments presumably of the Turfan holdings of the State Library at Berlin. It is listed as the first volume of a series, but no further volumes seem to have appeared.¹²⁹ A long article on the mythology of Chinese Buddhism by Franz J. MEIER in the *Wörterbuch der Mythologie* provides a general introduction to this aspect of Chinese Buddhism.¹³⁰

b. History and intellectual history

Herbert FRANKE (born 1914), emeritus of Munich University, has time and again, in teaching and writing, dealt with Buddhism. One of the few German-speaking Sinologists who has command not only over East Asian tongues, but also over a wide range of Central Asian and Indian languages, he has in many articles studied aspects of Buddhism under the Mongolian Yuan dynasty (1280-1367). Two of his more recent studies are concerned with the consecration of the White Stūpa in 1279 in Peking and its history under the Yuan,¹³¹ and with a Chinese non-canonical Buddhist text translated into Uigur, Mongolian, and Tibetan.¹³² In 1996 a collection of three studies appeared, dealing with the influential Tibetan monk Tan-pa, the Tripitaka catalogue compiled under Qubilai, and a collection of anecdotes describing Qubilai as a faithful Buddhist.¹³³

Helwig SCHMIDT-GLINTZER, FRANKE's successor in Munich and now director of the Herzog August Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel, has studied the history of Chinese Buddhism in two major works. His Munich Dr. phil. dissertation is a study of the *Hongming ji*, the oldest extant compilation of Buddhist apologetic literature by the monk

128. *Asia Major* 3rd ser.; *Asiatische Studien*; *Monumenta Serica*; *Nachrichten der Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens*; *Oriens Extremus*; *T'oung Pao*.

129. G. SCHMITT: *Katalog chinesischer buddhistischer Textfragmente*. Berlin n. d.

130. Fr. J. MEIER: "Die Mythologie des chinesischen Buddhismus," in *Wörterbuch der Mythologie*, vol. 4, Stuttgart 1988, pp. 441-735.

131. H. FRANKE: "Consecration of the 'White Stūpa' in 1279," *Asia Major* 3rd ser. 7, 1994: 155-183.

132. H. FRANKE: "The Taoist Elements in Buddhist Great Bear Sūtra (Pei-tou ching)," *Asia Major* 3rd ser., 1990: 75-111.

133. H. FRANKE: *Chinesischer und tibetischer Buddhismus im China der Yüanzeit. Drei Studien*. München 1996.

Sengyou (445-518).¹³⁴ In his habilitation thesis an attempt is undertaken to situate the universal histories of Chinese Buddhism during the Song dynasty (960-1279) in the social and intellectual milieu of their time.¹³⁵ Hannelore EISENHOFER-HALIM has written on the Japanese monk Dōshō (629-700) and Sino-Japanese relations.¹³⁶

Iso KERN, a Swiss philosopher with a strong interest in Chinese thought, has studied the Buddhist critique of Christianity in 17th-century China. Following an informed introduction, he presents translations of texts by one lay Buddhist and four monks of the late Ming (1368-1643) who were reacting to the spread of the Christian mission.¹³⁷

c. *Philosophy and schools of Buddhism*

German-language studies of East Asian Buddhism have a strong inclination towards philosophy as well as the history of ideas ("Geistesgeschichte"). Although the traditional partition in indigenous schools may be misleading in some respects, it is still used for identifying different ways of thought and exegesis.

Bruno PETZOLDT (1874-1949), who spent the second half of his life in Japan, has left voluminous manuscripts, some of which have recently been edited. Although not literate in Chinese or Japanese, he drew on the help of well-known Buddhist scholars who supplied him extensive information. Shohei ICHIMURA, one of his Japanese students who became a well-known scholar of Chinese Buddhism himself, has edited PETZOLDT's monumental study on the Buddhist doxographical systems.¹³⁸ The editor has added a bibliography and glossary which increase the size of the volume to more than 1,000 pages. The result is the most complete

134. H. SCHMIDT-GLINTZER: *Das Hung-ming chi und die Aufnahme des Buddhismus in China*. Wiesbaden 1976.
135. H. SCHMIDT-GLINTZER: *Die Identität der buddhistischen Schulen und die Kompilation buddhistischer Universalgeschichten in China. Ein Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte der Sung-Zeit*. Wiesbaden 1982.
136. H. EISENHOFER-HALIM: *Dōshō (629-700). Leben und Wirken eines japanischen Buddhisten vor dem Hintergrund der chinesisch-japanischen Beziehungen im 7. Jh.* Frankfurt am Main 1995.
137. I. KERN: *Buddhistische Kritik am Christentum im China des 17. Jahrhunderts*. Bern 1992.
138. Br. PETZOLD: *The Classification of Buddhism Bukkyō Kyōhan. Comprising the Classification of Buddhist Doctrines in India, China and Japan*. Ed. Shohei ICHIMURA in collaboration with Shinshō HANAYAMA, Wiesbaden 1995.

account of the different schools' attempts to classify Buddhist doctrines ranging from Indian beginnings to Chinese and Japanese classifications.

— α. Nichiren School

The Tendai monk Nichiren (1222-1282), founder of a school relying heavily on the teachings of the Lotus Sūtra and opposed to the popular beliefs of Amitābha-Buddhism, has been studied in the Munich Dr. phil. dissertation by Margret VON BORSIG; it was published in 1976.¹³⁹ Her German translation of the Lotus Sūtra on the basis of Kumārajīva's Chinese text was published in 1992.¹⁴⁰

— β. Tiantai/Tendai and Huayan/Kegon

In his monumental study of Tiantai/Tendai,¹⁴¹ PETZOLD not only gives a detailed account of its doctrines in China and Japan, but also relates them to influences from indigenous traditions such as Taoism. By drawing on European philosophers and mystics as well, PETZOLD focuses mainly on comparative issues. Even though this work is outdated in several respects, it remains the most comprehensive study of this school in any European language.

Peter FISCHER, in his Hamburg Dr. phil. dissertation, has studied the Japanese eschatological text *Mappō-tōmyō-ki* attributed to the Tendai monk Saichō (767-822).¹⁴² The translation of the text is accompanied by a useful sketch of the development of the concept of *Endzeit* in Buddhism and a thorough discussion of historical and textual problems which results in the confirmation of the traditional attribution of the text and its date (801).

Another important contribution not only to Tiantai, but also to Huayan is the monograph by Robert Klaus HEINEMANN on the relation of prac-

139. M. v. BORSIG: *Leben aus der Lotosblüte. Nichiren Shonin: Zeuge Buddhas, Kämpfer für das Lotos-Gesetz, Prophet der Gegenwart. Ein Beitrag zu den Beziehungen zwischen ostasiatischer und westlicher Geistigkeit und zum Verständnis des modernen Japan.* Freiburg im Breisgau 1976.

140. M. v. BORSIG (tr.): *Lotos-Sūtra. Sūtra von der Lotosblume des wunderbaren Gesetzes.* Gerlingen 1992.

141. Br. PETZOLD: *Die Quintessenz der T'ien-t'ai-(Tendai-)Lehre. Eine komparative Untersuchung.* Ed. H. HAMMITZSCH. Wiesbaden 1982.

142. P. FISCHER: *Studien zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Mappō-Gedankens und zum Mappō-tōmyō-ki.* Hamburg 1976.

tice to the goal of awakening.¹⁴³ He attempts to show that the strict gradual progression of the Bodhisattva's practice in earlier Buddhism is slowly dissolved and replaced by a different concept identifying the process of practice with the goal. According to HEINEMANN, the main stages in this development are the Chinese translation of the *Huayan jing* (*Avatamsaka-sūtra*), works of the Chinese monks Zhiyi (538-597) and Fazang (643-712), founders of the Tiantai and Huayan schools, and finally the work of Dōgen (1200-1253), the famous Japanese Zen monk and founder of the Japanese Sōtō (Chinese: Caodong) school. Although one may object to some of HEINEMANN's conclusions, the work has given a fresh perspective on the characteristics of East Asian Buddhism.

The philosophy of the famous Korean monk Wonhyō is the subject of a Würzburg Dr. phil. dissertation by Yung-kye KANG.¹⁴⁴

Finally, a complete translation of the shorter *Huayan jing* has to be mentioned, even though it is *sensu stricto* outside the scope of this survey. Torakazu DOI's German version was financed and published by the Tōdaiji in four volumes.¹⁴⁵

— γ. Chan/Zen

The supposedly unorthodox traditions of Chinese Chan and Japanese Zen have continually attracted the attention of scholars and laymen alike. Undoubtedly, the doyen of Zen studies is Heinrich DUMOULIN S.J. (born 1905), emeritus of Sophia University, Tokyo. Besides numerous books on general topics of Buddhism and on its present situation, he has published a comprehensive history of Zen Buddhism in two volumes which is the only work of its kind in a Western language.¹⁴⁶ Among his books on Zen, one has to mention those on its spiritual path,¹⁴⁷ on the

143. R. KI. HEINEMANN: *Der Weg des Übens im ostasiatischen Mahāyāna. Grundformen seiner Zeitrelation zum Übungsziel in der Entwicklung bis Dōgen*. Wiesbaden 1979.

144. Yung-Kye KANG: *Prinzip und Methode in der Philosophie Wonhyos*. Hildesheim 1981.

145. T. DOI (tr.): *Das Kegon Sutra. Im Auftrag des Tempels Tōdaiji aus dem chinesischen Text übersetzt*. 4 vols., Tokyo 1978-1983.

146. H. DUMOULIN: *Geschichte des Zen-Buddhismus*. Vol. 1: Indien und China, vol. 2: Japan, Bern 1975 (2nd ed. 1985, 1986).

147. H. DUMOULIN: *Der Erleuchtungsweg des Zen im Buddhismus*. Frankfurt am Main 1976.

development of Chinese Zen [!] after the sixth patriarch,¹⁴⁸ and on Zen in the 20th century.¹⁴⁹

Further, he has contributed a translation of one of the two most influential compilations of "public cases" (*gongan/kōan*) of Wumen Huikai's (1182-1260) *Wumen guan*, in 1975;¹⁵⁰ Walter LIEBENTHAL, another German-born scholar of renown, published his version of the same work in 1977.¹⁵¹ The other important compilation of *gongan* is the voluminous *Biyān lu* by Yuanwu Keqin (1063-1135). In 1973, the third and last part of the huge translation by the noted Japanologist Wilhelm GUNDERT (1881-1971) was published posthumously; although far from being complete, it is to date the most serious attempt to do justice to the text in a Western language.¹⁵² It contains not only the cases proper, but also all the commentaries by Xuedou Chongxian (980-1053) and Yuanwu himself.

The collected sayings of the Chan master Linji/Rinzai (?-866) are the subject of a Hamburg Dr. phil. dissertation by Robert Christian MÖRTH. In addition to a complete translation, he has presented an attempt to systematize the text known as *Linji lu*.¹⁵³ The topic of a Frankfurt Dr. phil. dissertation by Gerhard A. DÖHRN is a contemporary collection of Chan poems from the 7th up to the 16th century. The book, published in 1993, mainly consists of selected translations with some notes and general remarks on comparative aspects.¹⁵⁴

148. H. DUMOULIN: *The development of Chinese Zen after the sixth patriarch*. Taipei [ca. 1990].
149. H. DUMOULIN: *Zen im 20. Jahrhundert*. München 1990.
150. H. DUMOULIN (tr.): *Mumon Kan, die Schranke ohne Tor. Meister Wu-men's Sammlung der achtundvierzig Koan*. Mainz 1975.
151. W. LIEBENTHAL (tr.): *Ch'an-tsung Wu-men kuan. Zutritt nur durch die Wand*. Heidelberg 1977. – Yet another translation is by Kōun YAMADA, *Mumonkan: Zen-Meister Mumons Koan-Sammlung. Die torlose Schranke*. München 1989. LIEBENTHAL has earlier translated the work of Sengzhao, disciple of Kumārajīva: *Chao Lun. The Treatises of Seng-chao*. Hong Kong 1968.
152. W. GUNDERT (tr.): *Bi-Yān-Lu. Meister Yüan-wus Niederschrift von der Smaragdenen Felswand*. Vol. 1: München 1960, vol. 2: München 1967, vol. 3: München 1973. A paperback issue of all three volumes in one appeared München 1983.
153. R. Chr. MÖRTH: *Das Lin-chi lu des Ch'an-Meisters Lin-chi Yi-hsüan (+866). Der Versuch einer Systematisierung des Lin-chi lu*. Hamburg 1987.
154. G.A. DÖHRN: *Kurzgedichte chinesischer Chan-Meister*. Frankfurt am Main 1993.

An interesting topic forms the subject of a Zurich Dr. phil. dissertation by Claudia FRITZ. She studies the administrative structure of Chan-temples in late Yuan time (1280-1367) and, besides a copiously annotated translation of chapter IV of the *Chixiu Baizhang qinggui* (1343), provides a helpful overview of the development of rules and regulations in Zen institutions, drawing heavily on Japanese research.¹⁵⁵

Helmut BRINKER of the Rietberg Museum in Zurich has studied Chan/Zen in East Asian art and edited the papers of an International Symposium on Zen in East Asia at Zurich University in 1982 which finally appeared in 1985.¹⁵⁶ The same year saw the appearance of his monograph on Zen in the art of painting.¹⁵⁷ An exhibition on Zen and Japanese culture at the Museum für Völkerkunde in Berlin in 1993/94 is documented in a catalogue with articles by most German-language scholars of Zen. It also contains 100 photographs documenting the architecture and everyday life of the famous temple Tenryūji in Kyōto.¹⁵⁸

— δ. Xuanzang and Yogācāra

The above-mentioned project on the life and work of Xuanzang (600-664) (cf. section 3 above) has yielded, besides studies of the Old Turkic versions of his biography, helpful translations of two chapters of the Chinese biography of Xuanzang, the *Datang daciensi sanzang fashi zhuan* begun by Huili (born 615) and completed by Yancong (fl. middle of the 7th century). Chapter VII was translated by Alexander Leonhard MAYER,¹⁵⁹ and the following chapter by Uwe FRANKENHAUSER.¹⁶⁰ Copious notes along with the discussion of textual problems make these volumes valuable tools for further research. In 1992, MAYER published his work on Xuanzang as “translator and sage,” an account of the activities of this famous monk.¹⁶¹ FRANKENHAUSER’s Dr. phil. dissertation

155. Cl. FRITZ: *Die Verwaltungsstruktur der Chan-Klöster in der späten Yuan-Zeit. Das 4. Buch der Chixiu Baizhang qinggui, übersetzt, annotiert und mit einer Einleitung versehen.* Bern 1994.

156. H. BRINKER (ed.): *Zen in China, Japan, East Asian Art. Papers of the Internat. Symposium on Zen, Zurich University, 16.-18.11.1982.* Bern 1985.

157. H. BRINKER: *Zen in der Kunst des Malens.* Bern 1985.

158. Cl. MÜLLER (ed.): *Zen und die Kultur Japans. Klosteralltag in Kyoto.* Berlin 1993.

159. A.L. MAYER: *Cien-Biographie VII.* Wiesbaden 1991.

160. U. FRANKENHAUSER: *Cien-Biographie VIII.* Wiesbaden 1995.

161. A.L. MAYER: *Xuanzang. Übersetzer und Heiliger.* Wiesbaden 1992.

(Göttingen) deals mainly with the introduction of Buddhist logic (*yinming*) into China, but also covers later developments.¹⁶² Further, the Swiss philosopher KERN has published articles on the philosophy of Xuanzang.¹⁶³

— ε. Jintu/Jōdō (“Pure Land”)

Amitābha Buddhism has played an important role in China at the latest from the 4th century onwards. In Japan, the various Amitābha schools increasingly gained importance since Kamakura times (1192-1333), and they still represent the most numerous group today. Their supposed founder Hōnen (1133-1212) is studied in the Marburg Dr. phil. dissertation by Christoph KLEINE.¹⁶⁴ Relying on his background in religious studies, KLEINE attempts to answer the question whether Hōnen was proposing reform, reformation or heresy. He opts for the last. Christian STEINECK has translated short texts by three famous proponents of Jōdō: next to Hōnen, Shinran (1173-1262) and the mendicant monk Ippen (1239-1289) are represented.¹⁶⁵ In a study and translation of a pictorial scroll containing an account of Ippen’s life, Franziska EHMCKE has provided an introduction to Jōdō and Ippen.¹⁶⁶ Volker ZOTZ has written a study on Shin-Buddhism, one of the Amitābha-denominations.¹⁶⁷

— ζ. Shingon (“True Word”)

Esoteric Buddhism has survived in Japan up to the present and is known as Shingon or Mikkyō (“Secret Teaching”). Its introduction to Japan is

162. U. FRANKENHAUSER: *Die Einführung der buddhistischen Logik in China*. Wiesbaden 1996.
163. I. KERN: “The structure of consciousness according to Xuanzang,” *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, vol. 19, no. 3 (1988): 282-295; “Object, Objective Phenomenon and Objectivating Act According to the ‘Vijñaptimātrāsiddhi’ of Xuanzang (600-664)”, in D. P. CHATTOPADHYAYA, L. EMBREE and J. MOHANTY (eds), *Phenomenology and Indian Philosophy*, New Delhi 1992, pp. 262-269.
164. Chr. KLEINE: *Hōnens Buddhismus des Reinen Landes. Reform, Reformation oder Häresie?* Frankfurt am Main 1996.
165. Chr. STEINECK: *Quellentexte des japanischen Amida-Buddhismus*. Wiesbaden 1997.
166. Fr. EHMCKE: *Die Wanderungen des Mönchs Ippen. Bilder aus dem mittelalterlichen Japan*. Köln 1992.
167. V. ZOTZ: *Der Buddha im reinen Land. Shin-Buddhismus in Japan*. München 1991.

traditionally attributed to the monk Kūkai (774-835), or Kōbō Daishi, who brought it to Japan upon his return from his studies in China. Four short texts of his have been translated into German.¹⁶⁸ The catalogue of a 1988 Cologne exhibition of the art of Shingon covers all aspects of Shingon and contains some valuable essays.¹⁶⁹ Dietrich SECKEL has published a monograph on Buddhist temple names in Japan.¹⁷⁰

d. Practice

A Munich Dr. phil. dissertation examines the reception and the cult of an esoteric *dhāraṇī* in China; Maria Dorothea REIS-HABITO has given a very comprehensive account of the *Mahākaruṇikacittadhāraṇī* which was translated into Chinese by the Indian Bhagavaddharma around 650 and is still recited today on Taiwan. In addition to presenting a translation of the text containing the *dhāraṇī*, she discusses different versions of the text and supplementary materials from Tun-huang. Drawing on historical and literary sources, REIS-HABITO highlights the spread of the *dhāraṇī* and its role in confessional rituals.¹⁷¹ Marcus GÜNZEL has studied another aspect of Buddhist practice still alive today. His Göttingen Dr. phil. dissertation deals with the liturgical texts recited in the morning and evening classes. These texts have been in use since the late 16th century.¹⁷²

e. Art

Gunhild GABBERT has compiled a catalogue of the Buddhist sculptures originating from China and Japan in the Museum für Ostasiatische Kunst at Cologne.¹⁷³ Roger GOEPPER, the former director of the museum, has

168. M. Eihō KAWAHARA and C. Yūhō JOBST: *Kōbō Daishi Kūkai. Ausgewählte Schriften*. München 1992.
169. R. GOEPPER (ed.), *Shingon. Die Kunst des Geheimen Buddhismus in Japan*. Köln 1988; cf. also R. GOEPPER: *Das Kultbild im Ritus des esoterischen Buddhismus Japans*. Opladen 1983.
170. D. SECKEL: *Buddhistische Tempelnamen in Japan*. Stuttgart 1985.
171. M.D. REIS-HABITO: *Die Dhāraṇī des Großen Erbarmens des Bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara mit tausend Händen und Augen. Übersetzung und Untersuchung ihrer textlichen Grundlage sowie Erforschung ihres Kultes in China*. Nettetal 1993.
172. M. GÜNZEL: *Die Morgen- und Abendliturgie der chinesischen Buddhisten*. Göttingen 1994.
173. G. GABBERT: *Buddhistische Plastik aus China und Japan. Bestandskatalog des Museums für Ostasiatische Kunst der Stadt Köln*. Wiesbaden 1972.

edited a catalogue accompanying the exhibition of calligraphies of contemporary Japanese monks.¹⁷⁴ Fausta NOWOTNY has written on the Pāli canon and East Asian art.¹⁷⁵

f. Literature and theory of translation

Marion MEISIG has written a study on the well-known narrative of King Śibi and the dove which is found in different versions in the Mahābhārata and has been adopted by Jainas and Buddhists alike.¹⁷⁶ She examined all extant versions in the Chinese Buddhist canon, established a stemma and extensively discussed textual and interpretational problems. Furthermore, the Chinese glossary of 101 pages will be of great assistance in further research.

In his Cologne Dr. phil. dissertation Axel HELD has studied Yancong's (557-610) theory of translation.¹⁷⁷ In a short article¹⁷⁸ he has rejected the common opinion that Daoan (312/4-385), in one of his forewords, gave a general recommendation for translators, and relates the principles of translation proposed there to the concrete text the foreword was written for.

g. East Asian Buddhism in modern times

Chinese Buddhism in the 20th century has been the object of two studies. In the first years of the Republic, quite a few scholars turned to Chinese Yogācāra traditions in order to find new orientations. Important figures in this movement were the monk Taixu and the layman Ouyang Jingwu who are studied in the Munich Dr. phil. dissertation by Gotelind MÜLLER.¹⁷⁹ Xiong Shili (1885-1968), another representative of that current, exerted some influence with his "New Idealism" (*Xin weishi*

174. R. GOEPPER: *Worte des Buddha. Kalligraphien japanischer Priester der Gegenwart, Sammlung Seiko Kono, Abt des Daian-ji, Nara.* Köln 1982.

175. F. NOWOTNY: *Pāli-Kanon und ostasiatische Kunst.* Köln 1975.

176. M. MEISIG: *König Śibi und die Taube. Wandlung und Wanderung eines Erzählstoffes von Indien nach China.* Wiesbaden 1995.

177. A. HELD: *Der buddhistische Mönch Yen-Ts'ung (557-610) und seine Übersetzungstheorie.* Unpublished Dr. phil. dissertation, Köln 1972.

178. A. HELD: "Enthält Tao-an's Vorwort in CSTCC 8, 1 wirklich 'Leitsätze für die Übersetzer'?", *Nachrichten der Gesellschaft für Natur- und Völkerkunde Ostasiens* 127-128 (1980): 111-119.

179. G. MÜLLER: *Buddhismus und Moderne. Ouyang Jingwu, Taixu und das Ringen um ein zeitgemäßes Selbstverständnis im chinesischen Buddhismus des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts.* Stuttgart 1993.

lun). The Dr. phil. dissertation by Qingxiong ZHANG (Freiburg im Üechtland) deals with his philosophy.¹⁸⁰

The Cologne Dr. phil. dissertation by Gwan-yeon CHO is concerned with the interaction between popular Buddhism in Korea and new religious movements.¹⁸¹

Peter FISCHER has edited a volume on Buddhism and nationalism in modern Japan.¹⁸² In his Erlangen Dr. phil. dissertation Andreas NEHRING has studied one of the contemporary "New Buddhist" religions in Japan.¹⁸³ The Heidelberg habilitation thesis by Ulrich M. DEHN on the "historical perspective of Japanese Buddhism" is concerned with the historian Uehara Senroku (born 1899).¹⁸⁴

180. Q. ZHANG: *Xiong Shilis Neue Nur-Bewusstseins-Theorie. Vom Yogācāra-Buddhismus zum neuen Konfuzianismus*. Bern 1993.
181. Gwan-yeon CHO: *Die Entstehung und Entwicklung des Volksbuddhismus und der neuen religiösen Bewegungen in Korea und ihre Wechselbeziehungen*. Unpublished Dr. phil. dissertation Universität Köln 1995.
182. P. FISCHER (ed.): *Buddhismus und Nationalismus im modernen Japan*. Bochum 1979.
183. A. NEHRING: *Rissho Kosei-kai. Eine neobuddhistische Religion in Japan*. Erlangen 1992.
184. U.M. DEHN: *Die geschichtliche Perspektive des japanischen Buddhismus. Das Beispiel Uehara Senroku*. Ammersbek 1995.

II. BUDDHIST STUDIES IN AUSTRIA 1971-1996¹⁸⁵

Buddhist studies in Austria are practically identical with Buddhist studies in Vienna, because the University of Vienna is the only Austrian university that has established chairs in Indology, Tibetology and Buddhist studies. One can trace the beginning of Indology in Austria back to 1845 when the first Sanskrit classes were offered by Anton Boller.¹⁸⁶ Typically for that period, the study of Sanskrit was not an independent discipline, but only a part of comparative linguistics. However, after the nomination in 1880 of Georg BÜHLER to the newly created chair for Altindische Philologie und Altertumskunde, Austrian Indology attained international reputation and Vienna became one of the most important centres in Europe for Sanskrit and Indian studies. After BÜHLER's tragic death in 1898,¹⁸⁷ Indology in Austria underwent an eclipse. Yet one may say that the seeds of its future flourishing were already sown because Erich FRAUWALLNER (1898-1974) was born that very same year. FRAUWALLNER has been a dominant figure in the field of Indian and Buddhist philosophy for the better part of this century and his influence is likely to continue well into the next century. Therefore, even though FRAUWALLNER's major publications on Buddhism were written between the twenties and the sixties and thus precede the period with which we are mainly concerned here, they need to be taken into account.

FRAUWALLNER was a versatile scholar whose interest and competence were by no means restricted to Buddhism. He studied texts as widely

185. Just as in the previous section on Buddhist studies in Germany, I limit myself here to scholarly books and monographs. Papers, albeit extremely valuable, remain with a few exceptions outside the scope of this survey; similarly comparative studies and popular introductions for the general readership are also not mentioned here. As an exception to the rule, however, I would like to mention several works by Volker ZOTZ: *Zur Rezeption und Kritik des Buddhismus im deutschen Sprachraum von Fin de Siècle bis 1930*. Wien 1986. – *Erleuchtung im Alltag*. München 1990. – *Der Buddha im reinen Land*. München 1991. – *Buddha*. Reinbek 1991. – *Geschichte der buddhistischen Philosophie*. Reinbek 1996

186. For the early history of Indology in Vienna cf. E. FRAUWALLNER: "Geschichte und Aufgaben der Wiener Indologie," *Anzeiger der phil.-hist. Klasse der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Jg. 1961, Nr. 10, pp. 77-95.

187. BÜHLER drowned when a sudden storm on Lake Constance overturned his boat.

apart as the Upaniṣads and Navya-Nyāya works.¹⁸⁸ In the realm of Buddhist studies as well his achievements were in various fields, such as Vinaya¹⁸⁹ and Abhidharma.¹⁹⁰ His specialty, however, was the *pramāṇa*-school. As early as 1929 he published his first short study of the Sanskrit fragments of Dignāga¹⁹¹ where some of the typical characteristics of his later work are already present, notably, the use of Tibetan and Jaina materials for the reconstruction of portions of lost Sanskrit texts. His studies of Dignāga culminated in the seminal paper "Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung,"¹⁹² which remains, some forty years after its publication, the best study of Dignāga's thought. FRAUWALLNER's datings of Indian philosophers¹⁹³ have also proved to be of astonishing longevity and in spite of occasional challenges¹⁹⁴ remain widely accepted. His epoch-making articles on Dharmakīrti, whom he recognized as the central figure for the history of Indian philosophy¹⁹⁵ also remain un-superseded. FRAUWALLNER's incredible erudition, rigorous philological method and unflinching intuition for the history of ideas provided not only

188. For an almost complete list of FRAUWALLNER's publications cf. *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 20 (1976): 5-17. More recently, two volumes of posthumous documents were published; cf. E. FRAUWALLNER: *Nachgelassene Werke, Aufsätze, Beiträge, Skizzen*. Ed. E. STEINKELLNER. Wien 1984. – *Nachgelassene Werke. Philosophische Texte des Hinduismus*. Ed. G. OBERHAMMER and Ch. WERBA. Wien 1992.
189. Cf. especially *The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginning of Buddhist Literature*. Roma 1956.
190. Recently his Abhidharma studies were translated into English; cf. E. FRAUWALLNER: *Studies in Abhidharma Literature and the Origins of Buddhist Philosophical Systems*. Translated from the German by Sophie Francis KIDD under the supervision of Ernst STEINKELLNER. Ithaca 1995.
191. Cf. *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes* 36 (1929): 136-139.
192. Cf. *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens* 3 (1959): 83-164.
193. Cf. "Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic." *WZKSO* 5 (1961): 125-148.
194. Most recently FRAUWALLNER's dating of Dharmakīrti (600-660) was challenged by KIMURA on the grounds that Dharmakīrti is already mentioned by Dharmapāla. It is too early yet to pronounce a judgement on KIMURA's arguments (his paper was read at the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference held in Hiroshima in November 1997 and will appear in the Proceedings to be published by the Austrian Academy of Sciences). It is clear that if Dharmakīrti's dating will be changed, a considerable number of related datings will have to be modified as well.
195. Cf. *Kl. Sch.*, p. 689: "No one is mentioned as often by the representatives of the most diverse schools. No one has had such a lasting influence as he."

the first mapping and broad outlines of the historical development of Buddhist philosophy, but also a firm foundation for further studies by his disciples and the disciples of his disciples. Among his direct disciples one has to mention Lambert SCHMITHAUSEN, Ernst STEINKELLNER, Tilmann VETTER, and although to lesser degree, Yuichi KAJIYAMA. His indirect disciples are too numerous to be mentioned here.

Gerhard OBERHAMMER, FRAUWALLNER's successor at the chair of Indology in Vienna, had only a marginal interest in Buddhism, and the tradition of Buddhist studies would have disappeared completely from Austrian academic life had not a new Institute for Tibetology and Buddhist Studies at the University of Vienna been founded in 1973. Ernst STEINKELLNER was appointed its first director, and under his inspiring leadership the institute has grown to a major centre for Buddhist studies, both Indian and Tibetan. Like FRAUWALLNER, STEINKELLNER specializes in Buddhist *pramāṇa* studies; however, his work reflects the more advanced stage of this field. After the broad mapping of whole schools of thought and their mutual relationship had been accomplished by FRAUWALLNER, "the Viennese project" could turn to editions and translations of the major philosophical works as well as to more detailed investigations of the philosophical concepts that were developed by Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and the later Buddhist logicians. STEINKELLNER's initial studies concentrated on Dharmakīrti's logic. His edition and annotated translation of Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* is not only the definitive work on this text, but also unfolds Dharmakīrti's epistemological concepts both in their relation to Dharmakīrti's other works and in their relations to Dharmakīrti's predecessors and successors.¹⁹⁶ Another important result of this endeavour is the edition and annotated translation of the *Svārthānumāna* chapter of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya*.¹⁹⁷ However, STEINKELLNER's work is certainly not restricted to Dharmakīrti's logic. With the notable exception of the topic of perception (*pratyakṣa*)¹⁹⁸ there is hardly any topic treated in the *pramāṇa* texts

196. Cf. E. STEINKELLNER: *Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ. Teil I. Tibetischer Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text. Teil II. Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*. Wien 1967.

197. Cf. E. STEINKELLNER: *Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ. 2. Kapitel: Svārthānumānam. Teil I: Tibetischer Text und Sanskrit-Texte. Teil II: Übersetzung und Anmerkungen*. Wien 1976, 1979.

198. However, STEINKELLNER together with J. CHU, H. KRASSER, M. ONO, H. LASIC, E. PRETS and various other scholars are currently engaged in a major

upon which he has not published some pioneering contribution. During the 80's he dealt extensively with the topic of proofs of rebirth (*paralokasiddhi*) on which he published two monographs and a number of papers.¹⁹⁹

Beside accomplishing his own remarkable work, STEINKELLNER has closely supervised a large number of Ph.D. dissertations, many of which appeared in the series "Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde" which was founded in 1977 and in which some forty volumes of high scholarly standards have already appeared.²⁰⁰ The first dissertation at the Institut für Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde was penned by Gudrun BÜHNEMANN, now a professor of South Asian Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. It consists mainly in an annotated translation of Ratnakīrti's *Sarvajñasiddhi*.²⁰¹ BÜHNEMANN's facility in deciphering Sanskrit manuscripts (cf. also her collaboration with HAHN mentioned above) has led to two further publications in the same series, one of minor texts by Jitāri, the other of two *sādhana*s.²⁰² Other outstanding dissertations include Torsten MUCH's edition and annotated

study of perception in Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and Jinendrabuddhi's *Viśālāmalavatī*.

199. Cf. E. STEINKELLNER: *Dharmottaras Paralokasiddhi. Nachweis der Wiedergeburt, zugleich eine Wiederlegung materialistischer Thesen zur Natur der Geistigkeit*. Wien 1986. – *Nachweis der Wiedergeburt. Prajñāsenas 'Jig rten pha rol sgrub pa. Ein früher tibetischer Traktat aus Dunhuang, mit seinen Glossen diplomatisch herausgegeben, übersetzt und mit Anmerkungen versehen. Teil I: Texte. Teil II: Übersetzung*. Wien 1988. This latter work also deserves special mention because it is, I believe, the only diplomatic edition of any Buddhist philosophical text.
200. A list of books published in this series is appended to this paper. Practically all Austrian scholarly publications on Buddhism appear either in this series or in the Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaft, notably, in its two series *Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens* and *Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens*. Note, however, that the latter two series also contain many volumes that are not concerned with Buddhist studies.
201. Cf. G. BÜHNEMANN: *Der Allwissende Buddha. Ein Beweis und seine Probleme. Ratnakīrti's Sarvajñasiddhi*. Wien 1980.
202. Cf. G. BÜHNEMANN: *Jitāri, kleine Texte*. [Description of a manuscript from the Bihar Research Society with 10 small texts of Jitāri, and the edition of the following texts in Sanskrit: *Vedāprāmāṇyasiddhi, Sarvajñasiddhi, Nairātmyasiddhi, Jātinirākṛti, *Īśvaravādamataparīkṣā*.] Wien 1982. ²1985. – **Sādhanaśataka and Sādhanaśatakapañcaśikā. Two Buddhist Sādhana Collections in Sanskrit Manuscript*. Wien 1994.

translation of Dharmakīrti's late work on public philosophical-religious debate (*vāda*), and Helmut KRASSER's edition and annotated translation of Dharmottara's short treatise on general validity of cognition.²⁰³ KRASSER has recently completed his Habilitationsschrift on the refutation of the existence of God by Dharmakīrti and his commentators. He is presently employed at the new institute called "Institut für Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens," founded in 1992.

Next to his focus on the field of *pramāna*, STEINKELLNER also has a strong interest in Madhyamaka. Even though he did not publish in this field (except for a popular translation of the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*²⁰⁴), one of the first dissertations he supervised, by Helmut TAUSCHER, continues DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN's work on the influential Madhyamaka text *Madhyamakāvatāra* of Candrakīrti.²⁰⁵ TAUSCHER is presently one of the foremost Madhyamaka specialists in Europe and has recently published a *magnum opus* on the doctrine of two realities in Tson-kha-pa's works.²⁰⁶

A reliable indicator for the outstanding quality of an academic institution is its ability to attract graduate students and young scholars from all over the world. The geographical and historical position of Vienna facilitates the contacts of the institute with East European scholars. Furthermore, an increasing number of students from traditionally Buddhist countries, especially from Japan, have made the Vienna institute the place of their preferred choice for graduate work. Among the dissertations that were published so far I will mention only three. Toru FUNAYAMA published an excellent study of the concept of *kalpanā-podha* in the *Tattvasamgraha* which is unfortunately very difficult to

203. Cf. T. MUCH: *Dharmakīrtis Vādanyāya. Teil I: Sanskrit-Text. Teil II: Übersetzung und Anmerkungen.* Wien 1991. H. KRASSER: *Dharmottaras kurze Untersuchung der Gültigkeit einer Erkenntnis. Laghuprāmānyaparīkṣā. Teil I: Tibetischer Text und Sanskrit Materialien. Teil II: Übersetzung.* Wien 1991. Cf. also E. STEINKELLNER and H. KRASSER: *Dharmottaras Exkurs zur Definition gültiger Erkenntnis im Pramānaviniścaya.* Wien 1989.

204. Cf. E. STEINKELLNER (tr.): *Śāntideva, Eintritt in das Leben zur Erleuchtung. Poesie und Lehre des Mahāyāna- Buddhismus.* München 1989.

205. Cf. H. TAUSCHER: *Candrakīrti – Madhyamakāvatāraḥ und Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣyam (Kapitel VI, Vers 166- 266).* Wien 1981.

206. Cf. H. TAUSCHER: *Die Lehre von den zwei Wirklichkeiten in Tson kha pas Madhyamaka-Werken.* Wien 1995.

obtain.²⁰⁷ Shunzo ONODA contributed a valuable study on monastic debate in Tibet,²⁰⁸ and Chizuko YOSHIMIZU describes the fascinating and unexpected epistemology of the *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka.²⁰⁹

Apart from its ongoing activities in *pramāṇa* and Madhyamaka studies the Institut für Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde has a common commitment with the Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (IsMEO) to further Tibetological and Buddhist studies in the form of joint projects concerning mainly southern Asia. This agreement between the two institutes has made it possible for a group of scholars to participate in an expedition to the Tibetan monastery at Ta pho (Tabo) in Himachal Pradesh in 1991. A special number of *East and West* (44.1, March 1994) was devoted to the results of this joint mission, on which various disciplines, such as history, art history, epigraphy and philology, were brought to bear on this hitherto little-known place which now seems to be of crucial importance for future Tibetan and Buddhist studies. STEINKELLNER reports on the "Kanjur" of Ta pho: "After the first day of work, when we opened fourteen bundles and found their contents to be an unbelievable mixture of numerous manuscripts mainly of *Prajñāpāramitā* and *Sūtra* texts by numerous hands, from very different periods with very different formats, many seemingly rather old, but many also considerably later, we decided first to scan through the whole collection of altogether sixty bundles. It took us four tiring days. The impression was overwhelming. We had seen a veritable treasure: altogether 38,000 folios, presumably written between the 11th and the 17th-18th centuries."²¹⁰

207. Cf. T. FUNAYAMA: *A Study of kalpanāpodha. A Translation of the Tattvasaṃgraha vv. 1212-1263 by Śāntarakṣita and the Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā by Kamalaśīla on the Definition of Direct Perception*. Reprinted for private circulation from *Zinbun: Annals of the Institute of Research in the Humanities*. Kyoto University. No 27, 1992.

208. Cf. S. ONODA: *Monastic Debate in Tibet. A Study of the History and Structures of bsDus grwa Logic*. Wien 1992.

209. Cf. Ch. YOSHIMIZU: *Die Erkenntnislehre des Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka nach dem Tshig gsal ston thun gyi tshad ma'i rnam bśad des 'Jam dbyans bźad pa'i rdo rje*. Wien 1996.

210. Cf. E. STEINKELLNER: "A Report on the 'Kanjur' of Ta pho," *East and West* 44.1 (1994): 115-138, at p. 117. Cf. also E. STEINKELLNER: *Sudhana's Miraculous Journey in the Temple of Ta Pho. The inscriptional text of the Tibetan Gandavyūhasūtra edited with introductory remarks*. Roma 1995.

The existence of an independent West Tibetan Kanjur has already been proved by HAHN's study of the Phudrag-Kanjur.²¹¹ TAUSCHER studied a fragment of the *Sambandhaparīkṣā* together with Dharmakīrti's auto-commentary and an additional commentary by Vinītadeva found in the Ta pho library. His study clearly indicates that an independent West Tibetan textual tradition existed for the Tanjur too. The text of the Ta pho manuscript is independent of the four major canonical editions (Peking, Derge, Narthang and Cone) and thus reflects a version probably prior to the compilation of the canon in the early 14th century.²¹² The importance of Ta pho for art history can be gleaned from a recent volume edited by Deborah KLIMBURG-SALTER, who was appointed Professor of extra-European art history at the University of Vienna in 1996, the year that concludes our survey.²¹³

211. Cf. M. HAHN: "Bemerkungen zu zwei Texten aus dem Phudrag-Kanjur," in *Indology and Indo-Tibetology*, ed. H. EIMER, Bonn 1988, pp. 53-80.

212. Cf. H. TAUSCHER: "Tanjur Fragments from the Manuscript Collection at Ta pho Monastery. *Sambandhaparīkṣā* with its Commentaries *Vṛtti* and *ṭikā*," *East and West* 44.1 (1994): 173-184.

213. Cf. D. KLIMBURG-SALTER: *Tabo, A Lamp for the Kingdom. Early Indo-Tibetan Buddhist Art in the Western Himalaya*. Milan 1997. This work contains contributions by Christian LUCZANITS, Luciano PETECH, Ernst STEINKELLNER and Erna WANDL; all, except PETECH, are members of the Vienna Institute.

FRANK E. REYNOLDS

Coming of Age: Buddhist Studies
in the United States from 1972 to 1997*

Historical Overview.

During the early stages in the development of modern-style Buddhist Studies in the 19th century and the first five to six decades of the 20th century, very little first rate Buddhist studies scholarship was generated in the United States. For example, when Edward CONZE reviewed the history and then-present state of Buddhist studies in the 1960's, he identified three basic approaches that had been developed in the western world. These three he labeled, following an earlier classification by Constantin REGAMEY, the Franco-Belgian, the Anglo-German and the Russian. Only a few Buddhist studies scholars in the United States had, up to that point, attained a level where they received serious recognition in international circles.¹

During the 1950's and 1960's, however, three developments began to gather steam – developments that constituted the background and subsequently the context for a rapid expansion and up-grading of Buddhist studies in the United States. The first was a rapidly increasing interaction between Buddhism on the one hand, and American religion, culture and society on the other. With the emergence and extension of multi-cultural sensitivities, long established communities of Buddhist immigrants gradually gained greater visibility and voice. Over the years

* My thanks to the Department of Buddhist Studies at Chulalongkorn University that sponsored the "Buddhist Studies: 1972-1997" conference for which the original version of this paper was prepared; and especially to Acharn Wit Wisadavet who very adroitly managed all the details. I am also grateful for the comments and suggestions made by Chatsumarn Kabilsingh in her formal response to the paper; to the many participants who made contributions during the course of the discussions that followed; and to Jason Carbine, my research assistant in Chicago, whose substantive suggestions and library skills were essential.

1. "Recent Progress in Buddhist Studies" in Edward CONZE, *Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press 1968), pp. 1-32.

many new communities of Buddhist immigrants have been established in many different parts of the country. As these immigrant groups have become more integrated into the American mainstream, they have begun to produce and support Buddhist studies scholars.

At the individual level many Asian Buddhist scholars have taken up residence in the United States and have taught, either temporarily or permanently, at many American universities. Asian philanthropic groups such as the Japanese Numata foundation have supported Buddhist studies programs, including the funding of visiting professorships at various American universities. Beyond the university Zen Buddhism, Tibetan Buddhism, and Theravāda Buddhism have all had powerful representatives of Asian origin who have made an important impact on the American scene. These representatives have attracted significant numbers of committed practitioners, and have evoked considerable interest among many other well-positioned individuals as well. Several of these converts and sympathizers have become Buddhist studies professionals. Many others have provided an interested (and often very supportive) audience.

These increasing and multifaceted incursions of Buddhism into American religion, culture and society have contributed to the rapid emergence of Buddhist studies in universities and colleges all across the country. But in order to gain a more adequate understanding of the process that has occurred we must also take into account two very important institutional / structural developments that have occurred in higher education in the United States beginning in the 1950's and the 1960's.

The first of these two institutional / structural changes is closely associated with the appearance, following the end of the second world war, of a new kind of American concern and involvement in world affairs. Fueled by the cold war, this new interest led to the establishment of a number of Asian area studies centers at major American universities. These centers were generously funded by the U.S. government and by major private foundations. Especially important is the fact that these centers have provided – along with their admittedly strong emphasis on the social sciences – a great deal of support for the teaching and study of modern Asian languages.

In a significant number of cases these new Asian studies centers meshed with previously established “orientalist” programs that focused primarily on the study of classical languages and classical texts. In many of these rapidly developing Asian studies contexts, classically oriented

Buddhist studies scholars found a new academic home that provided a level of material support that greatly facilitated their research. In this situation many of these Buddhist studies scholars were challenged to branch out into important new areas of research. As a result of this same interaction, many contemporary oriented social scientists came to recognize the importance and relevance of the materials and issues that concerned their Buddhist studies colleagues.

The second major development in American higher education that has influenced both the expansion and the character of Buddhist studies scholarship has been the emergence of the study of religion as a significant, broadly recognized academic discipline. This process was actually initiated by the establishment of a number of university level positions in the comparative / historical study of religion in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. But until the 1960's progress was very slow, if indeed the term progress is appropriate at all.

In 1963, a major turning point came when the United States Supreme Court rendered an important decision regarding religious instruction. Though the actual facts are much more complicated, the decision came to be broadly understood as one in which a fundamental distinction was made between teaching *of* religion (which was confessional in character and therefore prohibited in any state supported school because it violated the prohibition against the government establishment of religion), and teaching *about* religion (which was allowed in state supported institutions and acceptable in private schools that sought to maintain their secular identity). Armed with an understanding of this problematic but important distinction between the teaching *of* religion and the teaching *about* religion, the discipline of religious studies developed very rapidly.²

As new religious studies programs and departments began to expand, they needed to clearly demonstrate that they were not teaching in a confessional vein. As a result they found it useful as well as appropriate to give an important place to the study of religions other than those that were the dominant traditions in the West. In this situation many of these new programs and departments incorporated a significant Buddhist

2. See Frank REYNOLDS and Sheryl BURKHALTER, eds., *Beyond the Classics? Essays in Religious Studies and Liberal Education* (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press 1990). This collection contains an important essay by W. Royce CLARK entitled "The Legal Status of Religious Studies Programs in Public Higher Education" (pp. 109-141).

studies component. Over the course of time, these programs and departments have become major sites at which Buddhist studies scholars are being trained. Even more important, religious studies programs and departments have come to provide the institutional and intellectual contexts in which the great majority of U.S. Buddhist studies scholars spend their academic careers. Clearly the religious studies ethos and disciplinary orientation have had a very profound influence on the way in which Buddhist studies in the United States has come to be understood and implemented.³

Before turning attention to the more specific developments that have taken place in Buddhist studies during the past twenty five years, it will be useful to reflect on the extent of the expansion that has taken place, and on the general character of the intellectual transformation that can be discerned. The extent of the expansion can perhaps best be measured by noting the rapid growth of Buddhist studies participation in two major professional associations – the Association for Asian Studies which is the primary professional association for scholars involved in area studies focused on various Asian regions, and the American Academy of Religion which is the primary professional association for scholars involved in the study of religion.

In the early 1970's Buddhist studies was represented in both associations by a very small number of individual scholars. Moreover, these small groups of scholars had virtually no organizational presence. Though I have not had the time to carry through any kind of full scale study of the process of expansion, I have spoken to Matthew KAPSTEIN, the Chair of the Buddhist Studies Development Committee of the Association for Asian Studies, and to John STRONG, the Co-Chair of the Buddhist Studies Committee of the American Academy of Religions.

KAPSTEIN estimates that there are now approximately 200 active Buddhist studies scholars who participate in the Association for Asian Studies. He reports that his Committee each year organizes a major panel that is presented at the national meeting, and that in recent years that panel has regularly drawn an audience of approximately 80 people. He adds that at each year's national meeting four to five other area-

3. In order to avoid distracting repetition I will, from this point forward, use the term Buddhist studies to refer to Buddhist studies as carried out in the United States from *ca.* 1972 to the present. When I use the term in a different or broader sense, this will be specifically indicated in the text.

studies panels are presented that deal primarily with Buddhist studies issues.⁴

STRONG reports the development of an even stronger Buddhist studies presence in the American Academy of Religion. The Buddhist Studies Committee which he co-chairs publishes a newsletter to which about 250 members of the AAR subscribe. (Since many Buddhist scholars belong to both associations, it is difficult to determine the total number who participate in at least one. My own very rough estimate is approximately 300). According to STRONG, the Buddhist Studies Committee received over twenty excellent proposals for panels to be presented at the AAR's annual meeting in November 1997. Since the Committee presently has a quota of five panels, only one fourth of the proposals that were competitive could actually be selected. STRONG expects that, given the quality and popularity of the presentations that have been made in recent years, the AAR governing council will soon increase the number of panels that the Buddhist Studies Committee is allowed to sponsor.⁵

Turning from the extent of the expansion of Buddhist studies to the intellectual profile of the field, the kind of change that has occurred is equally dramatic. The tradition of modern Buddhological studies that was dominant in the early 1970's – a tradition that had developed primarily in Europe and Japan over the period from the early 1800's to the 1970's – had several rather easily identifiable characteristics. There were a number of Buddhologists who worked within this inherited tradition whose research orientation and conclusions deviated from the general norm.⁶ And it also true that some intimations of future trends were already visible on the horizon.⁷ However there was a broadly accepted

4. Personal communication, November 13, 1997.

5. Personal communication, Nov. 2, 1997.

6. Perhaps the most important Buddhologist who – during the first six decades of the 20th century – worked at the edges of the dominant paradigm is the great French scholar Paul MUS. In the 1960's, during the last stages of his long and illustrious career, MUS taught for half the academic year at Yale University in the United States. MUS's Buddhological work, much of which was published in the late 1920's and early 1930's, anticipates many of the themes and emphases that have been taken up by U.S. Buddhist scholars in the 1980's and 1990's.

7. Three American scholars whose contribution in this regard should be noted are Winston KING, Melford SPIRO and Holmes WELCH. In 1964 KING published *In Hope of Nibbana: An Essay on Theravāda Buddhist Ethics* (La Salle, IL: Open Court) and *A Thousand Lives Away: Buddhism in Contemporary Burma* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). In 1970 Melford SPIRO's *Buddhism*

paradigm that had been inherited from the past, and a widespread emphasis on the kind of research that was considered worthwhile.

This traditional paradigm is quite familiar in Buddhist studies circles. It is a paradigm that places a strong emphasis on the study of texts and the intention of their presumed author; on the search for origins; on the primacy of the South Asian Sanskrit / Pali traditions; on the central importance of doctrines and scholastic systems; and on special attentiveness to the voices of monastic and social elites. Methodologically this traditional paradigm privileges a language-centered philological approach, gives little attention to the historical context and usage of texts, emphasizes the production of authoritative critical editions and translations, and tends toward a positivistic view of historical methods and historical facts.

In the early 1970's when Buddhist studies in the United States began to gain momentum, this paradigm still retained a dominant position. However it soon became apparent that new developments were in the making. New questions were being asked, new aspects of the tradition were being explored, and new approaches were being developed. It is certainly true that over the past twenty five years many aspects of the inherited Buddhological paradigm have persisted, and that the modes of scholarship that this paradigm encourages have been further honed and advanced. But it is also the case that much of the most interesting and important work in Buddhist studies has been generated by scholars who have set out in new directions.⁸ In the following review I will try to maintain a balance between these two trends that in the U.S. context have come to coexist in an uneasy but creative tension.⁹

and Society: A Great Tradition and Its Burmese Vicissitudes was published in New York by Harper and Row). For WELCH's important late 1960's work on Chinese Buddhism, see footnote 19.

8. Some of the relevant items that are included in this essay are also cited in J. W. DE JONG, *A Brief History of Buddhist Studies in Europe and America* (Tokyo: Kosei Publishing Company 1997). However the understanding of Buddhist studies that DE JONG employs is more closely attuned to the Buddhist studies approach that has been maintained in Europe than to the more expansive approach that has taken shape in the U.S..
9. Constraints of space seriously limit the range of materials that can be covered in the discussions that follow. In adjusting to these limits I have tried to achieve relatively equal coverage for various Buddhist areas of the world and various historical time periods. I have also tried to achieve a balance between mentioning books published at various periods within the twenty five year time span that is

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Manuscripts and Translations

From the very beginnings of modern Buddhist studies in Europe in the early 19th century the collection and editing of manuscripts, and the translation and interpretation of important texts have been foundational for the entire enterprise. As Buddhist studies has taken root in the United States, American scholars have joined in the task. The following are a few examples taken from various regional / linguistic contexts.¹⁰

Among the most interesting manuscript projects is one that is presently being conducted by Richard SALOMON and Collett COX at the University of Washington. This project focuses on a collection of manuscript fragments that have recently been discovered in the Gandhara region in the northwestern segment of the Indian sub-continent. These fragments, which are the earliest Buddhist manuscript materials that we possess (1st century C.E.), include segments of scholastic texts, *abhidharma* commentaries, *avadānas*, and *sūtra* commentaries. The project involves transcription, translation and efforts to provide a context for interpretation.¹¹

earliest
Bist
manuscripts

Translations of Buddhist texts have been numerous and very diverse. Turning first to the Buddhist scholarship on South Asia, Buddhist studies scholars have translated highly philosophical treatises as well as more accessible narrative texts. For an instance of the former, see Malcolm David ECKEL's *Jñānagarbha's Commentary on the Distinction Between the Two Truths* (Albany: SUNY Press 1987). John STRONG's *Legend of King Aśoka: A Study and Translation of the Aśokāvadāna* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1983) provides an example of the latter.

Scholars who specialize in the study of Theravāda Buddhism have also translated a number of important texts produced within particular Theravāda traditions. John Ross CARTER, working with Mahinda

being surveyed, and focusing attention on books that are still of more than historical interest. I am well aware that, as a result, my survey is far from complete, and apologize for any important imbalances or omissions that the reader may note.

10. In the discussions that follows I will – with the exception of several references to journal articles in the concluding section – refer only to books. The books that will be mentioned have been produced by scholars who – whether or not they were born and / or trained in the U.S. – have held (and if they remain active continue to hold) long-term, full-time appointments in U. S. colleges and universities. I will also include references to books produced by some younger scholars from other countries who are presently residing in the U.S.
11. Personal communication from Collett Cox, September 1997.

PALIHAWADANA, has produced an innovative translation of the “canonical” *Dhammapada* along with portions of the very ancient *Dhammapada Commentary* (Paperback Edition; New York: Oxford University press 1998). An example from medieval Sri Lanka is Ranjini OBEYSEKERE’s *Jewels of the Doctrine: Stories of the Saddharma Ratnavaliya* (Albany: SUNY 1991).

Three Worlds According to King Ruang: A Thai Buddhist Cosmology has been translated by Frank and Mani REYNOLDS (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press 1982). Bonnie BRERETON’s translation of several Thai versions of the *Phra Malai Sutta* was published in 1996 in Tempe by the Program in Southeast Asian Studies at Arizona State University. Two of the most important translations of contemporary Theravāda texts are also renditions from the Thai. They are Donald SWEARER’s translation of selected essays of Bhikkhu BUDDHADASA (*Me and Mine* published in Albany by SUNY Press in 1989) and Grant OLSON’s English version of the first edition of *Buddhadhamma* written by Ven. Prayudh PAYUTO (Albany: SUNY Press 1995).

During the past twenty five years, as Tibetan Buddhist studies have expanded, a number of Tibetan Buddhist texts have been translated. Robert THURMAN’s *Tsong kha pa’s Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1984) makes available in English a text authored by the 15th century reformer who established the dominant Dge-lugs-pa order. Jose CABEZÓN has followed with an annotated translation of another foundational Dge-lugs-pa text (see *Dose of Emptiness* published in Albany by SUNY Press 1992). An otherwise rather neglected Tibetan tradition is represented by the translation of a relatively recent sectarian history by Matthew KAPSTEIN in cooperation with Gyurme DORJE (*The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism* in 2 volumes published in Boston by Wisdom books 1991).

Luis GÓMEZ is involved in a major project that centers around the translation of both the Sanskrit and the Chinese versions of the Sukhavatīvyūha Sūtras. The first of three projected volumes contains an introduction to the Sanskrit and the Chinese versions, and what GÓMEZ calls “free” translations of both. Entitled *The Land of Bliss: The Paradise of the Buddha of Measureless Light*, this book was published in Honolulu by the University of Hawaii Press 1996. The second volume will provide the Sanskrit text accompanied by a technical translation complete with detailed annotations. The third volume, which will employ the

same kind of specialist-oriented format, will present and translate the Chinese version.

In the 1990's Columbia University Press (New York) has published two important translations of Chinese texts by Burton WATSON, *The Lotus Sutra* (1993) and *The Vimalakīrti Sutra* (1997). Texts drawn from a very different genre of Chinese Buddhist literature have been translated by Kathryn Ann TSAI in *Lives of the Nuns: Biographies of Chinese Nuns from the Fourth to Sixth Centuries* (Honolulu: Hawaii University Press 1994).

Robert BUSWELL has published *The Korean Approach to Zen* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1983) which contains an extended introduction followed by lengthy translations of the collected works of Chinul. A basic Japanese Zen text, *Dogen's Pure Standards for the Zen Community*, has been translated by Taigan Daniel LEIGHTON and Shohaku OKUNURA (Albany: SUNY 1996). Yoshito HAKEDA's *Kukai: Major Works* (New York: Columbia University Press 1972) remains to this day a basic source for the study of the Japanese Shingon tradition.

Most anthologies of translations that have been published have been designed as introductions. An important exception, however, is Donald LOPEZ, ed., *Buddhism in Practice* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1995). Because of its focus on previously neglected texts dealing with religious practice, LOPEZ' collection makes a distinctive and timely contribution.

Thus it is quite clear that during the past twenty five years American scholars have produced many important works that fall within the dominant paradigm in European Buddhological studies. They have carried on the task of basic textual research and translation. They have given significant attention to the advancement of "classical" studies. And they have broken new ground both geographically (focusing more than their predecessors on texts that were produced in so-called peripheral areas) and temporally (moving the center of gravity of their work forward into more recent phases in the history of various Buddhist traditions.)

South and Southeast Asia

Though it is very difficult to construct the appropriate categories to use in organizing a review of Buddhist studies, there is an obvious linguistic justification for distinguishing studies of Buddhist traditions in South and Southeast Asia as a relatively discreet unit for discussion. The fact that Sanskrit and Pali have been the primary sacred languages used by

The dominant paradigm in European Buddhological Studies

Buddhists throughout the South / Southeast Asian region establishes a special kind of continuity among the traditions themselves. In addition, that same commonality of sacred languages helps to facilitate more intensive interaction among the scholars who study these traditions.¹²

Within the South Asia area a strong emphasis on doctrinal and meditation-oriented studies has been maintained. In the Theravāda context noteworthy monographs include John Ross CARTER: *Dhamma: Western Academic and Sinhalese Buddhist Interpretations* (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press 1978) and George BOND: *The Word of the Buddha: The Tripitaka and Its Interpretation in Theravāda Buddhism* (Colombo: Gunasena Publishers 1982). A particular ethical strand of the canonical tradition has been identified and analyzed by Grace BURFORD in *Desire, Death and Goodness: The Conflict of Ultimate Values in Theravāda Buddhism* (New York: Peter Lang 1991). A rather different component has been explored by Winston KING in *Theravāda Meditation: The Buddhist Transformation of Yoga* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University press 1980).¹³

The teachings of other Hīnayāna schools have also received serious attention. Collet COX, Bart DESSEIN and Charles WILLEMEN have collaborated to produce a major work on *Sarvāstivādin Buddhist Scholasticism* (Leiden: E. J. Brill 1997). Focusing on a more particular theme, Jan NATTIER has contributed an intriguing book that bears the equally intriguing title *Once Upon a Future Time: Studies in a Buddhist Prophecy of Decline* (*Nanzan Studies in Asian Religions I*; Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press 1991).

A number of doctrinal studies treat both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna materials. Randy KLOETZLI has published an innovative discussion of *Buddhist Cosmology: From Single World System to Pure Land: Science*

12. It is important to note that the older Buddhological paradigm in which leading figures in the field were expected to know and use a broad range of classical languages (usually Sanskrit, Pali, Tibetan, Chinese, and sometimes Japanese) has in recent years become less dominant. This is largely due to the fact that many Buddhist studies scholars are now seriously engaged with work in one or more disciplines beyond Buddhology itself; and it is also closely related to the fact that many Buddhist studies scholars find it necessary / useful to learn the vernacular language(s) of the area(s) in which they do their specialized work.

13. I have not included a reference to Steven COLLINS' *Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravāda Buddhism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1982). At the time this book was published, COLLINS was still teaching in England.

and *Theology in the Images of Motion and Light* (Delhi: Motilal Barnasidass 1983). A very different topic has been explored by Paul GRIFFITHS in a philosophically sophisticated study entitled *On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Problem* (LaSalle, Il.: Open Court 1986).

Among the various doctrinal studies that focus more directly on Mahāyāna texts, many different approaches are represented. In 1986 David KALUPAHANA published a controversial study of *Nāgārjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way* (Albany: Suny Press). Three years later C. W. HUNTINGTON (with Geshe NAMGYAL) contributed *The Emptiness of Emptiness: An Introduction to Early Indian Madhyamika* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press).

Paul GRIFFITHS, in *On Being Buddha: The Classical Doctrine of Buddhahood* (Albany: SUNY Press 1994), combines a consideration of Mahāyāna Buddhism with an important discussion of the use of doctrine as a comparative category in the study of religion. Malcolm David ECKEL, in *To See the Buddha: A Philosopher's Quest For the Meaning of Emptiness* (San Francisco: Harper 1992), generates a number of original insights by highlighting the role of the senses in understanding and appropriating Buddhist philosophical teachings.

Buddhist studies scholars working on South Asian materials have, in addition to their interpretations of doctrines and meditational patterns, also produced numerous studies of various aspects of Buddhist community life. For example, the monastic ideals of different Buddhist schools have received considerable attention. Charles PREBISH contributed a study of *Buddhist Monastic Discipline: The Sanskrit Prātimokṣa Sūtras of the Mahāsāṃghikas and Mūlasarvāstivādins* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press 1975). John HOLT, focusing on the Pali / Theravāda tradition, has provided a more interpretative and still useful study of *Discipline: The Canonical Buddhism of the Vinayapitaka* (Delhi: Motilal Barnasidass 1981).

Reginald RAY's *Buddhist Saints in India* (New York: Oxford University Press 1994) is a large, richly documented historical study that focuses on the specifically religious dynamics of the development of the Buddhist community in India. In this book RAY mounts a strong argument for his thesis that forest monks were at the heart of the earliest Buddhist community. He also argues very forcefully that it was the later bearers of this forest monk tradition who, in their resistance to Hīnayāna

monasticism, developed specifically Mahāyāna approaches to Buddhist teaching and practice.

order [Gregory SCHOPEN's *Bones, Stones and Buddhist Monks* (*Studies in the Buddhist Traditions Series*; Honolulu: University of Hawaii 1997) is a collection of twelve historically focused essays published at various times over the past fifteen years. In this provocative collection of essays SCHOPEN sharply challenges the validity of using primarily textual evidence to reconstruct South Asian Buddhist history, particularly monastic history. He calls instead for an approach that takes archæological and epigraphic evidence as primary. Using this strategy, SCHOPEN demonstrates (among many other things) a deep monastic involvement in activities such as merit making, image worship, and the like that other scholars have associated primarily if not exclusively with the laity.¹⁴

order [Although much of the best work on South Asian Buddhist art is available only in the form of articles, several important books have been published. Sheila WEINER's *Ajanta: Its Place in Buddhist Art* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1977) is one of the best examples from the 1970's. More recently Geri MALANDRA has contributed *Unfolding a Mandala: The Buddhist Cave Temples at Ellora* (Albany: SUNY Press 1993). In this important study MALANDRA argues, on the basis of art historical evidence, that there existed at Ellora an early (7th / 8th century C.E.) form of Tantric Buddhism that was subsequently disseminated throughout South Asia and beyond.

During the twenty five year period that we are considering, literary and historical studies focused on women and gender in South Asian Buddhism have become increasingly common. Liz WILSON's *Charming Cadavers* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1996) explores a South Asian monastic story tradition in which male desire is extinguished through horrific encounters with deformed female bodies and corpses. Diana PAUL's *Women in Buddhism: Images of the Feminine in Mahāyāna Tradition* (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press 1979. 2nd ed., Berkeley: University of California Press 1985) covers materials not only from South Asia, but from East Asia as well.

14. Donald LOPEZ, in his Preface to *Bones, Stones and Buddhist Monks*, indicates that a second collection of SCHOPEN's essays will soon be published in the same series. This collection, which will be at least as innovative and challenging as the first, will have as its theme the rise of the movement(s) that have come to be classified as Mahāyāna.

Paula RICHMAN has made a different kind of contribution with her study of *Women, Branch Stories and Religious Rhetoric in a Tamil Buddhist Text* (*South Asia Series* #12; Syracuse: Maxwell School of Citizenship and Foreign Affairs 1988). The text that she presents and analyzes narrates a complex and fascinating story in which a Buddhist nun is the protagonist. Miranda SHAW's highly controversial *Passionate Enlightenment* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1994) makes the claim that – contrary to the received scholarly tradition – women played a central role in founding the Buddhist Tantric movement; and that these women and their successors made major contributions to the Tantric Buddhist understanding of enlightenment on the one hand, and of gender and sexuality on the other.

Many Buddhist studies scholars have focused their attention on particular aspects of the long and on-going history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. Already in 1972 Gananath OBEYESEKERE, Frank REYNOLDS and Bardwell SMITH – in a coauthored book, *Two Wheels of Dhamma: Essays on the Theravāda Tradition in India and Ceylon* (Chambersburg, Pa.: American Academy of Religion 1972) – called attention to the early and persistent presence of a Buddhist ideal of religio-political authority. Several years later Bardwell Smith edited a follow-up volume entitled *Religion and the Legitimation of Power in Sri Lanka* (Chambersburg, Pa.: Anima Books 1978).

In 1984 Gananath OBEYESEKERE published a study of *The Cult of The Goddess Pattani* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) in which he describes the incorporation of an ancient goddess cult into the Sinhalese Buddhist tradition. John HOLT's *Buddha in the Crown* (New York: Oxford University Press 1991), a winner of a prestigious American Academy of Religion book prize, traces the role that the Bodhisattva Avalokitesvara and his various transformations have played, and continue to play, in the history of Sinhalese Buddhism.¹⁵ HOLT has also contributed *The Religious World of Kirti Sri* (New York: Oxford 1996) in which he demonstrates the role of art and “visual liturgy” in the religio-political activity of an important Sri Lankan king who ruled in the 18th century.

During the last two years two younger scholars have entered the discussion. In 1996 Jonathan WALTERS came on the scene with a short but

15. The award was given for the best historically oriented study of religion published by an American scholar in 1991.

important book on *The History of Kelaniya* (Colombo: Social Science Association) in which he generates new insights into important aspects of Sri Lankan Buddhist history by placing that history within a broader South Asian geo-political and religio-political context. In 1997 Kevin TRAINOR followed with a more practice-oriented historical discussion entitled *Relics, Ritual and Representation in Buddhism: Rematerializing the Sri Lankan Theravāda Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997). } order

A number of religio-historical and anthropological studies deal with different aspects of modern Buddhist developments in Sri Lanka. Two books that provide rather different survey treatments are George BOND's *The Buddhist Revival in Sri Lanka: Tradition, Reinterpretation and Response* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press 1988) and *Buddhism Transformed: Religious Change in Sri Lanka* written by Gananath OBEYESEKERE in cooperation with Richard GOMBRICH (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1988). The revival of the early Buddhist tradition of female renunciation is described by Tessa BARTHOLOMEUSZ in *Women under the Bo Tree: Buddhist Nuns in Sri Lanka* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994).

The development of modern, Buddhist-oriented nationalism in Sri Lanka has attracted the attention of a number of historians and anthropologists. Much important background is provided by Steven KEMPER in *The Presence of the Past: Chronicles, Politics and Culture in Sinhala Life* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1991). A treatment of this topic that has aroused a great deal of controversy is Stanley TAMBIAH's *Buddhism Betrayed?: Religion, Politics and Violence in Sri Lanka* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1992).

As we move from South Asia to Southeast Asia, four books provide highly useful bridges. John STRONG, in *The Legend and Cult of Upagupta: Sanskrit Buddhism in North India and Southeast Asia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1992), combines literary, historical and ethnographic approaches to identify important connections between northern India on the one hand, and neighboring areas of Southeast Asia on the other. Steven COLLINS' *Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998) explores what he calls the Pali *imaginaire*. Drawing his materials from all across the Theravāda world, COLLINS integrates an insightful interpretation of Theravāda doctrine on the one hand, and an equally insightful interpretation of Theravāda imagery and narrative on the other.

Two other especially significant books that bridge the South / Southeast Asia divide are collections of essays. The first, edited by Donald SWEARER and Russell SIZEMORE, is entitled *Ethics, Wealth, and Salvation: A Study of Buddhist Social Ethics* (Columbia: University of South Carolina 1990). The second, edited by Juliane SCHOBER, recounts and analyzes *Sacred Biography in the Buddhist Traditions of South and Southeast Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii 1997). Both volumes contain some essays on South Asian traditions, some that focus on Southeast Asian materials, and some that deal with narratives and correlated issues that cut across both areas.¹⁶

Though contributions by U.S. scholars to the early history of Buddhism in Southeast Asia have been minimal, two books deserve mention. *Barabudur: History and Significance of a Buddhist Monument* edited by Luis GÓMEZ and Hiram WOODWARD (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press 1981) contains a number of useful essays. But clearly the most significant work on early Buddhist developments in Southeast Asia is Robert BROWN's *The Dvaravati Wheels of the Law and the Indianization of Southeast Asia* (Leiden: E. J. Brill 1996). Utilizing primarily art historical sources, BROWN makes a strong argument for the distinctiveness of the first expressions of Buddhism that can be identified in the Cambodian/Thai regions on which his research is focused.

Donald SWEARER's *The Buddhist World of Southeast Asia* (Albany: SUNY Press 1995) provides a well balanced introduction to later developments in the region. *Buddhism and the Legitimation of Power in Thailand, Laos and Burma* edited by Bardwell SMITH (Chambersburg, Pa.: Anima Books 1978) contains a number of important essays that deal with religio-political dynamics that were operative during the medieval and modern periods. Michael MENDELSON's *Sangha and State in Burma: A Study of Monastic Sectarianism and Leadership* edited by John FERGUSON (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press 1974) concentrates on similar issues. For an in depth, multi-dimensional study of single Theravāda temple, see Donald SWEARER's *Wat Haripunjaya: A Study of the Royal Temple of the Buddha's Relic, Lamphun, Thailand*

16. Both of these edited volumes contain essays by a least one scholar who is not a part of the U.S. Buddhist studies community. In the decision to refer to these volumes – and to other edited volumes that will be mentioned below – the criteria that I have used to justify their inclusion is that the editor(s) and the majority of contributors are U.S. scholars in the sense described in footnote 10.

scholastic texts produced and preserved by the dominant Dge-lugs-pa school.

One of the major publications of Jeffrey HOPKINS, who has been a prime mover in this effort, is *Meditation on Emptiness* (London: Wisdom Publications 1983). Daniel PERDUE has contributed a detailed study of *Debate in Tibetan Buddhism* (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications 1992) which includes the translation of a basic training text as well as an extensive introduction and commentary. In addition to single-authored volumes, collections of essays also contain useful material. See, for example, R. DAVIDSON and S. GOODMAN, eds. *Tibetan Buddhism: Reason and Revelation* (Albany: SUNY Press 1992).

From the point of view of a comparativist, the most interesting book devoted to Tibetan Buddhist thought is Jose CABEZÓN's *Buddhism and Language: A Study of Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism* (Albany: SUNY Press 1994). In this study of Dge-lugs-pa philosophy CABEZÓN combines a nuanced treatment of Buddhist materials with a careful clarification and exploration of scholasticism as a religious studies category.

First rate studies of Tibetan Buddhism as a religion that has been practiced "on the ground" have been less numerous. However two useful books were published in 1978: Steven BEYER's *Magic and Ritual in Tibet* (Berkeley: University of California Press) and Sherry ORTNER's *Sherpas through Their Rituals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).¹⁷ A more recent and quite distinctive contribution has been made by Rebecca FRENCH in *The Golden Yoke: The Legal Cosmology of Buddhist Tibet* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1995). Working primarily with legal texts, oral histories taken from Tibetan refugees, and a Tibetan instructor who was a former legal practitioner, FRENCH reconstructs both the theory and the practice of the Buddhist tradition of secular law that was operative in Tibet prior to the Chinese invasion of 1959.

Since the Chulalongkorn conference for which the original version of this paper was written, two important books have appeared that deal with Tibetan Buddhism. The first is Janet GYATSO's *Apparitions of the Self: The Secret Autobiography of a Tibetan Visionary* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998). The second, edited by Matthew KAPSTEIN and Melvyn GOLDSTEIN, is a well balanced collection of

17. ORTNER's book was based on field work done in a Tibetan community actually located in Nepal.

essays on the very timely and highly contested topic, *Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1998)

The East Asian group of Buddhist traditions is extremely complex, encompassing as it does the Buddhisms of China, Korea, much of Vietnam and Japan. Despite some important cross-over activity, most American Buddhist studies scholarship on East Asia can be classified in terms of a focus on China, Korea or Japan. Unfortunately American scholars have done very little work on Buddhist traditions in Vietnam. (For a recent exception, see Cuong Tu NGUYEN, *Zen in Medieval Vietnam: A Study and Translation of the Thien Uyen Tap Anh* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1997.)

The long-standing Buddhological interest in the acculturation of Buddhism in China has persisted in U.S. Buddhist studies. An important book that has tackled this problem from a doctrinal / philosophical perspective is Peter GREGORY's *Tsung-Mi and the Sinification of Buddhism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1991). A more unusual approach to the topic has been developed by Victor MAIR in his groundbreaking work on *Painting and Performance: Chinese Picture Recitation and Its Indian Genesis* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1988).

Particular doctrinal aspects of Chinese Buddhism are discussed by Francis COOK in *Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press 1977). Doctrinal issues as well as matters of practice are explored by contributors to two collections edited by Peter GREGORY – *Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought and Traditions of Meditation in Chinese Buddhism* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1987 and 1996). Quite different issues concerning text and authority have been investigated in a collection of essays edited by Robert BUSWELL under the title *Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1990).

Chan is by all odds the Chinese Buddhist school that has received the most attention from Buddhist studies scholars. The many excellent studies of Chan include John MCRAE, *The Northern School and the Formation of Early Ch'an Buddhism* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1986), and two books by Bernard FAURE - *The Rhetoric of Immediacy: A Cultural Critique of Chan / Zen Buddhism* and *Chan Insights and Oversights: An Epistemological Critique of the Chan Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1991 and 1993). FAURE's analyses are organized around the distinctive interplay between

Chan / Zen's characteristic rhetorical emphasis on the immediacy of Buddhist experience on the one hand, and its usage of a broad and fascinating range of mediating practices and modes of knowing on the other. Analytically erudite, with many comparative references, these books make a significant contribution not only to Buddhist studies, but to the history of religions more generally.

Among other books on Chinese Buddhism that are especially concerned with "religion on the ground" there are four that I find especially interesting. John KIESCHNICK's *The Eminent Monk: Buddhist Ideals in Medieval Chinese Hagiography* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1997) provides important insight into the behavioral norms that were operative within at least some medieval monastic communities.¹⁸ Steven TEISER, in *The Ghost Festival in Medieval China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1988) and *Scripture of the Ten Kings and the Making of Purgatory in Medieval Chinese Buddhism* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1994), explores the operative beliefs and practices of large segments of the Chinese Buddhist community, both monastic and lay. Daniel OVERMYER's *Folk Buddhist Religion: Dissenting Sects in Late Traditional China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1976) remains a useful source concerning an often neglected dimension of Chinese Buddhism.

The important topic of Buddhism and the Chinese political establishment has been addressed by Stanley WEINSTEIN in *Buddhism under the T'ang* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1987). Turning to a later period when Buddhism had lost much of its political influence, Chun-fung Yu has contributed a highly informative study of *The Renewal of Buddhism in China: Chu-hung and the Late Ming Synthesis* (New York: Columbia University Press 1981). This is a book that clearly demonstrates the resilience of Chinese Buddhism and its persistence in Chinese religious and cultural life. The Chinese Buddhist experience in the modern period is explored by Holmes WELCH in *Buddhism Under Mao* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1972).¹⁹

18. KIESCHNICK's book can be usefully paired with Kathryn Ann TSAI's *The Lives of Nuns* mentioned in the section on "Manuscripts and Translations."

19. *Buddhism Under Mao* is the third book in a trilogy that includes *The Practice of Chinese Buddhism: 1900-1950* and *The Buddhist Revival in China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press 1967 and 1968). Since these two earlier books were published prior to the time period covered by the present essay, they are not included in the main body of the text. Nevertheless it is worth noting that, taken

It is safe to say that scholarship on Korean Buddhism has not been especially rich. Robert BUSWELL, who has been by far the most prolific scholar in this field, followed his book on Chinul (see the "Manuscript and Translation" section above) by publishing *The Formation of Ch'an Ideology on China and Korea: The Vajrasamādhi Sūtra, A Buddhist Apocryphon* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989) and *Zen Monastic Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1992). Though Sun Bae PARK takes a very different approach in his *Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment* (Albany: SUNY Press 1983), his attention is also focused on the Chan segment of the Korean tradition.

The only really high quality Buddhist studies book on Korean Buddhism that is not explicitly oriented toward Chan is Francisca CHO BANTLY's *Embracing Illusion: Truth and Fiction in The Dream of the Nine Clouds* (Albany: SUNY Press 1996). In this study of a famous 17th century novel, CHO BANTLY deftly defends her innovative and challenging thesis that the author of *The Dream of the Nine Clouds* uses fiction as an effective mode – perhaps the most effective mode – of expressing key Buddhist attitudes toward reality and illusion.

Buddhist studies scholars in the area of Japanese Buddhism have been both numerous and productive. In 1974 and 1976 Daigan and Alicia MATSUNAGA published *Foundations of Japanese Buddhism* (Los Angeles: Buddhist Books International), a two volume set that deals with the history of Japanese Buddhism through the medieval period. A more recent and much different insight into medieval Japanese Buddhism is provided by William LAFLEUR in *The Karma of Words: Buddhism and the Literary Arts in Medieval Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1983). LAFLEUR's book remains to this day a classic.

Over the years Buddhist studies scholars have produced a number of books focused on particular sectarian traditions. As in the case of China and Korea, the Chan / Zen tradition has received a disproportionate amount of attention. Four studies that stand out in different ways are: Thomas KASULIS, *Zen Person, Zen Action* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1981); Carl BIELEFELDT, *Dogen's Manuals of Zen Meditation* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1988); William BODIFORD, *Soto Zen in Medieval Japan* (Honolulu: Hawaii University

together, WELCH's three books remain unrivaled resources for anyone interested in exploring the persistence and crises of Chinese Buddhism during the first six decades of the 20th century.

Press 1993); and Martin COLLCUTT, *Five Mountains: The Rinzai Zen Monastic Institution in Medieval Japan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1981).

In the late 1970's Minoru KIYOTO published *Shingon Buddhism: Theory and Practice* (Los Angeles: Buddhist Books International 1978). More recently James DOBBINS has focused on important aspects of the Pure Land tradition in *Jodo Shinshu: Shin Buddhism in Medieval Japan* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 1989).

Other scholars working on Japanese Buddhism have concentrated their attention on individual Buddhist figures. In 1984 Paul GRONER contributed *Saicho: the Establishment of the Japanese Tendai School* (Berkeley: Center for Southeast Asian Studies, University of California at Berkeley, Institute of Buddhist Studies). George TANABE followed with *Myoe the Dreamkeeper: Fantasy and Knowledge in Early Kamakura Buddhism* (Harvard: Harvard University Press 1992). Finally, in 1996, Bernard FAURE published *Visions of Power: Imagining Medieval Japanese Buddhism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), a rich interpretation of the mental world of a Soto Zen patriarch who lived in the late 13th / early 14th centuries.

Other topics that have received some attention are the ways in which Buddhist texts have been employed, and the role of Buddhist art. In 1989 George and Willa TANABE published an edited collection of essays on *The Lotus Sutra in Japanese Culture* (Honolulu: Hawaii University Press). In 1992 Susan TYLOR presented a fascinating look at visual symbolism in *The Cult of Kasuga Seen Through Its Art* (Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, University of Michigan).

The Buddhist experience in early modern / modern Japan has been treated in many publications covering many different topics. Certain aspects of the religio-political experience of Buddhism have been depicted and analyzed in an exciting new way by James KETELAAR in *Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan: Buddhism and Its Persecution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1990). Later religio-political aspects were taken up in a well attended panel on "Buddhism and Imperialism" that was presented at the November 1997 meeting of the American Academy of Religion. The members of this panel documented a wide range of Buddhist involvements in the Japanese nationalist chauvinism that developed during the first half of the 20th century.

At least two books that extend beyond the explicitly religio-political domain deserve to be included in any overall survey. A Buddhist-

oriented "new religion" is described and analyzed by Helen HARDACRE in *Lay Religion in Contemporary Japan: Reiyukai Kyodan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1984). Focusing on a very different subject William LAFLEUR – in *Liquid Life: Abortion and Buddhism in Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1992) – does a masterful job of describing and analyzing the historical background and contemporary character of Buddhist involvement in the Japanese abortion debate, and in the creation of Buddhist practices related to the memorialization of aborted fetuses. *Liquid Life* makes an ethics-oriented contribution to Buddhist studies research that is virtually unique. At the same time, it addresses issues that concern a much wider audience as well.

During the 19th and 20th centuries Buddhism has become firmly established in the West and has had particular success in the United States. However serious book-length studies of the processes through which this success has been achieved and of the communities that have been established are few and far between. Among the books that appeared early on in the twenty five year period we are considering, the most comprehensive overview of the American Buddhist scene was provided by Emma MCCLOY LAYMAN in her *Buddhism in America* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers 1976). In 1992 Rick FIELDS published the third edition of his informative survey entitled *How the Swans Came to the Lake: A Narrative History of Buddhism in America* (Boston: Shambala Publications 1992).²⁰

In the last two years two books have been published that break important new ground. The first is Paul David NUMRICH's sociologically based study of *Old Wisdom in the New World: Americanization in Two Immigrant Theravāda Buddhist Temples* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press 1996.) The second is Donald LOPEZ' *Prisoners of Shangri-La: Tibetan Buddhism and the West* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1998).

20. For an interesting book that correlates developments in America and Sri Lanka in the late 19th century see Stephen PROTHERO's *The White Buddhist: The Asian Odyssey of Henry Steel Olcott* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press 1996).

Concluding Reflections

Like any appropriate framework that might have been adopted, the area-by-area structure that has been employed in organizing the present essay has made it possible to highlight certain crucial aspects of the topic under consideration. From the discussion that has been developed using this area-by-area strategy, at least three important conclusions can be drawn.

Clearly our review of U.S. Buddhist studies scholarship over the past twenty five years has demonstrated that American scholars have increasingly shied away from any attempt to identify the origins of Buddhism (Ray's book is a notable exception), or to postulate any kind of pure or uniquely authentic Buddhist tradition.²¹ The correlate of this turn away from concerns with matters of origin and essence has been an increasing emphasis on the study of the later phases of Buddhist history, and on the almost infinite diversity of Buddhist beliefs, practices and modes of communal life.

It is also evident that during this same time period there has been a move away from a primary interest in purely philological methods and doctrinal issues toward a much greater emphasis on many various forms of Buddhist expression, including especially those that have been most deeply implicated in the everyday life of ordinary Buddhist practitioners. These other forms include narrative and story-telling, artistic and iconographic expressions, ritual performances (both monastic and lay), and the involvement and influence of Buddhism in various forms of political, economic, and social activity.

Our discussion has also highlighted a strong surge in the production of feminist scholarship. This is apparent in the growing corpus of works that deal with the role that feminine dimensions and symbols have played in the structure and dynamics of Buddhist doctrine, meditation, narrative and teaching. It is even more evident in the extensive attention that has been given to the achievements of women (especially but not exclusively female renunciants), and to the roles that women have played in the life of the Buddhist community.

21. In recent years the long-standing debate between those who consider the history of Buddhism to be the story of a degeneration from a pure (Theravāda or Theravāda-like) origin, and those who see that history as the story of a progressive development culminating in one or another form of Mahāyāna or Vajrayāna has virtually disappeared from the American Buddhist studies scene.

But at the same time that this area-by-area organizational strategy has facilitated the identification of a number of significant developments, other important trends have been left in the shadows. In order to round out the discussion, it will be useful to consider four dimensions of recent American Buddhist studies scholarship that this area-by-area approach has tended to hide from view.

The first of these innovative developments is the increasing use of computer technology for facilitating more rapid communication within the U.S. and beyond, and for generating new resources for research. An example of the more formalized use of computer technology for scholarly communications is the *Journal of Buddhist Ethics* – an electronic publication founded by Charles PREBISH and Dameon KEOWN that has its primary base of operations at Pennsylvania State University.

American Buddhist studies scholars have also taken the initiative in the development of computerized data bases that include not only textual materials, but visual and audial materials as well. Here the most active and productive scholar on the American scene has been Lewis LANCASTER, the chair of the American Academy of Religions Electronic Publications Committee. Prof. LANCASTER has been actively involved in several data base projects designed to make available different Buddhist “canonical” collections. Working in cooperation with Mahidol University, LANCASTER has already facilitated the production of a CD Rom that contains all of the items that are included in the Thai version of the Pali canon. This CD Rom is now available from Scholars Press, Atlanta Ga..

The second of these four dimensions of recent Buddhist studies scholarship that has been neglected is the production of communally generated research and publications that provide a counter-weight to the tendency to emphasize and isolate area-defined patterns of specialization. The basic publication genre in which these efforts to resist the fragmentation of Buddhist studies scholarship have been implemented is the edited volume. Three well crafted examples of this genre are: Donald LOPEZ, ed., *Buddhist Hermeneutics* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1988); Robert BUSWELL and Robert GIMELLO, eds., *Paths to Liberation: The Marga and Its Transformations in Buddhist Thought*

(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 1992); and Jose CABEZÓN, ed. *Buddhism, Sexuality and Gender* (Albany: SUNY Press 1992).²²

Somewhat different cross-area topics are considered in Helen Hardacre and Alan Sponberg, eds., *Maitreya: The Future Buddha* (New York: Cambridge University Press 1988) and in an *On Mandalas* special issue of the *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* (Vol. 19, no. 2 published in Winter 1996). This latter collection of essays, generated from a University of Chicago conference entitled "Mandalas on the Move: 750-850 C.E.," contains essays dealing with roughly 8th/9th century Buddhist materials from India, Indonesia, China, and Japan. Also in 1996 Chris QUEEN and Sallie KING published an edited collection of essays that examine a variety of widely separated contemporary developments that fit under the rubric *Socially Engaged Buddhism* (Albany: SUNY Press).

The third trend that our area-by-area approach has kept in the shadows is the emergence of serious Buddhist studies scholarship that is primarily concerned to generate new kinds of Buddhist understandings that are directly and explicitly related to contemporary issues of religious practice and social involvement. It is difficult to differentiate between normatively oriented modes of study and those that are descriptively oriented. And it is also not easy to draw a clear distinction between scholarship that is intellectually distanced and critical, and that which is primarily confessional and/or apologetic. However that may be, it is certainly the case that in the United States an increasing number of Buddhist studies books are being produced that combine an explicitly normative (and often activist) orientation with a high level of scholarly competence and sophistication.

Serious Buddhist studies scholarship of this particular kind is being carried on with special intensity by Buddhist practitioners who have strong interests in inter-religious dialogue, in feminist causes, and in ethical issues related to the environment and social justice. Examples that immediately come to mind are Joanna MACY, *Mutual Causality in Buddhism and General Systems Theory: The Dharma of Natural Systems* (Albany: SUNY Press 1991) and *Dharma and Development* West Hartford, Ct.: Kumarien Press 1983); Rita GROSS, *Buddhism After*

22. Those interested in the issues raised in the CABEZÓN volume should also consult Bernard FAURE's recent *Red Thread: Buddhist Approaches to Sexuality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1998)

Patriarchy (Albany: SUNY Press 1993); and Anne KLEIN, *Great Bliss Queen: Buddhists, Feminists and the Art of Self* (Boston: Beacon Press 1995).²³

The last of the recent trends that I wish to highlight is a crucial though belated recognition of the importance of theory and method. The best known and most influential book that represents this trend, particularly as it is expressed in a critique of various forms of orientalist scholarship, is Donald LOPEZ, ed. *Curators of the Buddha: The Study of Buddhism under Colonialism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1995). In an earlier study Andrew TUCK provided a critical examination of western interpretations of the Buddhist philosophy attributed to Nāgārjuna (see *Comparative Philosophy and the Philosophy of Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation of Nāgārjuna* published in New York by Oxford University Press in 1990). Galen AMSTUTZ has subsequently carried the discussion forward in his study entitled *Interpreting Amida: History and Orientalism in the Study of Pure Land Buddhism* (Albany: SUNY Press 1997).

The *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies*, in its Winter 1995 issue (Vol. 18, no. 2), published two thought provoking essays that raised a related but rather different set of theoretical and methodological issues. These essays, written by two of the leading figures in the American Buddhist studies community, address the urgent need to explore the problems and possibilities of conceptualizing Buddhist studies as a full fledged academic "field" or "discipline." The first, written by Luis GÓMEZ, is entitled "Unspoken Paradigms: Meanderings through the Metaphors of a Field" (pp. 183-230). The second, by Jose CABEZÓN, considers "Buddhist Studies as a Discipline and the Role of Theory" (pp. 231-268). These two essays mark an important new stage in the maturation of American Buddhist studies scholarship.

It should be evident from all that has been reported that the Buddhist studies community in the United States has, over the past twenty five years, made remarkable progress. Clearly it has grown immensely in

23. Due to limitations of space, works devoted to Buddhist-Christian dialogue have not been included in this essay. However it is important to note that this kind of dialogical scholarship has been and is being pursued by many U.S. scholars. One of the more important institutional settings for the systematic cultivation of scholarship devoted to Buddhist-Christian dialogue are the Religious Studies program at Temple University and the Society for Buddhist / Christian Studies.

terms of the number of scholars involved and the volume and quality of the research that is being produced. Buddhist studies has assumed an important place in the U.S. academy, not only as a significant component in its own right, but also as an important contributor to a wide range of other academic disciplines. And it has also taken on a significant role within the international community of Buddhist studies scholars. Given this evidence of growth and progress, it seems reasonable to conclude that Buddhist studies in the United States has, after a long period of marginal existence, finally "come of age."

JAN NATTIER

The Realm of Akṣobhya: A Missing Piece in the History of Pure Land Buddhism*

The form of Buddhism known as “Pure Land” (Ch. *ching-t’u*, Jpn. *jōdo* 淨土) has long held an uneasy status among English-speaking scholars of Buddhism. Exposed early in their training to the first substantial body of Buddhist texts to be made available in English – the canonical texts of the Theravāda school, translated from Pāli into English beginning in the late 19th century – British and American scholars have often found it difficult to find any connection between the seemingly austere and contemplative teachings of the so-called historical Buddha and the lush celestial imagery and faith-oriented language of scriptures like the longer and shorter *Sukhāvativyūha*.¹ Writing in the late 1920s, British historian Sir Charles ELIOT went so far as to ask whether the Pure Land Buddhism of Japan should be referred to as “Buddhism” at all:

It has grown out of Buddhism, no doubt: all the stages except the very earliest are perfectly clear, but has not the process of development resulted in such a complete transformation that one can no longer apply the same name to the teaching of Gotama and the teaching of Shinran?²

* This paper was originally presented at a conference held at the Chung-Hwa Institute in Taipei, Taiwan in July 1997. I am grateful to the conference organizers, especially the Ven. Sheng-yen, for the rich intellectual experience afforded by that gathering, as well as for their permission to publish this paper here. I would also like to thank Paul Harrison and Daniel Boucher for their helpful comments on an earlier draft. Any errors that remain are my own.

1. The difference is more apparent than real. Scholars of the Pāli texts are at long last beginning to break free of the European rationalism that informed (or better, constrained) the interpretation of these texts during the late 19th and early 20th century, and are now realizing that the Pāli texts contain abundant references to the use of paranormal powers by enlightened beings, the existence (and importance) of heavenly realms, the activities of ghosts and spirits of a variety of species, and so on.
2. At his death in 1931 ELIOT left a nearly completed manuscript which was published posthumously (together with a chapter on Nichiren contributed by G. B. SANSOM) as *Japanese Buddhism* (London: Edward Arnold & Co. 1935). The comments cited above appear on pp. 389-390 of the reprint edition (London:

ELIOT was hardly the last to express incredulity that two such seemingly divergent forms of Buddhism could be related. Indeed I would venture the guess that most scholars who have had the experience of teaching an “Introduction to Buddhism” course in an American or European university have heard these same sentiments expressed by our own undergraduate students.

Though the thrust of ELIOT’s remarks was to call into question the legitimacy of “Pure Land” Buddhism (or at least of the Japanese interpretation of that form of Buddhism set forth by Shinran), in so doing he also pointed – if perhaps inadvertently – to a way of overcoming this sense of unease. What has made Pure Land Buddhism so difficult for Westerners to appreciate, I believe, is that the “problem” has been posed in precisely the terms expressed by Eliot: that of the apparent discontinuity between the teachings of Gotama found in the early Pāli sources, on the one hand, and the teachings associated with scriptures devoted to Amitābha³ on the other. But the latter are not, historically speaking, directly related to the former. On the contrary, prior to the emergence of the belief in Amitābha several intermediate developments had taken place, and without a clear understanding of these prior stages the cultivation of devotion to Amitābha does indeed appear anomalous. As I hope to demonstrate, however, there is a significant body of evidence that has been largely overlooked in the study of Pure Land Buddhism: evidence concerning the Buddha Akṣobhya (Ch. 阿閼佛, 不動; Tib. *Mi-khrugs-pa*) who presides over an “eastern paradise” known as Abhirati (Ch. 阿比羅提, 妙喜; Tib. *Mñon-par dga’-ba*) that resembles in many respects the paradise-like world of Amitābha. Despite the abundant similarities (as well as illuminating divergences) between these two figures, it remains a fact that in both Asian and Western scholarly circles Amitābha has been studied in isolation, while Akṣobhya has hardly been

Routledge & Kegan Paul 1959). The idea of opening this discussion with ELIOT’s comments on Pure Land Buddhism was inspired by the use of the same quotation in FUJITA Kōtatsu, “Pure Land Buddhism in India,” translated by Taitetsu Unno, in James Foard, Michael Solomon, and Richard K. Payne, eds., *The Pure Land Tradition: History and Development* (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Buddhist Studies Series 1996), pp. 1–42 (p. 3).

3. As a matter of convenience I will use the name Amitābha (“Unlimited Light”) throughout this paper to refer to the Buddha known both by this name (Ch. 無量光) and by the name Amitāyus (“Unlimited Life,” Ch. 無量壽) in Sanskrit sources. The Chinese abbreviation A-mi-t’o 阿彌陀 can, of course, refer to either.

studied at all.⁴ This paper is intended as a small contribution toward remedying this situation. By examining in detail the information about Akṣobhya and his world contained in Indian sources (above all in the *Akṣobhyavyūha*, a sūtra devoted entirely to the career and the “pure land” of this figure) I hope to show that this material provides valuable clues concerning the “very earliest stage” in the development of Pure Land ideas to which Eliot referred. Far from being simply a “different lineage” of Indian thought concerning other Buddha-worlds than the one based on Amitābha, as FUJITA Kōtatsu has suggested,⁵ it may well have been an earlier one, which rather than running parallel to beliefs about Amitābha was actually assumed and elaborated upon by Amitābha’s devotees.

“Pure Land” Thought in Early Mahāyāna Literature

The term “Pure Land” (Ch. *ching-t’u* / Jpn. *jōdo* 淨土) is not, of course, an Indian term. It has no known Sanskrit antecedent, and it is now widely agreed that this expression was first coined in China.⁶

4. The only studies of Akṣobhya that have appeared in Western languages to date are Jean DANTINNE: *La Splendeur de l’Inébranlable*, Tome 1, Chapitres I-III: *Les Auditeurs (Śrāvaka)* (Louvain-la-Neuve, Institut Orientaliste 1983; no subsequent volumes have been issued) and an unpublished doctoral dissertation by KWAN Tai-wo, “A Study of the Teaching Regarding the Pure Land of Akṣobhya Buddha in Early Mahāyāna” (UCLA: Dept. of East Asian Languages and Cultures 1985). A partial translation of Bodhiruci’s version of the *Akṣobhyavyūha* (T No. 310[6]) is included in Garma C. C. Chang, ed., *A Treasury of Mahāyāna Sūtras* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press 1983), pp. 315-338. See also the brief but useful entry “Ashuku” in Paul DEMIÉVILLE et al., eds., *Hōbōgirin*, vol. II (Tokyo: Maison Franco-Japonaise 1930), pp. 39a-40b. Far more surprising than the relative paucity of studies of Akṣobhya in the West is the notable lack of attention to Akṣobhya in Japan, where Pure Land Buddhism is a topic of significant academic concern. The statement of FUJITA Kōtatsu (*op. cit.*, p. 9) that “Pure Land ideas are non-existent in such Mahāyāna sūtras as the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* and *Akṣobhyavyūha*” – both of which provide detailed information on Akṣobhya and his world – is indicative of the deep chasm that has separated the study of Amitābha Buddha from the study of his fellow celestial Buddhas in Japanese scholarly circles.
5. FUJITA, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
6. FUJITA, *op. cit.*, p. 20, and more recently in “The Origin of the Pure Land” by the same author, in *Eastern Buddhist*, vol. 29, no. 1 (1996): 33. The peculiar fact that the word *vyūha* is sometimes translated as *ching* 淨 “pure” by early Chinese translators, most notably Chih Ch’ien 支謙 and Dharmarakṣa 竺法護, raises the

Expressions such as “Pure Land teachings” (Ch. *ching-t’u chiao* 淨土教) or “Pure Land thought” (Jpn. *jōdo shisō* 淨土思想), however, have come to be widely used, and in Taiwan and Japan they are generally understood as referring solely to ideas and practices associated with the Buddha Amitābha.⁷

I would like to propose here, however, that we extend the category of “Pure Land Buddhism” to include scriptures devoted to Akṣobhya and other celestial Buddhas as well, at least for purposes of the discussion at hand. In so doing I am deliberately diverging from established tradition in order to engage in a particular type of comparative study. Specifically, I would like to define “Pure Land Buddhism” as the set of all ideas and practices related to Buddhas who are presently living in world-systems other than our own, a category which would include not only Amitābha but also Akṣobhya and the countless Buddha figures described in Mahāyāna texts as presiding over world-systems in all of the ten directions.⁸

Defined in this way, Pure Land Buddhism consists of all Buddhist teachings that look forward to the possibility of rebirth in another

possibility that the term *ching-t’u* 淨土 resulted from a confusion between a Prakrit form of *vyūha* (**viyuha*) and *viśuddha* “pure,” a confusion that could occur most easily in the Kharoṣṭhī script, where the characters for *yu* 𑖑 and *śu* 𑖑 are virtually identical (see the chart given in Plate XIV at the end of Part II of A. M. BOYER et al., *Kharoṣṭhī Inscriptions* [Oxford: Clarendon Press 1927]). See for example the translation of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* by Chih Ch’ien (T No. 474), where the character *ching* is used in translating the proper names Prabhāvyūha (T 14.519b6 and 14.524a21), Mahāvyūha (14.519b7), Padmavyūha (14.519b16), and Ratnavyūha (14.529a7), and the title of the translation of the *Mañjuśrībuddhakṣetraguṇavyūha* by Dharmarakṣa (T No. 318), where the characters *yen-ching* 嚴淨 are apparently used to translate *guṇa-vyūha*. If this line of reasoning is correct, the expression *ching-t’u* might well have originated as a rendering of *kṣetra-vyūha* (“field-array”), itself a very common expression in Mahāyāna sūtras.

7. This is not a recent development. According to FUJITA (“The Origin of the Pure Land,” p. 36) this usage had already become current in T’ang-period China.
8. I will exclude from this category only those Buddha-figures who have appeared, or will appear, in our own world-system, viz., Śākyamuni, Maitreya, and their numerous predecessors (including Krakucchanda, Kanakamuni, Kāśyapa, and so on). Maitreya might in fact be described as a borderline figure: though he will appear in our own world-system, which is generally described as characterized by undesirable qualities (in contrast to other more glorious Buddha-worlds), he will do so in a distant future age when our world has reached the peak of its potential.

world-system (*lokadhātu*) or Buddha-field (*buddha-kṣetra*), where a Buddha is presently teaching the Dharma. Such worlds are commonly described as far more glorious than our own, but this is not their defining feature; indeed many of these glories are shared with the *deva*-realms (e.g., the Trayastriṃśa and Paranirmitavaśavartin heavens) and even with parts of our own world (e.g., the northern continent of Uttarakuru, or the continent of Jambudvīpa itself during Maitreya's future time).⁹ The essential feature of a Pure Land is thus not its physical attributes, lovely as they may be, but the opportunity to live in the presence of a Buddha.

By defining "Pure Land Buddhism" in this more inclusive sense, we will be able to ask a number of important questions of this material as a whole. What brings such delightful world-systems into being, and what must one do to be born there? How are the (previous) practices of the presiding Buddha in such a land, on the one hand, and the (current) practices of the community of his devotees, on the other, related to traditional Mainstream¹⁰ and Mahāyāna ideas of the paths leading to Arhatship and to Buddhahood? To what extent are such Pure Lands analogous to the heavens in which many early Buddhists hoped to be reborn, and in what respects do they differ (in both form and function) from such worlds? In short: in what ways are ideas about Pure Lands and the possibility of rebirth there continuous with earlier Mainstream and Mahāyāna notions, and in what ways do they represent genuine innovations?

By viewing a wide range of such materials in conjunction we will not only be able to gain a clearer sense of the process of development of Pure Land thought and practice in India, but also to get a better sense of

9. There was clearly a widely accepted body of ideas in India about what an ideal world should be, for the same attributes – soft earth, golden color, pleasant breezes, fragrant scents, easily accessible food and clothing, abundant pools, flowers and fruit, a large population, and so on – recur in a wide range of literature. The appearance of these "utopian tropes" is thus not sufficient in itself to support the argument that one such text is directly related to another. On the most unexpected of such tropes – the notion that an ideal world is entirely flat – see below, note 23.
10. I am using the term "Mainstream" in the sense suggested by Paul HARRISON (in *The Samādhi of Direct Encounter with the Buddhas of the Present* [Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies 1990], p. xviii, n. 8) to refer to those Indian Buddhists who continued to pursue the traditional path to Arhatship rather than adopting the newer option of the bodhisattva vocation.

what is unique to traditions concerning Amitābha and what features the Amitābha scriptures share with the larger Pure Land tradition. The result of such a study should thus be of use not only to those interested in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism in general, but also to those concerned specifically with the development of faith in Amitābha.

In a paper of this length it will not, of course, be possible to deal with the full range of Indian Pure Land literature.¹¹ Instead, I will concentrate on what are arguably two of the earliest extant Pure Land texts: the *Akṣobhyavyūha*,¹² on the one hand, and the larger *Sukhāvativyūha*¹³ on

11. By “Indian Pure Land literature” I mean not only those few texts that have survived in Indic-language versions (such as the shorter and longer *Sukhāvativyūha* sūtras) but also scriptures that were surely composed in India but have been preserved only in Chinese and/or Tibetan translations.
12. The two extant Chinese translations are Taishō no. 313, 阿閼佛國經 (translated by Lokakṣema no later than 186 CE) and T no. 310(6), 不動如來會 (translated by Bodhiruci in 706-713 CE). The sole Tibetan translation, *'Phags-pa de-bzīn gśegs-pa Mi-'khrugs-pa'i bkod-pa źes bya-ba theg-pa chen-po'i mdo* (Stog Palace no. 11[6], Peking/Ōtani no. 760[6], Derge/Tōhoku no. 50, etc.) by Jinamitra, Surendrabodhi, and Ye-śes-sde, is undated, but was probably produced in the late 8th or early 9th century. No Sanskrit or Prakrit version of this sūtra has survived; a transliterated title *Akṣobhya-tathāgatasya-vyūha* is given in the Tibetan version, but this is in all probability (like many other such titles) only a reconstruction.
13. Following the chronology set forth by FUJITA Kōtatsu 藤田宏達 in his *Genshi jōdo shisō no kenkyū* 原始淨土思想の研究 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten 1970), most scholars now hold that the earliest extant Chinese translation of the larger *Sukhāvativyūha* is T No. 362, attributed to Chih Ch'ien and assigned to the period 223-253 C.E., followed by T No. 361 (attributed to Lokakṣema, but considered by FUJITA to be the work of Po-yen, c. 258 CE), No. 360 (attributed to Saṅghavarman, but attributed by FUJITA to Buddhahadra and Pao-yūn, c. 421 C.E.), The attribution of T Nos. 310[5] (translated by Bodhiruci in 706-713) and 363 (translated by Fa-hsien in 991 C.E.) is not controversial.

More recently, however, in a paper presented at the IABS meeting in Lausanne in August 1999 Paul HARRISON offered detailed evidence pointing to the likelihood that T No. 362 may be the work (or a revision of the work) of Lokakṣema, and that T No. 361 should be assigned to Chih Ch'ien (i.e., that the attributions were switched by early cataloguers). It is hoped that this important study will soon be available in print.

The relative ages of the shorter and longer *Sukhāvativyūha* sūtras (as they are known to Western scholars) is still a matter of debate. I am somewhat inclined to consider the longer version to be the earlier one, though arguments can be made in either direction. In any event it should be emphasized that we are not dealing here with the condensation or expansion of a single text, but with two quite different sūtras on the same topic. Whatever the date of the composition of the

the other. Since the *Akṣobhyavyūha* is far less familiar to most scholars of Buddhism I will first describe in some detail what is said in this sūtra about Akṣobhya's world and the possibility of rebirth there. Having done so, I will then turn to a comparison of this text with the *Sukhāvāṭīvyūha*, showing that a thorough study of Akṣobhya can indeed illuminate our understanding of Amitābha and his world.

Akṣobhyavyūha
Less familiar
to most

The Emergence of Pure Land Thought in India

Any study of early Mahāyāna Buddhism is subject to one overarching constraint: the absence of any written sources that could document directly the nascent phase of these new ideas and practices. To put it another way, the initial stages of the development of ideas about the practice of the bodhisattva path took place off-camera, and only after the basic ideas associated with this practice had undergone considerable development were the earliest texts that we now refer to as Mahāyāna sūtras composed. Rather than showing us the incipient phase of Mahāyāna thinking, these scriptures already represent a somewhat later phase of development, in which the viability of the bodhisattva path (at least for some members of the Buddhist community) is already taken for granted.¹⁴

absence
of written
sources

Much the same problem attends the study of the subset of early Mahāyāna thought with which we are concerned here: the emergence of ideas about other Buddhas and other worlds. What I will attempt to do in this section, therefore, is not to establish precisely when and in what form Pure Land ideas first appeared in India (for our sources do not allow us the luxury of such specificity), but simply to review briefly what the earliest Mahāyāna sūtras translated into Chinese can tell us about ideas and practices associated with these Buddha-figures. Such texts (for which a precise or at least an approximate translation date is generally known) cannot of course provide us with an absolute chronology of developments in India, but they at least offer us a *terminus ante quem*, a date by which the ideas and practices they contain must have been known at their Indian source.

emergence
of other
Buddhas

Chinese text
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t.a.g.

shorter *Sukhāvāṭīvyūha* in India, no Chinese translation is attested prior to that of Kumārajīva, completed in 402 CE (T No. 366). The only other Chinese version is that of Hsüan-tsang (T No. 367), translated in 650 CE.

14. I have discussed this issue in greater detail in a forthcoming study of the *Ugraparipṛcchā-sūtra*, provisionally titled *A Few Good Men: The Bodhisattva Path According to the Inquiry of Ugra*.

Pure Land assumptions already play a central role in a number of Buddhist scriptures translated into Chinese prior to 200 CE. There are numerous references to the “Buddhas of the ten directions,” i.e., to Buddhas who are presently living and teaching the Dharma in other worlds, itself an innovative concept vis-à-vis earlier Buddhist ideas of a single universe with long intervals between the appearance of Buddha figures. But among these many Buddhas two in particular – Akṣobhya and Amitābha – receive by far the most attention. Among the small number of Buddhist scriptures whose appearance in Chinese prior to 200 CE can be confirmed,¹⁵ Akṣobhya is the subject of one entire (and quite lengthy) sūtra, the *Akṣobhyavyūha* 阿閼佛國經 (Taishō No. 313, translated in 186 CE or before) and receives substantial attention in another, the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra* 道行般若經 (T No. 224, translated in 179 CE). Neither of these sūtras ever mentions Amitābha, but he is referred to several times in the *Pratyutpannabuddhasaṃmukhāvasthitasamādhisūtra* 般舟三昧經 (T No. 418, translated in 179 CE) as one of the numerous Buddhas of the ten directions who may be visualized in meditation. Both Buddhas, therefore, must have been well known in India prior to the translation of these texts, all of which are the work of the pioneering Yüeh-chih translator, Lokakṣema 支婁迦讖.

By the middle of the third century still other scriptures dealing with these figures had been translated into Chinese, of which we may mention in particular two attributed to Chih Ch’ien 支謙: the larger *Sukhāvativyūha* 阿彌陀三耶三佛薩模佛壇過奏人道經 (T No. 362, assigned to the period 223-253 CE), which of course is devoted entirely to Amitābha,¹⁶ and the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* 維摩菴經 (T No. 474, translated in 223-228 CE), in which the name of Amitābha is mentioned once in

15. For an authoritative discussion of which translated sūtras can legitimately be assigned to this early date see Erik ZÜRCHER, “A New Look at the Earliest Chinese Buddhist Texts,” in Koichi Shinohara and Gregory Schopen, eds., *From Benares to Beijing: Essays on Buddhism and Chinese Religion* (Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic Press 1991), pp. 277-304. On the translations of Lokakṣema see also Paul HARRISON, “The Earliest Chinese translations of Mahāyāna Buddhist Sūtras: Some Notes on the Works of Lokakṣema,” *Buddhist Studies Review*, vol. 10, no. 2 (1993), pp. 135-177.

16. If the revised attributions proposed by HARRISON are accepted – as I am strongly inclined to do – T No. 361, and not T No. 362, would now be considered the work of Chih Ch’ien. In either event the translation of a version of the *Sukhāvativyūha* by Chih Ch’ien during the early to mid-third century CE is assured.

wrong ?

Small number of confirmation

reduction of variety

attribution to Chih Ch’ien

Harrison as authoritative

passing (in a list of various Buddhas), while Akṣobhya and his world are discussed in considerable detail.

While still other Buddhas and their worlds would eventually appear in translated scriptures – most notably perhaps the (not yet actualized) world of Mañjuśrī in the *Mañjuśrībuddhakṣetraguṇavyūhasūtra* 文殊師利佛土嚴淨經 (T No. 318), first translated into Chinese by Dharmarakṣa 竺法護 in 290 CE, and the world of Bhaiṣajyaguru, described in chapter 12 of the *Kuan-ting ching* 灌頂經 translated by Po Śrīmitra in the first half of the fourth century – the evidence provided by the earliest Chinese translations points clearly in the direction of viewing Akṣobhya and Amitābha as the first and most important Buddhas of their type.

The fact that Akṣobhya appears to be better represented than Amitābha in scriptures translated prior to the beginning of the third century cannot of course be treated as decisive evidence for the situation in India.¹⁷ There is no reason to think that the scriptures that happened to have arrived in China by that date were at all representative of the body of Buddhist literature then circulating in India, nor for that matter that translators such as Lokakṣema actually succeeded in rendering into Chinese all the Indian texts that were available to them. All we can say for sure, based on the Chinese evidence, is that these early translations demonstrate with certainty that the cult of Akṣobhya (to a significant degree) and the cult of Amitābha (perhaps to a lesser degree) were already well established in India by this time. In scriptures translated from the late third century onward, however, the relationship between Akṣobhya and Amitābha is reversed, for no new scripture devoted wholly to Akṣobhya is ever translated (though the *Akṣobhyavyūha* is retranslated once), while works extolling Amitābha (including several re-translations of the larger *Sukhāvativyūha*, two translations of the

} decisive
evidence?
?

17. Indeed there is considerable reason to suppose the opposite. To take just one example: the scriptures translated into Chinese during the 2nd-4th centuries C.E. are overwhelmingly Mahāyānist in content, while as late as the mid-7th century C.E. (when Hsüan-tsang recorded his famous statistics on the number of members of various Buddhist schools) Mahāyānists still represented less than half of the Buddhist population in India (for a convenient tabulation of Hsüan-tsang's figures see Étienne LAMOTTE, *Histoire du bouddhisme indien* [Louvain: Institut Orientaliste 1958], pp. 597-600). It seems quite possible that partisans of the Mahāyāna path appeared in China as missionaries and translators in disproportionate numbers precisely because they were a minority – and in some cases a despised one – in their own homeland.

shorter *Sukhāvātīvyūha*, and one version of the apocryphal *Kuan Wu-liang-shou ching* 觀無量壽經) appear with considerable frequency.

There is some evidence to suggest that this increasing attention to Amitābha is an accurate reflection of the situation in India, for it is during this same period of time that we see a proliferation of references to Amitābha in Indian Mahāyāna texts.¹⁸ A particularly intriguing tidbit of evidence is found in the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, where a change in the sequence of names in a list of Buddhas suggests that the cult of Akṣobhya was gradually being eclipsed by that of Amitābha.¹⁹

We will return to the difficult question of the chronological relationship between these two Pure Land figures below. First, however, we must examine the contents of the *Akṣobhyavyūha* in detail.

The Nature of Akṣobhya's World

Though the existence of Akṣobhya's eastern paradise is taken for granted in several early Mahāyāna sūtras, it is in the *Akṣobhyavyūha* that this world is discussed in the greatest detail. I will rely primarily on this scripture, therefore, in the discussion given below.²⁰ It should also be pointed out that the considerably shorter discussions of Akṣobhya and his realm contained in texts like the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* and the *Vimalakīrti* conform to the description given in the *Akṣobhyavyūha* in most of the relevant details.²¹ Thus there is every reason to believe that a coherent

18. For a discussion of a number of such references and their implications for the history of Pure Land Buddhism see Gregory SCHOPEN, "Sukhāvātī as a Generalized Religious Goal in Sanskrit Mahāyāna Sūtra Literature," *Indo-Iranian Journal* vol. 19 (1977): 177-210.

19. Akṣobhya appears first after Śākyamuni in the list of Buddhas given in Chih Ch'ien's translation of the *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa* (T No. 474, 14.529a7-8), while by the time of Kumārajīva's translation in the early 5th century Amitābha (who appears in sixth place after Śākyamuni in Chih Ch'ien's version) has now been moved into first place (T No. 475, 14.548b14-16). Amitābha remains in first place in Hsüan-tsang's mid-7th century translation (T No. 476, 14.574b8-11), and the same order is found in the Tibetan version (Peking/Ötani No. 843, vol. 34, 90.2.8).

20. All citations from the *Akṣobhyavyūha*, unless otherwise indicated, will be taken from the earliest available version of the text, translated by Lokakṣema in the late 2nd century CE (see above, n. 12).

21. The sole exception is that the *Vimalakīrti* refers to the presence of mountains in Abhirati.

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body of thought concerning the celestial realm of the Buddha Akṣobhya was already circulating in India, at least in certain Mahāyāna circles.

The first point to note is that Akṣobhya's realm is not, in the technical sense, a heaven: on the contrary, it comprises an entire world-system (*lokadhātu*) endowed with heavens of its own. Indeed the sūtra makes much of the fact that in Akṣobhya's world the human realm and the Trayastriṃśa Heaven are connected by a staircase, and that the gods frequently descend to the human realm, drawn by the presence of Akṣobhya there.²² Abhirati is thus a multi-layered universe much like our own Sahā world, but with two important exceptions: it lacks the lower three realms, or *durgatis* (hell-beings, animals, and ghosts), and it lacks Mt. Sumeru and the other mountain ranges that are so central to Indian (including Buddhist) cosmology.²³ In other respects, however, Akṣobhya's land is clearly modeled on that of Śākyamuni, so much so that the human realm within it is even referred to repeatedly as "that Jambudvīpa." It is thus not a heaven in the traditional Buddhist sense – that is, a realm located in the upper reaches of the Desire Realm or in the realms of Form or Formlessness – but an entire (if slightly truncated) world-system, shorn only of what the *Akṣobhyavyūha*'s authors apparently considered to be our own world's most unattractive features.

In a number of respects Akṣobhya's world appears simply as a much improved version of our own. Here we find no reference to the "apparitional birth" (*hua-sheng* 化生) by which living beings are born into the various heaven-realms (or, for that matter, into Sukhāvātī);

22. T 11.757a-b.

23. The absence of mountains is a regular feature of ideal lands in Indian Buddhist literature, including Amitābha's world, the future worlds of the various śrāvakas predicted to Buddhahood in the *Lotus Sūtra*, and even our own Jambudvīpa during the time of the future Buddha Maitreya. Given the centrality of mountains (and indeed, their positive valence) in Indian cosmographic thought, it seems surprising that they should be entirely absent from these utopian realms. One possible explanation is that the "flat-earth" scenario did not emerge out of Indian utopian speculation, but was borrowed from another source. In fact this motif appears with some regularity in Iranian apocalyptic literature, where – in contrast to the Indian texts, where the motif of flatness is isolated and plays no productive role – it is explicitly associated with a leveling of social status, and thus with the promise (or threat, depending on the text in question) of an egalitarian society. For a discussion of this motif and the Iranian sources in which it occurs see Bruce LINCOLN, "'The Earth Becomes Flat' – A Study of Apocalyptic Imagery," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* vol. 25 (1983): 136-153.

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rather, men and women are born in the normal manner, but without any impurity or suffering on the mother's part. The version preserved in Tibetan translation supplies additional details not found in the Chinese, hastening to add that in Akṣobhya's world birth does not result from ordinary sexual intercourse. On the contrary, whenever a man looks at a woman with desire (for in this world desire has not been completely eliminated) his lust is immediately cooled, and he enters into a state of *samādhi*; as for the woman, she immediately conceives a child.²⁴ All this takes place, in other words, without any physical contact between the "parents" whatsoever.

heretical
 religions

Just as the manner of conception and birth is simply a more rarefied version of processes that take place here in this Jambudvīpa, so are the other physical aspects of Akṣobhya's realm best described as upgraded versions of our own. His land is free of sickness, people are never ugly, and (on a doctrinal note) there are no "heretical religions" there. Jewelry and clothing grow on trees, and once picked these garments always remain fresh and clean, imbued with the scent of heavenly flowers (thus averting the drudgery of laundry). Nor does food need to be planted, harvested, or cooked: like the gods of the Trayastriṃśa Heaven, as soon as the inhabitants of Abhirati think of food and drink, they immediately attain whatever they desire. In Akṣobhya's world people do not have to exert any effort to earn a living, and buying and selling are unknown. Thus those fortunate enough to be born in Abhirati are free to relax and enjoy a paradise-like climate free from the extremes of heat or cold, where a gentle, scented breeze blows in accord with people's wishes.²⁵

I will not enumerate here all of the myriad features of Abhirati, virtually all of which (an abundance of jewels, lotuses, ponds, celestial music, and so on) will be familiar to those who have studied other Pure Land texts. Before moving on to describe other aspects of life in this land, however, we should pause to take note of the use to which these enticing features are put within the text. Contrary to what we might expect, the sūtra does not use these attractive qualities – not, at least, in this portion of the text²⁶ – to encourage rank-and-file Buddhists to look

24. Tib. 74.7-75.3. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to the Tibetan text are to the version contained in vol. 36 of the Stog Palace edition.

25. 11.755c-756b.

26. Cf. however what I have described below as a "coda" to the sūtra, in which devotees are urged to seek rebirth there by remembering and reciting the sūtra itself.

forward to rebirth in Abhirati. Instead the delightful features of that land are marshaled to elicit a very different response: bodhisattvas are urged to study and emulate Akṣobhya's conduct so that they will eventually obtain such a world for themselves.²⁷

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The Practice of Buddhism in Akṣobhya's World

Not all of the *Akṣobhyavyūha* is devoted to enumerating the physical attributes of the Abhirati realm. Considerable attention is also given to how those fortunate enough to be reborn there will carry out Buddhist practices once they arrive. In particular, the text describes at length how much easier it is to attain Arhatship in Akṣobhya's world than in our own. Innumerable listeners attain Arhatship each time Akṣobhya preaches the Dharma, and those who require four such lectures to progress step by step from stream-enterer to Arhatship are considered the "slow learners" of the group. No one, apparently, will require rebirth elsewhere before attaining final liberation; thus birth in Akṣobhya's land is tantamount to the last birth of the non-returner.

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The description of life in Abhirati closely resembles that of an idealized monastic community. Akṣobhya's disciples do not need to beg for food, nor do they have to cut and sew their own monastic robes; robes and bowls simply appear before them as needed, and at mealtime their bowls automatically fill up with food. Nor is there any need for the monks and nuns to wash their dishes, for at the end of the meal their bowls simply disappear.²⁸ Since no one in Abhirati would even think of doing an evil deed, Akṣobhya does not confer the prohibitive precepts on his congregation, but preaches only about the positive aspects of the Dharma,²⁹ and the entire congregation listens attentively as he does.³⁰ When one of Akṣobhya's disciples at last enters into extinction the ground quakes in recognition, and many of them exhibit various marvels (such as spontaneous disappearance, self-cremation in the sky, or the emanation of a rainbow body) as they pass into final nirvāṇa.³¹

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Not all the inhabitants of Akṣobhya's realm, however, are engaged in pursuing the path to Arhatship. Comparably gargantuan numbers of

27. This theme is repeated throughout the sūtra, but see especially 11.756b22-24.

28. 11.757b16-22.

29. 11.757b22-28, 757c4-10.

30. 11.757c21.

31. 11.757c26-758a6.

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bodhisattvas are also present, and just as was the case with Akṣobhya's *śrāvaka*-assembly, the bodhisattvas reborn in his land have a much easier time pursuing their chosen path than do their counterparts in our world. Whenever Akṣobhya preaches, for example, those bodhisattvas will be able to remember and recite all that they hear.³² Though Māra is present in Akṣobhya's world – or rather, though Abhirati has its own Māra figure – he will not attempt to obstruct the bodhisattvas' progress, and without such interference they will all be able to attain the state of non-retrogression from Buddhahood.³³

MARA

Despite all the wonders of Akṣobhya's realm, the bodhisattvas there will not be content simply to enjoy life in Abhirati itself, for the sūtra emphasizes the fact that they will be able to travel freely to other Buddha-worlds. Upon their arrival they will make offerings to the Tathāgata who resides there, listen to his Dharma-teachings, and clarify their understanding by asking relevant questions before returning to Akṣobhya's realm.³⁴ Elaborating upon the straightforward description of this process found in Lokakṣema's version, the editor of a later recension displays a rather cosmopolitan sense of the difficulties that sometimes attend travelers to other cultures:

... if those bodhisattvas wish to go to another Buddha-land, they will no sooner think of that land than they will arrive there, wearing the native costume, speaking the local language with no accent, and acting in harmony with the customs of that land.³⁵

It is noteworthy, incidentally, that only bodhisattvas (and not *śrāvakas*) are described as engaging in this inter-galactic travel, an issue to which we will return below.

The benefits experienced by bodhisattvas in that land continue to accrue even after death, for the sūtra tells us that they will be able to see all of the nine hundred ninety-six Buddhas who are yet to come in this Good Aeon (*bhadrakalpa*),³⁶ and will be reborn in one Buddha-field after another until enlightenment is attained.³⁷ In this connection the

32. 11.758b1-2, 758c1-2, etc.

33. 11.758c24ff., 759b16ff., etc.

34. 11.758b9-13.

35. This passage is found only in Bodhiruci's version; see 11.107a27-28. The English translation is taken from CHANG, *Treasury*, p. 327 (cited above, n. 4).

36. 11.758b13-15.

37. 11.760a16-18, 760b7-8, etc.

theme of being able to remember the Buddha's teachings is sounded once again, for it is said that even across the cycle of death-and-rebirth, these bodhisattvas will never forget the sūtras they have heard.³⁸

The Conclusion of Akṣobhya's Career

Glorious as it is, Akṣobhya's lifespan as a Buddha will not last forever, and the *Akṣobhyavyūha* devotes considerable attention to the circumstances that will attend his demise. On the last day of his life Akṣobhya will send out magically produced versions of himself which will appear throughout all the worlds, preaching the Dharma and causing sentient beings to attain Arhatship.³⁹ He will also issue a prophecy (*vyākaraṇa*) to his successor, the bodhisattva Gandhahastin, predicting his future attainment of Buddhahood.⁴⁰ Upon his entry into extinction various auspicious portents will occur (the shaking of the earth, the sound of a great roar, etc.).⁴¹ Finally Akṣobhya will bring forth fire from his own body,⁴² thus performing the same kind of self-cremation previously displayed by many of the Arhats in his realm. After his death Akṣobhya's Dharma will endure for several hundred thousand kalpas,⁴³ after which it will gradually fade away as the inhabitants of his world lose interest in the Buddhist teachings.⁴⁴

Death
Akṣobhya

The Making of a Buddha-Field: Akṣobhya's Path to Buddhahood

Like the longer *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, the *Akṣobhyavyūha* begins with an encounter between a Buddha and a monk. Inspired by the preaching of a Buddha known as "Great Eyes" (Ch. *ta-mu* 大目, *kuang-mu* 廣目; Tib. *Spyan chen-po*),⁴⁵ the initially nameless monk who is to become

38. 11.758c5-7.

39. 11.760b26-28.

40. 11.760b28-c2.

41. 11.760c5-8.

42. 11.761a13.

43. 11.761b14-15.

44. 11.761b20-24. Even in its later recensions the *Akṣobhyavyūha* does not refer to any of the various periodization systems that some Indian writers used to divide the duration of the Buddhist religion into periods of *saddharma* and *saddharma-pratirūpaka*.

45. The underlying Sanskrit name is uncertain, but Viśālanetra – a word which occurs as an epithet of the Buddha in the larger *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, §9(6), and also at *Mvy.* 678 as the name of a bodhisattva – would be one possible candidate.

Akṣobhya states his intention to undertake the training of the bodhisattva.⁴⁶ Rather than simply validating his disciple's ambition, however, the Buddha offers a realistic caution. Just as a contemporary professor of Buddhist Studies might try to discourage an eager student from setting out on the long and difficult path that would culminate in the student's becoming a professor herself, so Great Eyes attempts to dissuade his eager disciple. The training of the bodhisattva is very difficult, he points out, implying that the monk should consider the matter carefully before embarking on such a daunting course. Specifically, the Buddha states that the bodhisattva path is extraordinarily demanding because a bodhisattva must bear no malice toward any living being.⁴⁷

The monk is not easily dissuaded, however, and he immediately pronounces a series of resolutions, beginning with the promise not to bring forth anger, malice or ire toward any living being from then on until his attainment of Buddhahood. Impressed by this long list of vows, another unnamed monk in the audience suggests that it would be good if this bodhisattva-monk were to be called Akṣobhya ("the unperturbed"). Others present in the assembly also take up this usage, and "Akṣobhya" becomes the monk's name for the remainder of his lifetimes.

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15.10.101* Akṣobhya then goes on to make an extensive series of vows detailing the specifics of his intended practices. And the majority of these reflect the acts of strenuous self-denial that the writers of a number of early Mahāyāna sūtras (e.g., the *Ugraparipṛcchā*, the *Kāśyapaparivarta*, and the *Ratnarāṣi*) saw as essential prerequisites for attaining Buddhahood: not simply observing all ten of the "good deeds" (*kuśala-karmapatha*), though these are enumerated in full, but leaving home in every lifetime to become a monk, practicing the twelve (sometimes thirteen) ascetic practices known as *dhūtaguṇas*,⁴⁸ maintaining utter detachment from one's audience while preaching the Dharma, and so on.

The validity of Akṣobhya's vows – that is, the fact that he will actually succeed in carrying them out – is subsequently confirmed by an

46. 11.752a1-2.

47. 11.752a3-5.

48. Only four of the most important of these – wearing a patchwork robe, limiting oneself to the three robes of the *śramaṇa*, dwelling at the foot of a tree, and constantly standing, sitting, or walking (i.e., never lying down) – are singled out for attention in Lokakṣema's version (11.752b11-12 and 23-25); in Bodhiruci's translation and in the Tibetan, however, the list of *dhūtaguṇas* is spelled out in full.

Act of
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“Act of Truth” voiced by another monk in the audience.⁴⁹ If it is true that Akṣobhya will succeed in fulfilling his vows, the monk proposes, “may he press the earth with the finger of his right hand and cause a great quake.”⁵⁰ The earth indeed shakes six ways in confirmation, and Great Eyes then confers on Akṣobhya the formal prediction (*vyākaraṇa*) of his future Buddhahood, a prophecy which – as Śākyamuni remarks parenthetically to Ānanda – is just like the one Śākyamuni himself received from the Buddha Dīpaṅkara.⁵¹

The Bodhisattva Path According to the Akṣobhyavyūha

But that is not the end of the story. The sūtra goes on to describe how Akṣobhya successfully carried out his vows, never shrinking from giving away parts of his body⁵² and going from Buddha-field to Buddha-field in one life after another, always making offerings to the Buddhas there and practicing *brahmacarya* in their presence.⁵³ The story of Akṣobhya makes explicit, in other words, the kinds of activities that early

49. The “act of truth” (for which several different Indian terms – including Pāli *saccakiriya* and Skt. *satyavacana*, *satyavādya*, *satyavākya*, etc. – are used) is often conflated with the bodhisattva’s vows (*pratijñā*, *praṇidhāna*) in Japanese and Western scholarship, but it is in fact a speech-act of a very different type. The act of truth is not a promise or pledge to do something; on the contrary, it is based on a simple declaration of a fact (though this may be a fact that is to occur in the future). What makes this an “act” rather than a mere pronouncement is the request made by the speaker for a confirmation of his or her statement by the forces of nature: “If what I have said is true, may this river run backwards,” for example, or “If Akṣobhya will succeed in carrying out his vows, may the earth quake in response.” Such an act of truth may occur, as here, when a vow or series of vows has just been made, but it may also occur independently, as when the prostitute Bindumatī causes the Ganges to flow backwards in confirmation of her statement that she has treated all of her customers equally regardless of their social status (*Milindapañha* 4.1.42), or when King Sivi’s eye is restored by his statement that “whatsoever sort or kind of beggar comes to me is dear to my heart” (*Jātaka* no. 499). What is common to all accounts of the performance of an act of truth is that a proposition is first set forth and then confirmed (or disconfirmed, as the case may be) by a miraculous response from the environment. For a thorough discussion of the act of truth as presented in both Buddhist and Hindu sources see W. Norman BROWN, “Duty as Truth in Ancient India,” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, vol. 116, no. 3 (1972), pp. 252-268.

50. 11.753a18-19. This is of course the *bhūmi-sparśa-mudrā*.

51. 11.753b10-15.

52. 11.754b26-27.

53. 11.754c2-5.

1. Sattva
Requirements

Mahāyāna Buddhists believed were required in order to amass the vast amounts of merit needed to procure all the qualities of a Buddha.⁵⁴ Using a script supplied at least in part by the *jātaka* tales, these pioneering bodhisattvas had to look forward to thousands of lifetimes of self-sacrifice before Buddhahood could be attained. And this self-sacrifice did not consist simply of renouncing one's belongings or being kind and compassionate to others; on the contrary, it required dramatic acts of "giving up the body" (*ātmabhāva-parityāga*), narrated in such tales as the *Khāntivādi-jātaka* (no. 313), where the bodhisattva as a renunciant sage (*ṛṣi*, Pāli *isi*) is cut to pieces at the order of an evil king, or the *Vyāghrī-jātaka* (found in, among other sources, chapter 19 of the Sanskrit *Suvarṇaprabhāsa-sūtra*) in which the bodhisattva as a young prince sacrifices his body to feed a hungry tigress and her cubs. It is no wonder, then, that the bodhisattva is referred to in a number of early Mahāyāna sūtras as a "doer of what is hard" (*duṣkara-kāra*).⁵⁵

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But there were other means through which merit could be attained as well. From the very beginning of Buddhist history, the act of giving (*dāna*) to members of the Buddhist monastic community was seen as the merit-making activity par excellence. Though the notion of the recipient as a "field of merit" (*punya-kṣetra*) was subject to a variety of interpre-

54. Opinions on the length of time required to complete all the prerequisites for Buddhahood varied according to school, but one common figure was three *asamkhyeya* kalpas and one hundred *mahākalpas*. See for example the *Ta chih-tu lun* 大智奏蔥 (T No. 1509), 25.86c-87c and the French translation in Étienne LAMOTTE, *Le traité de la grande vertu de sagesse*, vol. 1 (Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste 1981), pp. 246-255. According to the *Ta chih-tu lun* each of the thirty-two marks of a Buddha is "adorned with one hundred merits." Each one of these merits, in turn, is the equivalent of the amount of merit necessary to become a cakravartin (according to some sources cited by the *Traité*), Indra (according to others), or Māra, the chief of the Paranirmitavaśavartin gods (according to yet another opinion). Some authorities gave even more immense equivalents, e.g. "the collective merit of all beings at the end of the kalpa," which is the amount of merit that results in the re-formation of a *trisāhasramahā-sāhasra* world-system after a period of dissolution (25.87b; *Traité* I, 250-251).
55. The prominence given to the *Lotus Sūtra* (with its promises that even a child who offers to the Buddha a stūpa made of sand will eventually become a Buddha himself) in both Western and East Asian interpretations of Mahāyāna Buddhism is probably one of the factors (together with a certain squeamishness about bloody acts of self-sacrifice) that have made it difficult for modern readers to appreciate the extent to which the bodhisattva career was viewed by most Indian Buddhists as an excruciatingly difficult path.

tations, in at least some circles it was maintained that it was not merely the gift itself, or even the intention with which it was given, but the virtuousness of the recipient that determined the amount of merit the donor received. What better object of giving could there be, therefore, than a fully enlightened Buddha?

Thus for a bodhisattva-in-training the possibility of meeting with an endless series of Buddhas – in the course of “traveling from Buddha-field to Buddha-field,” as so many early Mahāyāna sūtras put it – is not merely optional but required, for there is simply no other way to attain the vast quantities of merit required in order to become a Buddha oneself. “Serving billions of Buddhas” thus becomes a kind of internship, as it were, during which the bodhisattva can learn how to be a Buddha by serving one, while simultaneously amassing vast stores of merit by making offerings to the Best of Men.

But there is yet another prerequisite to becoming a Buddha according to these early texts. Not only the equipment of merit (*punya-sambhāra*) but also the equipment of knowledge (*jñāna-sambhāra*) is required. Specifically, the bodhisattva must attain the same degree of knowledge that the Buddha had (now frequently referred to as *sarvajña* or “omniscience”), a knowledge that seems to be associated, for many early Mahāyāna thinkers, with the teachings contained in Buddhist Dharma-texts. Hence the emphasis on traveling to other Buddha-fields – even while inhabiting a place as glorious as Akṣobhya’s realm – to hear additional discourses on the Dharma, as well as the importance placed on being able to actually remember those discourses, not only during one’s present lifetime but even after death.

Finally, it should be noted that while myriads of beings succeed in attaining Arhatship in Akṣobhya’s land, not a single bodhisattva (other than, of course, Akṣobhya himself) is described as attaining Buddhahood there. Indeed such cannot be the case, for (as the Tibetan version makes explicit) “since only one bodhisattva, not two, can attain *anuttarasamyaksambodhi*” in a given time and place, those who want to attain Buddhahood “should do as Akṣobhya did.”⁵⁶ Those who wish to become Buddhas, in other words, cannot simply do so in Akṣobhya’s encouraging presence, but must themselves retrace the steps of his path.⁵⁷

56. Tib. 195.2-6.

57. 11.753a21-25; cf. the Tibetan version at 31

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This brings us to yet another factor that must surely have contributed to the formulation of ideas concerning other Buddha-worlds, a problem that we might describe (in contemporary parlance) as “bodhisattva job-market crowding.” As more and more people within the Buddhist community opted for Buddhahood rather than Arhatship, the problem of where one might find “employment” as a Buddha emerged in sharp relief. Given the axiomatic assumption that there could be only one Buddha in a given world at a time (for the very definition of a Buddha is one who discovers the path to enlightenment by himself and then teaches it to others in a world where no “Buddhism” exists), one could not of course become a Buddha while still a member of an existing Buddhist community; the attainment of the final goal would have to wait until a later life when one is reborn into a world with no knowledge of the Buddha’s teachings. Those desiring to become Buddhas in our own world-system might, of course, simply get in line behind the bodhisattva Maitreya (recognized by virtually all Buddhists as the next Buddha-to-be), but this would mean a wait of several billion years, as Maitreya’s own descent from the Tuṣita heaven was not expected to occur for some five and a half billion years.⁵⁸ Alternatively – and much more appealingly – one might seek rebirth in another realm whose qualities are the result of one’s own bodhisattva activities, and where Buddhahood could far more quickly be attained.

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All of the above suggests a radically new way of understanding the emergence of so-called “Pure Land” ideas in Indian Buddhism. No longer do these paradise-like realms appear as a concession to the needs of an under-achieving laity, much less as evidence for the incorporation of foreign (e.g., Iranian) or non-Buddhist (e.g., Hindu) ideas. On the contrary, the existence of other Buddha-fields now appears as a logical necessity, elicited by the mainstream understanding of the requirements of the bodhisattva path itself. Whatever the other factors in Indian culture at the time that might have contributed to this expanded vision of the cosmos,⁵⁹ the idea of the bodhisattva path as a viable option for a

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- 58. On some of the ways in which Buddhists have responded to this anticipated delay see Jan NATTIER, “The Meanings of the Maitreya Myth: A Typological Analysis,” in Alan Sponberg and Helen Hardacre, eds., *Maitreya, the Future Buddha* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1988), pp. 23-47.
- 59. A wide-ranging comparative study of the emergence of ideas of other world-systems in India would be a valuable contribution not just to Buddhist Studies, but to the study of Indian religious history as a whole.

small but significant minority within the Buddhist community virtually required that such a worldview be produced.

* * *

If the existence of other worlds where bodhisattvas might be reborn in the presence of Buddhas in the near future and ultimately become Buddhas themselves was viewed as a necessity by those those who had taken bodhisattva vows, such worlds surely offered an attractive possibility for rank-and-file Buddhist devotees as well. Before turning to a comparison of the *Akṣobhyavyūha* and the *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, therefore, we must first pause to consider what the Akṣobhya literature can tell us about the emergence of a generalized hope for rebirth in a “Pure Land.”

It is clear from the outset that, while rebirth in Abhirati is portrayed as an option for many Buddhists, it is far from easy or automatic. “Those born into [Akṣobhya’s] Buddha-world,” the gods remark after hearing his vows, “will not [be people who] have inferior merits.”⁶⁰ Somewhat later in the sūtra the difficulty of entry into Abhirati is made even clearer when an unnamed monk in the audience naïvely expresses his desire to be reborn in Akṣobhya’s world and is rebuked by Śākyamuni: “A deluded man like you cannot be born in that Buddha-field!” Śākyamuni replies. “One who has a lustful mind cannot be born there. Beings are born there by virtue of meritorious conduct, righteous conduct, pure conduct [*brahmacarya*, i.e., celibacy] and correct conduct.”⁶¹ Based on these statements it would seem that birth into Abhirati operates in much the same way as birth into the various heavens known in earlier Buddhist literature: it is a reward for one’s own merit, and considerable quantities are required.

This stance is maintained throughout most of the *Akṣobhyavyūha*, with repeated mentions of the importance of dedicating one’s merit to rebirth in Abhirati (for which, of course, one must have accumulated the requisite merit). Toward the end of the sūtra, however, it suddenly appears that birth in Abhirati might be much easier than the text had previously suggested. Now we are told that rebirth in Akṣobhya’s presence can rather easily be ensured – not by visualizing him or remembering his name (as those familiar with the *Sukhāvatī* literature

60. 11.753b3 (reading with note 6 to the Taishō edition; cf. Bodhiruci’s version, 11.103b4).

61. 11.756a18-22. Bodhiruci and the Tibetan have essentially the same reading.

might suppose), but rather by the acceptance, memorization, and diffusion of the text of the *Akṣobhyavyūha* itself.⁶² What we have here, in other words, is a series of classic “book-cult” exhortations of the type that appear at the conclusion of so many Mahāyāna sūtras.⁶³

* * *

Having examined the contents of the *Akṣobhyavyūha* in some detail, we may now conclude with some comparative observations on the content of the larger *Sukhāvatīvyūha*.⁶⁴ These two texts – both of which describe the career of a bodhisattva-monk from his initial vow in the presence of a Buddha to his present-day life in a glorious Buddha-field – are strikingly similar in structure and content, and thus they provide an ideal laboratory for comparative analysis. If we use the *Akṣobhyavyūha* as a mirror for comparison with the larger *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, what can we see in each of these sūtras that might have been invisible before?⁶⁵

Both sūtras begin with the narration by Śākyamuni of a long-ago encounter between a Buddha and a monk, but even at the outset they begin to diverge in interesting ways. In the *Akṣobhyavyūha* the Buddha Great Eyes, as we have seen, tries at first to dissuade the future

62. 11.762c-764a. It is interesting to note that the two methods of attaining rebirth in Abhirati described in the *Akṣobhyavyūha* – directing one’s accumulated merit toward that end and revering the text of the sūtra itself – are the same methods recommended in a set of verses on how to be reborn in Abhirati included in the *Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra* (T No. 375, 12.734a-b); cf. the English translation in John STRONG, *The Experience of Buddhism: Sources and Interpretations* (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth 1995), pp. 193-195.

63. A casual perusal of the concluding sections of the Mahāyāna sūtras preserved in the Taishō edition of the canon will turn up dozens, if not hundreds, of such passages.

64. The larger *Sukhāvatīvyūha* has been chosen for this purpose mainly because its more extensive content allows for a much more detailed comparison. It is also possible (and in my view rather likely) that it is older than the shorter text. The authors of the shorter *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, incidentally, were clearly aware of the existence of Akṣobhya, who is correctly placed (along with several other Buddhas) in the East (§11). In the *Akṣobhyavyūha*, by contrast, there is no mention of Amitābha.

65. All references to the larger *Sukhāvatīvyūha* in this section, unless otherwise noted, will be taken from the Sanskrit edition edited by F. MAX MÜLLER. A thorough comparative study of the treatment of each of the issues discussed here in all extant versions of the sūtra – Chinese and Tibetan as well as Sanskrit – is highly desirable, but unfortunately this lies outside the scope of the present paper.

Akṣobhya from embarking on the bodhisattva path; in the *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, by contrast, Lokeśvararāja makes no attempt to discourage Dharmākara. On the contrary, he simply replies that the monk should obtain for himself the vast array (*vyūha*) of qualities that constitute a Buddha-field, and then proceeds to tutor him for a full million years on what constitutes this “array.”

Already we can discern the outlines of two major differences in perspective between these texts. First, it is clear that for the writers of the *Akṣobhyavyūha* the bodhisattva path is not intended for everyone, and should only be undertaken after serious reflection on what it entails. For the authors of the *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, by contrast, the bodhisattva path is simply taken for granted, and the appropriateness of Dharmākara’s “choice” is never called into question. Second, while the future Akṣobhya’s initial resolution is simply to train himself in the bodhisattva path, Dharmākara’s initial resolutions are already focused on the final goal of Buddhahood. And that goal is understood in a very specific way: it involves, above all, the design and construction of one’s own Buddha-land.

These foreshadowings are confirmed by what is found later in the texts. In the *Akṣobhyavyūha*, as we have seen, Abhirati is praised as a place where Arhatship can easily be attained, thus making it clear that Arhatship is still viewed as a viable (and indeed valuable) path. In the *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, by contrast, there is no discussion whatsoever concerning the ease of attaining Arhatship in Amitābha’s land. On the contrary, though Arhats are mentioned briefly,⁶⁶ the sūtra seems to suggest that the only “live option” for members of its Buddhist audience is the attainment of *anuttarasamyaksambodhi*. But this notion is bifurcated in a peculiar way: a distinction is made between rank-and-file bodhisattvas, described as *ekajātipratibaddha* “bound to (only) one more birth,” and bodhisattvas who have taken on vows to rescue other beings.⁶⁷ The classical notion of the bodhisattva as one who has vowed to attain

Place
Arhatship
Abhirati
visavis
SUKHĀVATĪ

Bifurcation

66. Arhats receive considerably more notice in the the two earliest versions of the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* (T Nos. 361 and 362) than in the extant Sanskrit text or, for that matter, in the Chinese version attributed to Saṅghavarman. A thorough comparison of these two early renditions of the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* with Lokakṣema’s translation of the *Akṣobhyavyūha* could provide valuable additional information on the stages by which the Arhats gradually became marginalized to the point of near-invisibility in later recensions of the *Sukhāvatīvyūha*.

67. The most vivid instance of this bifurcation is in §33.

left Behind

Buddhahood for the sake of others thus appears here only in vestigial form, suggesting that the idea of the bodhisattva path as a challenging alternative suited for only the few has now been left far behind. What we see in the *Akṣobhyavyūha*, in other words, is the standard scenario of the “three vehicles,” according to which some Buddhists – but not all – can and should undertake the difficult practices leading to Buddhahood so that they may in turn assist others in attaining Arhatship, just as Śākyamuni did.⁶⁸ In the *Sukhāvativyūha*, by contrast, this notion has receded into the background, and the bodhisattva path (now understood in far less rigorous terms) has now been generalized as appropriate to all.

In fact these two developments would be expected to occur in conjunction, for it is quite improbable that the bodhisattva path – conceived of in the intensely demanding terms in which it was initially formulated – could be viewed as appropriate for, much less attractive to, the entire Buddhist community. On the contrary, the bodhisattva path in its incipient stages is best viewed not as a new “school” of Buddhism at all but simply as a higher and more demanding vocation suitable for a few within the larger Buddhist sangha, analogous to the monastic vocation

bodhisattva path as a continuity of monasticism

68. It is important to point out that the notion of “one vehicle” (*ekayāna*) was never universally accepted by Indian Mahāyāna Buddhists. The *Aṣṭasāhāsrīkāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra* and its descendants, for example, take for granted the validity of all three vehicles even as they direct their message (mainly) toward those on the bodhisattva path, and the widely used five-*gotra* theory is explicitly based on the understanding that the bodhisattva path is not an appropriate choice for all Buddhists. Even Śāntideva – the 8th-century Mādhyamika scholar-monk who so eloquently describes the requirements of the bodhisattva path in his *Bodhicaryāvatāra* and *Śikṣāsamuccaya* – makes it clear at the beginning of the latter that his instructions are intended not for all Buddhists, but specifically for those who belong to the Buddha-*gotra* (BENDALL ed., p. 2, line 9). Much confusion has been created by the widespread practice of interpreting all negative comments found in Mahāyāna sources about “falling to the level of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*” (to use the wording found in the *Aṣṭasāhāsrīkā*) as if they were criticisms directed toward a competing Buddhist school. On the contrary – to use an academic analogy once again – they are better understood as the exhortations of a professor to a Ph.D. student not to take a terminal M.A. degree and be done with it, but to strive to complete the much more demanding doctoral degree, at which point the student (having become a professor) can then teach others, leading them to the attainment of the (admittedly lower) B.A. and M.A. degrees.

distinction of H...?

within the Roman Catholic church.⁶⁹ In those circles where the bodhisattva path came to be viewed as appropriate for all members of the Buddhist community, however, the requirements for being a bodhisattva had of necessity to be reduced. To put it simply: the bodhisattva path as originally conceived was suitable (and indeed intended) only for a small elite within the larger Buddhist community. Once it had been generalized to apply to the entire population of Buddhist practitioners – old and young, male and female, householder and renunciant – the difficult requirements of the bodhisattva path had either to be deferred to a future lifetime for most members of the Buddhist community or to be radically reduced in the present.

reduction
of requirements

To explore the significance of the second difference in perspective foreshadowed above – the centrality of the traditional bodhisattva path in the *Akṣobhyavyūha* versus the centrality of the construction of a Buddha-field in the *Sukhāvativyūha* – we must turn to what is widely considered to be the heart of the *Sukhāvātī* literature: the vows made by the monk Dharmākara. These vows are almost too well known to require discussion, but we may summarize them briefly by saying that in a series of resolutions – twenty-four in the earliest extant versions (T Nos. 361 and 362), forty-eight in the version most widely used in East Asia (T No. 360) – the future Amitābha details the specific qualities of his future Buddha-field. Each vow concludes with what might be described as a “sanction” clause, in which Dharmākara states “[If I do not succeed in bringing this about], may I not attain Buddhahood.”⁷⁰

centrality
of vows in
analysis

Akṣobhya’s vows are also followed by a sanction clause, but the formulation of the penalty is entirely different. In wording widely echoed in other Mahāyāna sūtras,⁷¹ the future Akṣobhya underscores the

69. In the Buddhist case, of course, the bodhisattva option is initially presented as a more rigorous path within the monastic community, thus making it (at least at the outset) an even more demanding religious option. I am drawing here on several sources, including my own study and translation of the *Ugraparipṛcchā*, the content of several other early Mahāyāna sūtras, and the work of a number of other scholars including Paul HARRISON, Paul WILLIAMS, and SHIZUTANI Masao. 靜谷正雄.

70. Skt. *mā tāvad aham anuttarāṃ samyaksambodhim abhisambudhyeyaṃ*; Ch. 睚不作佛 in T No. 362, 不取正覺 in T No. 360.

71. See for example the *Mañjuśrībuddhakṣetraguṇavyūhasūtra* (T Nos. 318, 310[15], 319; Tibetan Peking/Ötani No. 760[15]); the *Vimaladattāparipṛcchā* (T Nos. 338, 3110[33], 339; Pek. No. 760[33]); and the *Sumatidārikā-paripṛcchā* (T Nos. 334, 335, 336, 310[30]; Pek. No. 760[30]).

seriousness of his vows by stating “[If I should fail to fulfill these vows] I would be breaking faith with all the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, who are even now teaching the Dharma in incalculable, innumerable, inconceivable, immeasurable world-systems – those Buddhas, the Blessed Ones.”⁷² The notion of breaking a promise made to the Buddhas may not seem, to the contemporary reader, nearly as serious as the prospect of renouncing the possibility of Buddhahood; but as the discussion in Śāntideva’s *Śikṣāsamuccaya* makes clear, in the Indian religious context, where the relationship with one’s guru was of paramount importance, the notion of breaking a pledge made to one’s spiritual teacher was a dreadful prospect indeed.⁷³

Breaking
pledge w/
one's guru

More important than the difference in the wording of the sanction clause, however, is the difference in the content of the vows themselves. In Dharmākara’s case, as we have seen, the majority of his vows are

72. The version I have cited is from Lokakṣema’s translation, where the sanction clause, repeated after each of the eight sets of vows, reads 我為欺是諸諸佛世尊 諸不可計無央數不可思議無量世界中諸佛天中天今現在說法者 (11.752a-c). Bodhiruci’s version is generally shorter, reading in most cases simply “that would be to deceive all the Buddhas” 則為欺誑一切諸佛 (e.g., 11.102b4-5). In a few cases, however, his version reads “that would be to turn my back on all the Buddhas” 則為違背一切諸佛 (e.g. 11.102b26-27). The same expression occurs in a longer version of the same clause at 102b2-3 (“that would be to turn my back on the Buddhas, the Tathāgatas, who are presently teaching the Dharma in immeasurable, innumerable, unlimited world-systems”). The Tibetans seem to have interpreted the underlying optative verb not as a conditional statement (“I would be...”) but as an imperative (“may I ...”), for the Tibetan version reads *bdag-gis ... sañs-rgyas bcom-ldan-'das de-dag bslus-par gyur-cig*, “May I deceive (*sic*) the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones” (15.6-16.1 and *passim*).

Happily a Sanskrit version of this statement has been preserved in Śāntideva’s *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, which makes it clear that the underlying verb form was indeed an optative. Singling out Akṣobhya’s vow to become a monk in every future lifetime, Śāntideva quotes him as saying *viśaṃvāditā me buddhā bhagavanto bhaveyur yadi sarvasyām jātau na pravrajeyam* “the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones would be broken faith with by me if in all my lives I do not go forth [as a monk]” (BENDALL ed., 14.15). (I do not know the source of the phrasing *tāvad ahaṃ buddhāṃs tathāgatān vañceyam ye 'parimāṇeṣv asaṃkhyeyeṣv aparamiteṣu lokadhātuṣv etarhi dharmam deśayanti* given without attribution in DANTINNE [*La splendeur*, p. 81]; presumably it is a reconstruction based on the Tibetan cited in his previous note.) Since a bodhisattva necessarily makes his vows in the presence of the Buddhas of the ten directions (who are, after all, all-seeing and all-knowing), the degree of his offence if he should he break one of his vows would be immense.

73. *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (BENDALL ed.), pp. 12-13.

devoted to a description of the precise qualities of the Buddha-field he intends to create. Akṣobhya's vows, however, are entirely different in focus. Rather than describing the particular features of his future Buddha-world, he sets forth in detail the bodhisattva-practices that he promises to carry out. These practices are in no way innovative, but simply draw on standard Mahāyāna assumptions about the necessity of spending countless eons in the cycle of rebirth, engaging (via self-sacrifice as well as *dāna* and other practices) in the acquisition of the tremendous quantity of merit required for Buddhahood.⁷⁴

To be sure, the *Akṣobhyavyūha* devotes considerable attention to the delightful features of the Abhirati realm, but Akṣobhya is never described as vowing to bring these particular qualities about.⁷⁵ On the

74. In the earliest version of the *Akṣobhyavyūha* there are eight sets of such vows (11.752a-c), containing an average of five vows each. Following the pronouncement of these eight sets of vows the sūtra states that Great Eyes and various gods and humans "stood as guarantors" for the vows, and the Buddha declares that if bodhisattva-monks put on that kind of armor (i.e., take vows of this kind) they will all attain *anuttarasamyakṣambodhi*.

75. Certain passages within the sūtra might be viewed at first glance as exceptions, but they can, I believe, be easily explained. In the section of the sūtra that follows the eight sets of vows in Lokakṣema's version (and are set off from these main vows by the statement that Great Eyes and various gods, *asuras* and humans witnessed Akṣobhya's vows, thus arousing the suspicion that these additional resolutions are an interpolation) the future Akṣobhya makes some additional promises, including the promise not to find fault with the members of the four-fold sangha and not to emit semen even in a dream (752c18-753a15). Each of these additional two resolutions has a correlate in the nature of his future world: in the first case, that the members of his future sangha will in fact be faultless; and in the second, that the members of his community will be free from certain types of contamination – specifically, that renunciant bodhisattvas will not suffer from the emission of semen even during dreams, and that the women (literally "mothers") of Abhirati will not suffer from any impurity. My point is that even though these two resolutions appear to be phrased in such a way as to constitute an exception to the rule, they probably originated simply as by-products of actions Akṣobhya himself promised to do.

In Bodhiruci's version and in the Tibetan, only one of Akṣobhya's vows appears to violate this rule: the vow in which he promises that women will have no impurity (now understood, in these two versions, as being free of faults). It is interesting to note that in both versions (or rather, in the branch of the Indian textual tradition that underlies them) this vow seems to have been altered in transmission by an editor familiar with the sanction clause of the *Sukhāvaiṭṭvyūha*: in both cases, the future Akṣobhya states that if women in his land are not free of

contrary, the lovely features of his Buddha-field are portrayed as a side effect of the excellence of what he *did* in fact vow: to undergo intensive and sometimes grueling bodhisattva practices. Just as rebirth in more comfortable circumstances in this world is regularly described in Buddhist literature as the result of good actions which often have no direct connection to the reward received, so the specific features of Akṣobhya's world are described as the by-product of the "excellence of his vows" (*praṇidhāna-viśeṣa*).⁷⁶

This same expression occurs, as is well known, in the *Sukhāvativyūha*, both before and after the list of Dharmākara's vows.⁷⁷ But there it is used in a quite different sense. Now it is understood not as referring to the "excellence" or "distinguished quality" of the bodhisattva's vows in general, but to the specific (and individual) promises contained in those vows. In the *Sukhāvativyūha*, in other words, the expression *praṇidhāna-viśeṣāḥ* (here used in the plural) is understood as referring to the distinctive – i.e., unique and individual – vows made by Dharmākara that determined what his Buddha-field would be like.

It is easy to see how someone familiar with the kind of language used in the *Akṣobhyavyūha* could have interpreted the expression in this sense. It occurs only in the section of the sūtra in which Akṣobhya's future Buddha-field is being described, and the context in which it is used could well have led a listener to assume that it referred to some unstated list of vows concerning the features of that field. What we may have in the *Sukhāvativyūha*, in other words, is a reinterpretation of the expression *praṇidhāna-viśeṣa* as used in the *Akṣobhyavyūha* in a way that brought the notion of making vows concerning the nature of one's future Buddha-field onto center stage, while the more generic vows concerning the requirements of bodhisattva practice receded into the background.

* * *

faults, he will renounce his own attainment of Buddhahood (11.103a15ff., Tib 29.3-7). No such statement appears in Lokakṣema's version.

76. The wording in Lokakṣema's version is 是為阿閼如來昔行菩薩道時所願而有特 (11.756b20-21, reading the final character with the Taishō editors' note 10, a reading that is confirmed by the Tibetan, where *khyad-par* is also surely a translation of Skt. *viśeṣa* "excellence, distinctive [quality]").

77. See §7 (MAX MÜLLER ed., p. 11, line 7) and §9 (p. 21, line 19 - p. 22, line 1). The Chinese reads 發無上殊勝之願.

By reading the *Akṣobhyavyūha* and the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* in conjunction we have been able to identify a number of elements shared by these two texts, as well as a number of important differences. To return now to the question posed at the outset: in what ways are the ideas about Pure Lands contained in these sūtras continuous with earlier Mainstream and Mahāyāna notions, and in what ways do they represent genuine innovations?

genuine
origins

Both sūtras – to begin with elements they share in common – present a vision of a world in which a Buddhist practitioner may aspire to be born which is in many respects like the early Buddhist vision of heaven. Indeed both texts, in searching for analogies to the glories of Abhirati or Sukhāvatī, refer explicitly to heavens known already in earlier Buddhist cosmology.⁷⁸ More specifically, the fact that Abhirati provides an optimal setting for the rapid attainment of Arhatship makes it analogous to the “Pure Abodes” (*suddhāvāsa*) of the Theravāda (and indeed the general Mainstream) tradition, the upper heavens of the Form Realm in which the non-returner (*anāgamin*) is reborn, attaining Arhatship there and never returning to our world. Here the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* diverges, however, for it contains – at least in the Sanskrit and “Sanghavarman” recensions – no discussion of the ease of attaining Arhatship there.⁷⁹ On the contrary, Sukhāvatī appears to provide a way-station only for bodhisattvas, who (apparently with little preparation here on earth) will become irreversible from the enlightenment of a Buddha.

early
vision

△

If we look at what is necessary to attain rebirth in these worlds, once again the *Akṣobhyavyūha* appears to be closer to earlier tradition. What is necessary to attain rebirth in Abhirati (according to all sections of the text except the closing “book-cult” passage) is very much in line with the entrance requirements for traditional heavens: it is the result of one’s own good actions, and a considerable quantity of such merit is required. In the *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, by contrast, access to Amitābha’s world is considerably easier: all that is necessary is remembering Amitābha ten times, and avoiding particularly heinous actions (viz., the five *ānantarya* sins and slandering the Dharma). What is especially noteworthy in the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* is what replaces individual merit as the means of

78. The *Akṣobhyavyūha* refers several times to the Trayastrimśa heaven, while the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* takes its analogy from the highest heaven in the Desire Realm, the Paranirmitavaśavartin heaven.

79. As mentioned above, however (note 66), Arhats are considerably more prominent in the two earliest Chinese versions.

entrance, for rebirth in Sukhāvātī is portrayed as the result of a relationship between the believer and Amitābha. We have here the seeds – if not yet the full fruition – of what would come to be known as reliance on “other-power” in the Pure Land Buddhism of East Asia.

Thus in several respects the *Akṣobhyavyūha* appears to lie slightly closer than does the *Sukhāvātīvyūha* to the pre-existing worldview of Mainstream Buddhism. But how do these two sūtras align themselves with what we have referred to above as the “trunk-line” Mahāyāna tradition? That is, in what ways does the Pure Land Buddhism of these two texts appear to be continuous with early Mahāyāna beliefs and practices, and in what ways do these sūtras diverge from those conventions in unique and innovative ways?

Once again it is the *Akṣobhyavyūha* that appears to be the more conservative of the two. Here we still find the standard early Mahāyāna assumption that Buddhahood is only for certain members of the community, while other Buddhists should be content to attain Arhatship. Indeed it is the role of a Buddha to help them do so quickly, a part that Akṣobhya plays with great effectiveness. Moreover, the path to Buddhahood is still conceived of as tremendously difficult, requiring eons of self-sacrifice to attain. Though Akṣobhya offers an “accelerated course” (as it were) to those fortunate enough to be born in his realm, it is also reiterated throughout the sūtra that those who wish to become Buddhas must imitate the rigorous and extensive bodhisattva training undergone by Akṣobhya himself. Thus while the path to Buddhahood may be shortened by hearing the Dharma and making offerings both in the presence of Akṣobhya and in other Buddha-worlds, the basic requirements of the path have not been changed. Nor has the final destiny of the bodhisattva been revised in any way: the ultimate goal is to become a Buddha oneself in a world that has no Buddhism, and there to preside over one’s own immeasurable assembly of *śrāvakas*.

When we turn to the *Sukhāvātīvyūha*, by contrast, we see that many of these ideas have changed. Buddhahood now appears to be viewed as appropriate for everyone – or at any rate, there is no discussion of the attainment of Arhatship by the denizens of Sukhāvātī,⁸⁰ and the term *anuttarasamyaksambodhi* is now generalized to the extent that it seems

80. Once again these comments are based solely on the text of the sūtra contained in the extant Sanskrit version and in T No. 360.

to refer to the spiritual destination of all beings.⁸¹ Even in the case of Amitābha himself the path appears far less difficult: in the sole passage in which Dharmākara's bodhisattva-conduct is actually described, only such practices as self-restraint, kindness to others, and the practice of the *pāramitās* are named.⁸² There is no reference to bloody acts of self-sacrifice like those described in the *jātaka* stories, nor to the solitary and rigorous self-cultivation in the forest that characterized the pursuit of enlightenment in Śākyamuni's final life.

Above all, though, there is a shift in focus in the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* toward viewing the creation of a Pure Land as the primary aim of the bodhisattva path. Virtually all of Dharmākara's bodhisattva vows are centered on this project, while in the *Akṣobhyavyūha* the qualities of Abhirati are portrayed not as the objective but as the by-product of Akṣobhya's vows. Indeed we have even seen evidence that the authors of the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* may have formulated their own understanding of the content of Dharmākara's resolutions with the wording of the *Akṣobhyavyūha* in mind.

Whatever the direct relationship between the *Akṣobhyavyūha* and the *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, however (and we should recall that we do not have the "original" version of either text), one thing is clear. The *Akṣobhyavyūha* – though it is explicitly a "Pure Land" sūtra – remains quite close in its content and expectations to the world-view of earlier Mainstream and Mahāyāna Buddhism. The *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, by contrast, has introduced a number of important innovations, including the generalization of the bodhisattva path to all practitioners, the ease of the attainment of Buddhahood, and the importance of relying on Amitābha with faith. All of these suggest that the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* – at least in the form of the text most widely used in East Asia today – is the product of a community that was operating on the principle of "one vehicle" for all, in which the requirements for Buddhahood had accordingly been radically revised.

It seems clear, therefore, that the ideas contained in the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* represent a further development of those found in the *Akṣobhyavyūha*, and not vice versa. The type of Pure Land Buddhism presented in the *Akṣobhyavyūha* thus constitutes a transitional stage

81. This issue is explored in detail in an unpublished paper by Andrew JUNKER, "A Look at Oddities and Influence in the Shorter and Longer *Sukhāvatīvyūha* Sūtras" (Indiana University 1997).

82. MAX MÜLLER ed., §10.

between the earliest understanding of the bodhisattva path and the distinctive form of Pure Land Buddhism articulated in the larger *Sukhāvativyūha*. As such it provides an important missing piece in the historical puzzle, revealing that “very earliest stage” of Indian Pure Land Buddhism to which Charles Eliot so long ago referred. Perhaps with the addition of this new material we will more accurately be able to trace the steps by which Pure Land Buddhism gradually became an important element in Indian Buddhist thought and practice, and ultimately – through its East Asian manifestations – a major player on the world religious scene today.

CHARLES B. JONES

Mentally Constructing What Already Exists:
The Pure Land Thought of Chan Master Jixing Chewu
際醒徹悟 (1741-1810)

I. INTRODUCTION

One aspect of Chinese Pure Land history that has begun receiving attention during the past twenty years is the existence of a widely-recognized series of “patriarchs” (*zu* 祖), whose number stands at thirteen (although one list I have seen contains fourteen names).¹ These are figures whom Pure Land devotees acknowledge as shapers, defenders, and revivers of the tradition. Twelfth in this series is the mid-Qing dynasty figure of Jixing Chewu 際醒徹悟, a Chan monk in the Linji line who, in mid-life, abandoned the practice of Chan and devoted himself exclusively to the Pure Land path. After this change of direction, he put his energy into building up his home temple, the Zifu Temple 資福寺 on Hongluo Mountain 紅螺山 in Hebei, into a center for Pure Land practice, and his talks and essays focused on issues related to Pure Land practice, philosophy, and apologetics. His essays, as well as notes recorded by disciples during his dharma-talks, were later compiled into a relatively small work called “The Recorded Sayings of Chan Master Chewu” (*Chewu chanshi yulu* 徹悟禪師語錄).² The writings contained in this brief

1. See for example YU 1981: 36-52 for a survey of patriarchs and an account of the formation of the list. The only source of which I am aware for fourteen patriarchs is found in DAOYUAN 1978, p. 330-331, which lists Cizhou 慈舟 as the fourteenth after Yinguang. However, from DAOYUAN’s remarks this appears to be a part of a personal crusade to add Cizhou to the list, a move that has so far failed to attract wide support.
2. *Chewu chanshi yulu*, ZZ 109: 750-790. Another edition is found in OUYI 1980, 2: 589-664. The thirteenth patriarch, the late-Qing/early Republican era figure Yinguang, also privately printed an edition that re-arranged the different parts of this work and gave them new section titles without altering the actual content, under the title *Mengdong chanshi yi ji* 夢東禪師遺集 (An anthology of Chan Master Mengdong’s [i.e., Chewu’s] literary remains). All references to the *Dai Nihon Zoku Zōkyō* will be given as “ZZ,” and the volume and page numbers that follow will be taken from the Taiwan reprint edition.

anthology show a very gifted literary mind at work: full of parallel phrases, literary allusions, and clear, concise writing, it is a joy to read. The contents reveal his wide learning in several branches of Buddhist thought: perfection of wisdom, Tiantai 天台, Huayan, and Chan. His overriding concern is to generate a desire on the part of his reader to follow in the Pure Land path, and to settle any intellectual doubts that the reader might have by demonstrating that Pure Land practice and soteriology are fully compatible with the highest and most speculative Buddhist philosophy. In addition, it contains stele inscriptions, forewords and prefaces to other works, and his famous “One Hundred *Gāthās* on the Teachings” (*Jiaoyi bai jie*), a set of one hundred four-line verses all beginning with the line “The single word Amitābha...” (*yi ju Mituo*) and going on to praise the wonderful effects and doctrinal significance of this name.

In this article, we will begin our examination of this figure with a résumé of his life, and then look more closely at his methods of Pure Land practice, and his incorporation of mind-only thought into Pure Land theory as the basis for practice.

II. THE LIFE OF CHEWU

There is only one source for Chewu’s biography, and that is the “Brief Sketch of the Life of Chan Master Chewu” (*Chewu chanshi xing lue* 徹悟禪師行略) written by the monk Mulian and appended to the end of “The Recorded Sayings of Chan Master Chewu” (*Chewu chanshi yulu* 徹悟禪師語錄).³ This brief outline of the master’s life is remarkably un-hagiographical. Mulian claims that he heard everything from eyewitnesses and Chewu’s close associates, and that he intentionally presents his material in a straightforward, unembroidered manner. The result is a true biography that is very modern in its style and content.

Chewu’s ordination name was Jixing; “Chewu,” along with “Natang 訥堂,” were his style-names (*zi* 字), and he was also occasionally called (*hao* 號) Mengdong 夢東. He came from Fengrun County 豐潤縣 in what is now Hebei Province, the son of a family surnamed Ma. He was a gifted student and an avid reader in his youth, taking in the classics,

3. ZZ 109: 788-790. Other sources recount Chewu’s life, but they are all summaries or abbreviations of this work. See, for example, the entry “Jixing” in the *Foguang Da Cidian* 1988, 5947c-5948a; and PENG 1987: 360-363. As a way of demonstrating the variability in the Pure Land patriarchal tradition, this last source lists him as the eleventh, not the twelfth, patriarch.

histories, and anything else he came across. As Mulian says, “There is nothing that he did not survey.” The course of his life was changed at the age of twenty-two by a serious illness, which had the effect on him, as it has had on many other famous Buddhist figures, of awakening him to the evanescence of life. As soon as he recovered, he left home and went to the Sansheng Hermitage (*sansheng an* 三聖菴), in Fangshan County 房山縣, also in Hebei, and took refuge under the monk Rongchi 榮池, who tonsured him. The following year, he received the full precepts from the Vinaya Master Hengshi 恆實律師 of the Xiuyun Temple 岫雲寺, twenty-five kilometers west of Beijing.⁴ For the first few years after ordination, he immersed himself in doctrinal and textual studies, attending lectures on a variety of scriptures including the *Sūtra of Perfect Enlightenment*, the *Lotus Sūtra*, the *Diamond Sūtra*, and the *Sūrangamasamādhisūtra*. He travelled to one monastery after another, and eventually mastered the teachings of all the schools. In the course of his studies, he concentrated especially on the Faxiang teachings of consciousness-only, teachings that he would adapt later in life to explain the Pure Land.

He also began Chan practice sometime during this period, and had his breakthrough in the year 1768, while practicing under the master Cuiru 粹如 at the Guangtong Temple 廣通寺. As Mulian writes, “Master, student, and the Way all came together, and he received the mind-seal [from Cuiru] in the 36th generation of Linji.” Thus, at the age of twenty-seven, Chewu was already an accomplished scholar and a certified Chan master. Five years later, Cuiru moved away to the Wanshou Temple 萬壽寺, and Chewu remained at the Guangtong Temple to continue “leading the assembly in the practice of Chan.” He remained there as an eminent Chan teacher for the next fourteen years, and his fame spread far and wide. Mulian credits Chewu with contributing to a revival of Chan teaching and practice.

Despite the success of his career as a Chan teacher, Chewu felt there was still something missing. He himself later wrote:

From the *guisi* 癸巳 year of the Qianlong reign period (1773) I was the abbot of the Guangtong Temple in Jingdu 京都. I led the people in Chan-practice, talking here and there, and my words were recorded. In the *dingxi* 丁酉 year (1777)⁵ my

4. Also known as the Tanzhe Temple 潭柘寺. There is an entry on this temple in the *Foguang da cidian*, 6106b-6107a.
5. The text in the *Zoku Zōkyō* gives this date as the *dingmao* 丁卯 year (1807), which is clearly incorrect. The version of the text found in the *Jingtu shiyao*, first

store of karma was deep and heavy, and so the conditions for all [kinds of] illnesses increased.⁶

He began to look at the example of the Song dynasty Chan master and scholar-monk Yongming Yanshou 永明延壽 (904-975), a genuinely enlightened master living in times that Chewu considered far more conducive to the dharma who had turned to the Pure Land. Reflecting on Yanshou's example of reciting Amitābha's name 100,000 times daily in hopes of gaining rebirth, Chewu thought, "how much more in this age of decline would it be especially right and proper to follow and accept [this path], coming to rest one's mind in the Pure Land?" He began to turn away from Chan practice and toward recitation, and Mulian reports that he eventually set aside only a short period of each day for receiving guests, and devoted the rest of his time to worship and recitation of Amitābha's name.

In the 57th year of the Qianlong emperor (i.e., 1792), Chewu accepted an invitation from the Juesheng Temple 覺生寺 near Beijing to come and serve as its abbot, a post he held for the next eight years.⁸ During this time, he restored the original buildings and added several others "so that all the old and sick could have a place to go for help, and beginners would have a convenient [place] in which to recite and practice." Both resident clergy and the local people admired him for his devotion and strict observance of the precepts, and many came to hear him preach or to receive advice and encouragement in their practice.

In 1800, he moved once again to the Zifu Temple on Hongluo Mountain 紅螺山 near Beijing, where he remained for the last ten years of his life. During this time, he carried on as before: teaching disciples, restoring the temple, meeting with lay devotees, and lecturing. In the third month of 1810, he began to have premonitions that his life was nearing its end, and he made arrangements for his own cremation and

published in 1678 and reprinted in expanded form in 1930 by Ven. Yinguang to include the *Chewu chanshi yulu* has the *dingxi* 丁酉 year (1777), which seems much more likely. See OUYI Zhixu 藕益智旭 1980, 2: 593.

6. ZZ 109: 750b10-11.

7. ZZ 109: 789a1-2.

8. There is an entry on this temple in the *Foguang da cidian* 1988, 6796b-c. It was constructed in 1733, and its most notable feature, according to the dictionary, is its large, eight-sided bronze bell, which is 9.6 meters in height and inscribed with several sūtras, mantras, and illustrations.

chose a senior disciple to succeed him as abbot. At one point, he assembled the resident clergy and admonished them with these words:

The Pure Land dharma-gate covers all [beings] of the three roots [i.e., inferior, middling, superior]; there is no level of capability that it does not take in. For many years now I have labored along with the assembly to build up this *daochang* 道場. It was originally for the sake of drawing [people] from all directions to practice pure karma together. It would behoove everyone always to observe the rules and procedures I have set up; you are not permitted to alter course. This is so that perhaps the old monks and the assembly will not be burdened with any hardships.⁹

About two weeks before his death, he detected the first slight symptoms of the illness that would take him. He called together his disciples and set them to the task of helping him remain focused on the Pure Land by reciting the Buddha's name by his bedside, and he began to see signs that he would be reborn there: innumerable pennants and banners filled the sky in the west. When his disciples expressed sadness that he was leaving them, he told them: "I have arrived in the realm of the sages – you should be happy for your master. Why do you remain in suffering?"

On the seventeenth day of the twelfth month, he reported having seen a vision of Mañjuśrī, Avalokiteśvara, and Mahāsthāmaprāpta in the west, and told his followers that he fully expected to see the Buddha Amitābha himself that day. His disciples chanted the name more intensely, and Chewu said that with every *nian*, he could see more of the Buddha's body. He died that day, sitting upright with his hands in the Amitābhā-mudrā. The assembly could smell an unusual fragrance filling the room. After the first seven days of the funeral period, the master's face looked like he was still alive; it was filled with compassion and peace. Hair that was white at the end of his life turned black, and was extraordinarily lustrous. After the second seven days, he was placed in the vault, and after the third seven days he was cremated. Over one hundred relics (*śarīra*) were collected, and his followers, respecting his wishes, placed his remains in the common pagoda rather than construct a special structure just for him.

Chewu died at the age of seventy, having been a monk for 49 years. Mulian, who wrote the master's biography a decade or so later, says nothing of his recognition as a "patriarch" of the Pure Land School, but Yinguang's (印光, 1861-1940) 1933 expanded edition of Peng Jiqing's (彭際清, 1740-1796), 1783 *Jingtu sheng xian lu* (Record of the sages

9. ZZ 109:789a15-18.

and worthies of the Pure Land) labels him the eleventh patriarch,¹⁰ and OGASAWARA Senshū believes that the popularity of this anthology of biographies and rebirth stories may have contributed to his acceptance throughout China as such¹¹

III. CHEWU'S METHODS OF PURE LAND PRACTICE

At different times in Pure Land history, masters have recommended various forms of practice to their followers. In China, Lushan Huiyuan 廬山慧遠 (344-416) and Tiantai 天台 founder Zhiyi 智顛 (538-597) taught forms of meditative contemplation suitable for rigorously disciplined practitioners. Guifeng Zongmi 圭峰宗密 (780-841) described four different methods of *nianfo* 念佛, and even today one can find a work that describes forty-eight different methods of *nianfo*, each of which serves a different purpose or is suited to a different circumstance.¹² How did Chewu envision the methods of Pure Land practice and what results did he expect from them?

A. *The prerequisites.* In concert with other Pure Land writers, Chewu recommended that practitioners develop certain beliefs and attitudes prior to the actual practice of *nianfo*. The first was *bodhicitta* (*putixin* 菩提心), the altruistic intention to dedicate the merit of all one's practices to the benefit of other living beings.¹³ After that, one needed faith and vows. Faith came first, and was indeed the basis for the generation of vows: "One need only have deep faith in the Buddha's words, and in dependence upon them generate a vow to hold on to his name (*chi ming* 持名)."¹⁴

As to vows, Chewu explains these both in terms of the practitioner's own aspiration to achieve rebirth in Sukhāvātī, and Amitābha's vows to

10. PENG 1987: 360.

11. OGASAWARA 1951: 10. As OGASAWARA notes, the list of patriarchs of the Pure Land school has undergone many changes as different authorities proposed their own versions. Modern usage makes Chewu the 12th, not the 11th patriarch, as one can see in the monastic breviary most in use in Taiwan, the *Fomen bibei kesong ben*, which includes a liturgy for honoring the patriarchs on page 118-119, and in the list given by Ven. DAOYUAN in his study of Pure Land's "globalization" (*shijie hua* 世界化) in DAOYUAN 1978: 330-331.

12. ZHENG 1991.

13. ZZ 109: 754a10.

14. ZZ 109: 758b2; see also 109: 769b8-10.

bring rebirth about. In a long hortatory essay designed to engender faith and vows on the part of his audience, Chewu relates the following story:

For example, take Ying Ke 瑩珂. He was a man who had not given up alcohol and meat. Later, he began reading biographies of those who have gone to rebirth. With each story he read, he gradually gained more willingness until at last he gave up the food [and] recited the Buddha's name. After seven days, he felt the Buddha appearing to him, comforting him and saying, "You have ten years remaining to your life. Recite the Buddha's name well, and after ten years I will receive you." Ke replied, "In this Sahā world, it is easy to lose true recitation. I wish that I could attain rebirth even sooner, and serve all of the worthies." The Buddha said, "Since you have made this wish, I will come for you in three days." Three days later, he attained rebirth.¹⁵

At the end of this essay, after presenting several such inspirational stories of vows made and aspirations granted, Chewu drives home his point:

Ah! There is nothing that the Buddha will not achieve for the sake of sentient beings. He is truly a kind and compassionate mother and father. If one wishes rapid rebirth [in the Pure Land, as in the story of Ying Ke 瑩珂], then he leads them to rapid rebirth. [...] Thus, he shows kindness to all; how is it that he should withhold his compassion from me alone? He brings to pass the vows of all beings; how is it that he should frustrate my vows alone? [...] Therefore, these three seeds: faith, vow, and practice, are exhausted by the single word vow.¹⁶

Besides faith and vows (and practice, mentioned in the above quotation and to which we will come shortly), a list of four requisite states of mind appears in another essay. Here Chewu says:

In *nianfo*, one needs to produce four kinds of mind. What are these four? First, from beginningless time up to the present one has created karma; one must generate a mind of shame. Second, having had an opportunity to hear this dharma gate, one must generate a mind of joy. Third, one's karmic obstructions are beginningless, and this dharma-gate is difficult to encounter, and so one ought to generate a mind of great sorrow. Fourth, as the Buddha is thus compassionate, one ought to generate a mind of gratitude. If [even] one of these four minds are present, then one's pure karma¹⁷ will be fruitful.¹⁸

15. ZZ 109: 757a16-b3.

16. ZZ 109: 757b9-16.

17. *jing ye* 淨業, a term frequently used in Pure Land writings to refer specifically to Pure Land practices. The *locus classicus* of this term is the *Guan wuliangshou fo jing* 觀無量壽佛經 (or *Meditation Sūtra*), where the Buddha Śākyamuni uses this term to refer to the practices and attitudes that will lead to rebirth in Sukhāvātī. See, for example, T.365, 12:341c8.

18. ZZ 109: 772b5-8.

This list of four prerequisite states of mind does not appear in any of the three Pure Land scriptures, although it may come from another source within the Chinese Pure Land tradition.

One item that Chewu explicitly leaves out of the list of prerequisites for practice is confession of faults. Chewu states that the lack of any need for confession in fact constitutes one of Pure Land's advantages over the other dharma-gates. He says:

Moreover, the other gates of cultivation require one to confess one's present karma; if any manifest karma is not confessed, then it constitutes an obstacle on the Way, leaving one without a path for advancement. But the one who practices pure karma goes to rebirth carrying their karma with them; there is no need to confess one's karma. This is because when the mind reaches the point of reciting the Buddha's name just once, one is able to extinguish the faults [accumulated over] 8,000,000,000 *kalpas*.¹⁹

And so, with these preliminaries in place, one is ready to begin practice. What does one then do?

B. Oral/mental invocation and the goal of attaining rebirth. The term *nianfo* 念佛 is ambiguous: the first character, *nian*, can mean either to contemplate or think about, or it can mean to recite aloud. Thus, in reading Pure Land texts, one must always attend to the context within which an individual author discusses *nianfo* in order to clarify whether he or she means oral invocation and recitation or mental contemplation and visualization. In the case of Chewu, we find evidence that he taught *nianfo* at various times in both senses, and so extra care is needed to determine which meaning he gives in any given passage. In this section, we will look at the places where Chewu uses terms such as *chi ming* 持名 (“hold the name”), *nian yi/duo sheng* 念一/多聲 (“recite one/many sound[s]), or *cheng ming* 程名 (“invoke the name”), and see how he envisioned this aspect of practice and what results he expected it to bring.

Aside from the term *nianfo* 念佛 itself, the term that Chewu most commonly uses for Pure Land practice is *chi ming* 持名, “to hold the name.” In the Pure Land scriptures, this term (or its expanded form *zhichi minghao* 執持名號) does not necessarily mean oral recitation of the name, although such practice is not excluded either. For example, Luís GÓMEZ's translation of the relevant passage from the shorter *Sukhāvativyūhasūtra* reads as follows:

19. ZZ 109:758b8-11.

Śāriputra, if good men or good women hear this explanation of the qualities of the Buddha Amita, and embrace his name (*zhichi minghao* 執持名號), and keep it in mind single-mindedly and without distraction, be it for one day, or for two, for three, for four, for five, for six, or for seven days, then, when their lives come to an end, the Buddha Amita, together with his holy entourage, will appear before them. At the time of their death, their minds free of any distorted views, they will be able to be reborn forthwith in Amita Buddha's Land of Supreme Bliss.²⁰

Similarly, the final instructions of Śākyamuni Buddha at the end of the *Meditation Sūtra* are: "Hold well to these words. 'Holding these words' means to hold the name of the Buddha Amitāyus."²¹ In both cases, the emphasis is on the name itself rather than on any meditative visualization of the Buddha, his retinue, or his land. One hears the name, and one keeps it firmly in mind. Whether one does so through spoken recitation or mental concentration appears to be left to the practitioner's discretion.

Chewu uses the term *chi ming* 持名 in exactly this sense. At times he clearly uses the term in the sense of oral invocation, as when he says, "when one holds to the name with a mind of faith and aspiration, each recitation will be a seed for a nine [-petalled] lotus. Reciting one time is the proper causal basis for rebirth."²² Here, "reciting one time" is my rendering of *chi yi sheng* 持一聲, where *sheng* ("sound") is a numerary adjunct used for counting a number of audible repetitions. Nevertheless, in other places where the term occurs, he seems to mean something more like keeping the name in one's mind and letting it dominate one's thoughts at all times. For example, in the middle of a discussion of the basic identity of the Buddha that is recited or contemplated (*nian*) with the practitioner, he says, "the causal mind of the self that is itself the Buddha, with profound faith and total resolve, holds the name exclusively and sincerely."²³ In the context of this discussion within which this statement appears, it is clear that Chewu is recommending that the practitioner keep the name in mind at all times, understanding that the

20. GÓMEZ 1996: 148. His translation of the same passage from the Sanskrit text appears on page 19. Interestingly, it omits the words "this explanation of the qualities of" and stipulates only that people should hear the name itself and bring it to mind. Thus, the Sanskrit focuses more concretely than the Chinese on the sense of hearing the name and remembering it.

21. T.465, 12:346b15-16.

22. ZZ 109: 754b10-11.

23. ZZ 109:772a13-14.

presence of the name both realizes and brings about the identity of his or her mind with the Buddha.

In the final analysis, we must say that Chewu was indifferent on the issue of oral versus mental invocation of the name, and he used the term *chi ming* 持名 freely in both senses, sometimes emphasizing one or the other explicitly as in the examples given above, and other times leaving the issue ambiguous. We find in his writings no attempt to categorize or systematize oral and mental methods of *chi ming* 持名 as we see in, for instance, Zhuhong 祿宏's "audible," "silent," and "half-audible and half-silent" typology with its recommendations as to when or for whom one or the other was most appropriate.²⁴ What mattered to Chewu was that, whatever means one used, the name, and not a visualized image, predominated in one's mind every waking moment.

The reason for this emphasis lay in Chewu's explanation of the relationship between Amitābha's name and his reality. Chewu equated the name "Amitābha" and the title "Buddha" with the existence of all the virtues that enable a being to merit the name "Amitābha Buddha": "The Buddha that appears in an instant of thought establishes his name with all of his virtue; outside of this virtue, there is no name. By means of the name one calls virtue in; outside of that name, there is no virtue."²⁵ In this and similar passages, Chewu appears to assume that Amitābha could not even establish his own name as a Buddha if he did not exercise the merits and virtues by which he earned that title; the name depends on the reality that gives it validity. Therefore, the simple name "Amitābha" held in the mind or on the lips stands as a placeholder for the full visualized image of the Buddha and opens the mind to the Buddha's full reality. This may perhaps serve to account for Chewu's apparent lack of interest in training students to perform the visualization techniques found in the *Meditation Sūtra* and his emphasis on the practice of *chi ming* 持名.

Finally, it is quite clear from almost every passage in the *Recorded Sayings* that Chewu takes for granted that the goal of practice is the attainment of rebirth in the Pure Land of Sukhāvātī. The stories he recounts to illustrate the power of even the most frivolously-made vows all show how beings attain the rebirth that they desire, and he devotes much space to instilling a longing for the Pure Land in his readers.

24. YÜ 1981: 59.

25. ZZ 109: 762b5. See also 109: 767b7.

However, the question for the next section is: Is rebirth in the Pure Land at the end of the present life the *only* goal he imagined for his students and followers? Or did *chi ming* 持名 bring other benefits in this life?

C. *Mental contemplation and the goal of enlightenment.* The first essay in Chewu's *Recorded Sayings* begins this way:

The essence of all the gates of teaching is to illuminate the mind; the essence of all the gates of practice is to purify the mind. Now for illuminating the mind, there is nothing to compare with *nianfo* 念佛. Recollect the Buddha (*yi fo* 憶佛), contemplate the Buddha (*nianfo*), and you will surely see the Buddha manifesting before you. This is *not* a provisional skillful means! One attains to the opening of the mind oneself. Is this kind of Buddha-contemplation (*nianfo*) not the essence of illuminating the mind? Again, for purifying the mind, there is also nothing to compare with *nianfo*. When one thought conforms [to the Buddha], that one thought is Buddha; when thought after thought conforms [to the Buddha], then thought after thought is Buddha. When a clear jewel drops into turbid water, the turbid water cannot but become clear; when the Buddha's name enters into a chaotic mind, that mind cannot help but [be] Buddha. Is this kind of Buddha-contemplation not the essence of purifying the mind?²⁶

Thus, at the very outset we get clues as to the results that Chewu expected to obtain from the practice of *nianfo*: the illumination of the mind, the purification of the mind, and a vision of the Buddha Amitābha, all accomplishments that are to come about not after death, but in this very life. Throughout his writings, he discussed (a) the way in which *nianfo* had its effects instantaneously, (b) the way in which it caused practitioners to manifest their innate Buddha-mind, and (c) the need to persevere in the practice every moment over a lifetime in order to maintain the identity of the self and the Buddha and assure the attainment of rebirth. We will examine these three aspects of his teaching in turn.

(a) Chewu saw the mind as an ongoing process of thinkings that could radically alter their course from one moment to the next. He reminds his reader in several places that thought creates karma, and karma has only ten directions into which it can lead one: the traditional ten realms of Buddhas, bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas, śrāvakas, gods, asuras, humans, animals, hungry ghosts, and hell-denzens. He says:

With the manifestation of a single moment of the mind, all of reality can become delusion and all delusion can become reality. On my last day there is no change [in my fundamental nature], and on my last day I will follow my conditioning.

26. ZZ 109:752b5-10.

Now if it is not the conditioning of the Buddha-realm and the thought of the Buddha-realm, then I will have thoughts of one of the other nine realms. If it is not one of the three vehicles [of śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha, or bodhisattva], then I will have thoughts of the six worldly paths. If I do not have thoughts of [the realms of] gods and humans, then I will have thoughts of the three evil paths. If I do not have thoughts of [the realms of] animals and hungry ghosts, then I will have thoughts of the hells. As an ordinary being, I cannot but have thoughts; only a Buddha has accomplished [the feat of] having the substance of the mind empty of all thoughts. [...] If a thought arises, then it must fall into one of the ten realms; there is no thought that subsists outside of the ten realms. Every thought that arises is a condition for receiving [future] rebirths. There is no-one who knows this principle and yet fails to *nianfo*.²⁷

Thus, for Chewu, every instant was a pivotal moment in which one's fate could be decided and one's trajectory altered. The law of cause-and-effect meant that the contents of one's mind set one on a certain path. Since everyone had thoughts at every moment (fully-enlightened Buddhas excepted), then their path was set or re-set at every moment. Since there were only ten possible directions to go, then one's path must of necessity be chosen from among those ten. The most desirable path, as he thought should be obvious to all, was that of the Buddhas, and to put oneself on that path, one had to *nianfo*. That meant, as outlined above, to practice *chi ming* 持名, to hold the name which, as the vessel of all the Buddha's virtues, was the Buddha itself.

(b) Based on this principle, Chewu could assert that allowing the Buddha's name to dominate one's mind for a moment made it identical with the Buddha in that moment. He stated the matter in this way:

What is "being a Buddha"? "Being a Buddha" is just reciting the Buddha's name and contemplating the Buddha's proper and dependent [recompense]. Thus, it is easy. A sūtra says, "When your mind thinks of the Buddha, then it is the thirty-two marks and the 80 minor characteristics." How could this not mean that thinking of the Buddha entails being the Buddha? And becoming the Buddha means that one is the Buddha.²⁸

In a later essay, Chewu elaborates on this idea further. When one's mind is filled with Amitābha Buddha (even if only through holding the name

27. ZZ 109: 752b14-753a2.

28. ZZ 109:754b18-755a3. The term "proper recompense" (*zheng bao* 正報) and "dependent recompense" (*yi bao* 依報) refer respectively to the fruition of a Buddha's pure karma in terms of his own natural attributes (stature, adornments, intelligence, wisdom, strength, and so on) and in terms of his environment (land, dwelling, retinue, and so on).

in mind without any other mental imagery), then it becomes identical to the Buddha in that instant:

Now if at this present moment, my mind is focused on Amitābha, the Western Region, and on seeking rebirth in the Pure Land of utmost bliss, then at this very moment the proper and dependent [recompense] of the western region are within my mind, and my mind is within the proper and dependent [recompense] of the western region. They are like two mirrors exchanging light and mutually illuminating each other. This is the mark of horizontally pervading the ten directions. If it firmly exhausts the three margins of time, then the very moment of contemplating the Buddha is the very moment of seeing the Buddha and becoming the Buddha. The very moment of seeking rebirth is the very moment of attaining rebirth and the very moment of liberating all beings. The three margins of time are all a single, identical time; there is no before and after. [...] Awakening to this principle is most difficult; having faith in it is most easy.²⁹

The fact that *nianfo* 念佛 revealed Buddha-nature so directly in this way made its practice superior to any method that Chan had to offer.

The two phrases in the *Meditation Sūtra*, 'this mind becomes the Buddha,' 'this mind is the Buddha,' are simpler and more direct than the Chan statements 'direct pointing to the person's mind,' and 'see [one's own] nature and become a Buddha.' Why is this? Because 'seeing the nature' is difficult and 'being a Buddha' is easy.³⁰

As this passage and the quotation that opened this section show, even though Chewu turned his back on Chan, illumination of the mind and the uncovering of its inherent Buddhahood remained important goals for him. What had changed was the method he recommended for attaining these goals.

(c) The fact that the course of the mind could be turned in a single instant presented practitioners with a wonderful opportunity. A single moment spent filling the mind with Amitābha's name made the mind Amitābha for that moment. However, there was also a danger: in the very next moment the mind was liable to turn back to its old patterns of thought, and Chewu asserted that the benefits of *nianfo* could all be lost as quickly as they were gained:

However, if in this very moment one occasionally loses the illumination, or suddenly produces regressive regrets, and is out of accord with the Buddha, then karma can [once again] entangle the mind, and the present sensory-realm will

29. ZZ 109: 756a3-9.

30. ZZ 109: 754b16-18.

revert to its previous recompense. As a result, one will again be just another suffering sentient being in the land of endurance.³¹

Such an idea contrasts sharply with the ebullient optimism of a Shinran or an Ippen that rebirth is assured after the first utterance of the *nem-but*.

In practical terms, this meant that the Pure Land practitioner was under the necessity of maintaining this practice of *chi ming* 持名 from one moment to the next, deepening it and strengthening it through constant application all their lives. Not only that, but Chewu thought that this life was too precious even to waste it on other Buddhist practices; they were not as reliable as *nianfo*, and thus time and energy spent in their pursuit was time taken away from the critical practice of *chi ming* 持名:

This day has passed; our lives are now that much shorter. The light that passes in a span of time is also the light that passes through a span of our lives. Can you not cherish it? Knowing how precious is the spirit (*jingshen* 精神), then one must not dissipate it uselessly; hold on to the Buddha's name each and every moment! The days and nights [must] not pass away empty; practice pure karma each and every instant! If one sets aside the Buddha's name and cultivates the holy practices of the three vehicles, this too is squandering one's spirit. Even this is like a common mouse trying to use a 1000-pound crossbow; how much more the activities of those in the six paths of birth-and-death! If one puts aside pure karma in favor of the small results of the provisional vehicles, this is also an empty passage of days and nights. Even this would be like using a precious jewel to buy one garment or one meal; how much more choosing [to aim for] the small results with outflows of [rebirth in the realms of] deities or humans!³²

This constant practice had two purposes. One was to maintain the identity of one's own mind and the Buddha's mind as much as possible, which led to the very this-worldly or pre-mortem results of illumination and purification. In this it provided the same results that Chan practice promises, but much more easily and reliably.

The other purpose was to establish the mind in this identification with the Buddha Amitābha so that, at the moment of death, one would be much more likely to have one's mind properly focused at this most critical juncture. This raises a point in which I believe one may see a major difference of opinion between Chinese and Japanese Pure Land thought. Chinese masters tended to be much less sanguine than their Japanese

31. ZZ 109:756b9-12.

32. ZZ 109:758a1-8. "Pure karma" (*jingye* 淨業) is a term specifically used to refer to Pure Land practice.

counterparts about the certainty of rebirth, and one can even find stories within the tradition about devoted practitioners who, despite years of *nianfo* practice, are distracted from it on their deathbeds and lose their place in the Pure Land.³³

While Chewu may not express the idea quite this starkly, he is very frank about the possibility that one may turn away from the practice in a moment and never recover it again:

However, if at the very moment the mind can turn its karma [...], the great mind suddenly regresses and the true practices are compromised, then karma will be able to [once again] entangle the mind.³⁴

It is imperative, according to Chewu, that the last thought in this lifetime be fixed on Amitābha; only then is rebirth assured. And, he says, the arising of this thought at the proper time does not happen by chance. One must prepare for it through prior training.³⁵ Thus, constant practice not only provides the pre-mortem benefits of purifying the mind and manifesting its original Buddha-nature; lifelong effort also sets up a pattern of thought that makes the arising of concentration on Amitābha and his Pure Land at the crucial moment of death more and more likely the longer it is prolonged.

At this point we have a fairly complete picture of the kinds of practices Chewu advocated and the goals that he expected the practitioner to realize through them. It remains now to examine the way in which he thought that the practice of *chi ming* 持名 made these goals possible. The key, as we shall see, lay in a melding of Pure Land and mind-only thought.

33. The modern Taiwan Pure Land Master Zhiyu once told this story during a dharma-talk: There was once an elderly layman who had two wives. He was very pious, and practiced *nianfo* ardently for many years. He developed a serious illness, and knew that his death was near, so he concentrated his mind and practiced intensely on his bed, and reported to those around him that he could see Amitābha and his retinue coming to receive him. Right at this critical moment, his second wife came into the room crying and agitated, and asked him how she and her son were to get along once he was dead. The layman assured her that he would provide for them in his will, but the distraction proved disastrous for him. He lost the vision of Amitābha and could not get it back. Instead of the Buddha and his attendants, he now saw a wall of black and the pathway to hell opening before him. This story is found in Zhiyu 1992: 58.

34. ZZ 109:756b2-4.

35. See ZZ 109: 762a1-3.

IV. THE BUDDHA AND THE DEVOTEE IN THE MIRROR OF THE MIND

Like many commentators in the Chinese Pure Land tradition, Chewu concerned himself at times to explain how *nianfo* worked to bring about the results it did, and these explanations brought him into the realms of the theological and the metaphysical. However, a comparison of Chewu's writings on this aspect of Pure Land theory with other writers' demonstrates a narrower range of concerns than one finds in most other texts. A reading of MOCHIZUKI Shinkō 望月言亨's *History of Chinese Pure Land Thought* (*Chūgoku jōdōkyōri-shi* 中國淨土教理史) shows that Pure Land thinkers in China historically took on a wide range of problems in explaining the workings of Pure Land practice: the nature of the Pure Land itself; how the Pure Land fit into the overall picture of the cosmos and the various other realms that constituted it; how defiled beings could be reborn in the Pure Land without defiling it in turn; the relationship of Amitābha to Śākyamuni; how the Amitābha seen in visions and dreams relates to the Amitābha who lives in his distant Pure Land; how to define both the practices and goals of Pure Land in the vocabulary of principle (*li* 理) and phenomena (*shi* 事); and so on.³⁶ In contrast, Chewu's comparatively small literary output deals with only one or two problems of this sort in any depth: the relationship of Pure Land thought to the two truths of Mādhyamika, and its compatibility with the principle of mind-only. Of the two, the latter draws the lion's share of his thought and is elaborated in more detail and subtlety. However, his exposition of the theme of mind-only contains an interesting twist that makes a closer examination worthwhile.

Near the end of Chewu's *Recorded Sayings*, one finds a creed of sorts that he composed which lists ten essential articles of faith for practitioners. Of these ten, the sixth says, "Believe that there really is a Pure Land," and is followed by an editorial gloss that reads, "Its existence is no different from the present Sahā world." The tenth article reads, "Believe that the only source of all dharmas is the mind."³⁷ These two statements in juxtaposition define the problem that appears to have pre-occupied Chewu greatly: to confirm the existence of Amitābha and his Pure Land in a literal, realistic way while simultaneously upholding the

36. MOCHIZUKI 1932, passim.

37. ZZ 109: 788a.

fundamental tenet of Chinese Buddhist thought which held that all reality is nothing more than a manifestation of mind.

Chewu was certainly not the first Chinese Buddhist to apply mind-only thought to Pure Land practice. This had been done throughout history by Pure Land's supporters and detractors both. One of the main issues dividing the two camps was not whether the Pure Land and the Buddha who created and sustained it were mind-only – all agreed that they were. The difference lay in their willingness or unwillingness to accept that they also existed literally, apart from the *Sahā* world, off to the west, as a destination for those of low capacities who had failed to realize the truths of mind-only and universal emptiness. This latter position, sometimes called “Western Direction Pure Land” (*xifang jingtu* 西方淨土), was rejected by detractors in favor of a strict mind-only construction called “Mind-Only Pure Land” (*weixin jingtu* 唯心淨土).³⁸ The supporters claimed that both “Western Direction Pure Land” and “Mind-Only Pure Land” were equally true, and this is the position that Chewu, in the simultaneous affirmations of the sixth and tenth articles, defended.

The detractors of Pure Land practice liked to point out that a literal belief in Amitābha as a Buddha external to one's own consciousness to whom one could cry for help, and the belief in the real existence of *Sukhāvātī* as a land localizable to the west were violations of a basic Buddhist understanding of the world. Their favorite prooftexts were the dictum in the “Chapter on Buddha-Lands” in the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* that stated: “If the bodhisattva wishes to acquire a pure land, he must purify his mind. When the mind is pure, the Buddha-land will be pure,”³⁹ and the statement in the *Meditation Sūtra*: “This mind creates the Buddha; this mind is the Buddha.”⁴⁰ For example, the Ming dynasty Buddhist reformer Hanshan Deqing (1546-1623) disparaged the practice of *cheng ming* 程名 or *chi ming* 持名 if it consisted solely of oral invocation without any effort made to purify the mind. In his view, the practice of *nianfo* absolutely had to be accompanied by a strict observance of the precepts and the firm intention to cut off the roots of desire, after which one could engage in either recitation or visualization exercises.

38. On the opposition between *xifang jingtu* 西方淨土 and *weixin jingtu* 唯心淨土, see SHI Jianzheng 1989: 48.

39. WATSON, trans. 1997, p. 29.

40. *Guan wuliangshou fo jing* 觀無量壽佛經, T.365, vol. 12:343a21.

However, during the course of this practice, one must understand that while one will be reborn in the Pure Land, this birth will really be “no-birth” and the going “non-going.” This, he claimed, was the splendor of the teaching of “Mind-Only Pure Land.”⁴¹ Hanshan was uncompromising in his belief that *nianfo* only worked when used as an active form of self-cultivation and mental illumination; it did not work automatically for the ignorant and the defiled.

Chewu fully agreed that the Buddha Amitābha and the land Sukhāvātī were manifestations of the mind. The opening statement of his longest and most sustained exposition of his thought begins with the statement, “It is essential to know that the phrase ‘*a-mi-tuo-fo*’ 阿彌陀佛 has its main import in the doctrine of mind-only.” From this starting-point he goes on to demonstrate the truth of the doctrine of mind-only from the three viewpoints of direct experience, the use of similes and metaphors, and the testimony of enlightened beings and Buddhas.⁴² After these demonstrations, he argues that a further examination of the meaning of the word “mind” in “mind-only” reveals the multivalence of this word. Following an analysis from Guifeng Zongmi 圭峰宗密’s (780-841) *Chan yuan zhu quan ji dou xu* 禪源諸詮集都序 (T.2015, vol. 48, p.397-415), Chewu states that “mind” can mean the insentient, material mind-organ, the mind composed of the eight consciousnesses of the Faxiang or Weishi school, the unenlightened *ālayavijñāna*, and the enlightened *ālayavijñāna* which is the “true mind.” This last aspect is the “mind” one affirms in the doctrine of “mind-only,” and this mind exists inherently (*ben you* 本有) and beginninglessly (*wu shi* 無始) in all beings, whether worldlings or Buddhas. To affirm that all of reality, whether the Sahā world or Sukhāvātī, is mind-only is to affirm its non-duality with this mind.

Up to this point in his argument, Chewu has said nothing with which a critic such as Hanshan Deqing 憨山德清 could find fault. However, Chewu then begins to shift the terms of the debate in such a way as to simultaneously affirm the reality of other things, including the Buddha, as external to the mind and existent in a provisional, phenomenal way. He asserts that, just as one can take the word “mind” and make it part of the compound “mind-only,” one may take any phenomenon and make it part of a parallel compound, “X-only.” The equal pervasion of the

41. Hanshan Deqing 1: 437, 439.

42. ZZ 109: 763a10 ff.

enlightened mind that all sentient beings possess with all other phenomena makes this novel construction of “X-only” thought possible.

If the mind pervades everywhere horizontally and exhausts everything vertically, then the meaning of mind-only is complete, and the meaning of all the other “X-only” doctrines (*wei yi* 唯義) is also complete: form-only, sound-only, smell-only, flavor-only, touch-only, dharma-only, right on up to subtle-obscuration only and particle-only. Only when these “X-only” doctrines attain completion does one complete the true meaning of mind-only. If the meanings of all these other “X-only” doctrines are not attained, then one is left with only the empty name of “mind-only” rather than the true meaning of “mind-only.” It is only because the meanings of all these other “X-only” are attained that one can say that dharmas lack fixed characteristics, and the import is that they encounter conditions, as one could also say of subtle-obscuration-only and particle-only.⁴³

Thus, because this fundamental mind unobstructedly pervades all phenomena, one can say that they also unobstructedly pervade the mind and each other, and everything can become the “only” reality there is. Chewu uses “mind-only” as a way of affirming the Huayan doctrine of the mutual interpenetration of principle and all phenomena and of all phenomena with each other.⁴⁴

Within this understanding, Chewu then begins to discuss the status of Amitābha. One of the variables that one may insert into the algebraic expression “X-only” is “Buddha”: thus, “Buddha-only” is just as much the case from the ultimate point of view as “mind-only.” As he develops his argument further, Chewu then goes on to stress the transcendence of all oppositions in the enlightened mind, and the mutual interpenetration of all distinct phenomena that takes place even while the transcendence of oppositions undercuts their distinctiveness one from another. Thus, the mind of the practitioner who recites the name “Amitābha,” as we have seen, actually incorporates the complete reality of Amitābha (through the transcending of oppositions between practitioner and Buddha) while remaining distinct from him (through the Huayan doctrine of perfect interpenetration which requires that distinctions be maintained in order to have things that can interpenetrate). Because this complete coincidence of transcendence and immanence is impossible for the rational mind to hold, it is inconceivable, and can only be understood by “surpassing feelings and leaving aside views.”

43. ZZ 109: 764a16-b3.

44. That Chewu draws his inspiration from Huayan thought on this point is clear from his use of the metaphor of the jewels in Indra’s net at 764b10-11.

Chewu sums up his argument as follows:

First, we took “mind-only” as the meaning. Second, we took “Buddha-only” as the meaning. Third, we took “transcendence of oppositions and perfect interpenetration” as the meaning. Finally, we took “surpassing feelings and leaving aside views” as the meaning. Only when one takes all four of these meanings as the primary import does one get a proper understanding of the single phrase, “Amitābha.” How, then, could it be simple to talk about the proper understanding!⁴⁵

How, indeed!

What has Chewu done with this argument? First, he has co-opted the detractors’ position of “mind-only,” agreeing with them that this doctrine is fundamental to orthodox belief and making it a member of his own list of ten essential beliefs. But then, by making use of the Huayan doctrine of mutual, unobstructed interpenetration, he advances his position in two ways that begin to undercut the position of the strict “Mind-Only Pure Land” partisans.

First, he de-centers the practitioner’s mind. Those critics who depended upon the above-quoted statements from the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* and the *Meditation Sūtra* tended to emphasize the centrality of the individual’s mind while ignoring the status of other beings and phenomena. When they repeatedly argued that the purity or impurity of the practitioner’s mind constituted the decisive factor in the attainment of rebirth (as Hanshan Deqing argued) or in the adornment of one’s own pure land through self-purification (as the Sixth Chan Patriarch Huineng 惠能 stated),⁴⁶ they left any notion of Amitābha as a being who existed in his own right out of the account altogether. The practitioner’s own mind then becomes the central creative and organizing principle for all of reality. Chewu’s exposition of “Buddha-only” and all the other “X-only” philosophies that flow logically from the pervasion of mind into all reality takes the practitioner’s own mind out of the center and places it as one phenomenon among all others, not creating them, not dominating them, not organizing them in any way, but interacting with them equally and reciprocally.

Second, he reaffirms the real distinction between the practitioner and the Buddha in such a way that Amitābha can be seen as a genuinely different being from the practitioner without violating the principle of

45. ZZ 109:765a1-3.

46. YAMPOLSKY 1967:156-159.

non-duality. Amitābha, as much as any other being or phenomenon, exists external to and in distinction from the practitioner. The critics, in over-emphasizing the mind's role in "creating" Amitābha and "being" Amitābha, had neglected Amitābha as an autonomous being who is free to act according to his own purity and enlightenment, independently of the practitioner's level of attainment. Chewu, on the other hand, affirmed both positions at the same time, and so re-positioned Amitābha as a phenomenon in the world as well as an instantiation of the principle that pervaded the world. This allowed the practitioner and the Buddha to co-exist in a relationship of mutuality and equality as fellow phenomena, where neither could subsume or dominate the other. By emancipating Amitābha from the domination of the practitioner's mind, Chewu set the stage for the explanation of the efficacy of *nianfo* 念佛 according to the concept of *ganying* 感應 found in other parts of his *Recorded Sayings*.

Chewu, like many other Pure Land thinkers, attributed the efficacy of *nianfo* to *ganying*, a kind of sympathetic vibration or resonance that took place when one set one's mind upon Amitābha. The non-dual relationship of perfect interpenetration at the level of phenomenon – phenomenon explained in terms of "mind-only" as given above – gave Chewu the freedom to explain how this *ganying* worked. By affirming the principle of "mind-only," Chewu agreed that Amitābha was an image (a *phänomenon* in the Greek sense) in the practitioner's mind, even if only the name appeared there with no accompanying visualization. However, by maintaining Amitābha's autonomy from the practitioner's mind, Chewu was able to affirm that the practitioner was equally an image in Amitābha's mind. The result of *nianfo*, therefore, was to bring two authentically-separate-yet-interpenetrating minds into a similarity and simultaneity of content in such a way that they could begin to "vibrate" together, setting in motion the mechanism of *ganying* 感應 that would lead to illumination and rebirth. Unenlightened beings cannot conceive of this mutual interpenetration of two minds, and so in discussing it one necessarily has to look at the matter from the point of view of either the practitioner's mind or Amitābha's mind, as Chewu does in a passage that is a rhetorical *tour de force*:

Now the reason that Amitābha can be Amitābha is that he deeply realized his self-nature as mind-only. However, this Amitābha and his Pure Land – are they not [also the practitioner's own] self-natured Amitābha and a Mind-Only Pure Land? This mind-nature is exactly the same in both sentient beings and Buddhas; it does not belong more to Buddhas and less to beings. If this mind is Amitābha's, then sentient beings are sentient beings within the mind of Amitābha. If this mind is

sentient beings', then Amitābha is Amitābha within the minds of sentient beings. If sentient beings within the mind of Amitābha recollect (*nian*) the Amitābha within the mind of sentient beings, then how could the Amitābha within the mind of sentient beings fail to respond to the sentient beings within the mind of Amitābha?⁴⁷

In other words, Amitābha and the practitioner are related to each other within a completely symmetrical two-way contemplation. Amitābha is a *phænomenon* of the practitioner's mind, but at the same time, the practitioner is a *phænomenon* of Amitābha's mind. Amitābha, being an omniscient Buddha, is always aware of sentient beings, but these beings, in their delusion and distraction, are seldom aware of Amitābha. However, when someone begins the practice of *nianfo*, then both become aware of each other and each becomes a *phænomenon* within the other's mind, and this sets up the resonance. Non-duality is the key: the distinction between beings and Buddhas as phenomenon (*shi* 事) makes this relationship possible, while their fundamental identity in terms of principle (*li* 理) makes this resonance possible. Thus, Chewu summarizes: "This means that the one is the many, always identical and always distinct [...] this is the essential summary of *nianfo*."⁴⁸

V. CONCLUSIONS

What is Chewu's place in the Pure Land tradition, how original are his formulations, and how do we profit from this reading of his works?

At the outset of an evaluation of his significance, it seems that Chewu's claim on our attention and study should be assured because of his place within the lineage of Chinese Pure Land patriarchs. For those who study the Chinese Pure Land tradition, this in itself makes some level of awareness of his life and thought self-evidently worthwhile.

But to dig deeper, we may ask: how significant a figure is he within the wide and varied scope of Chinese Pure Land thought? That he was acclaimed a patriarch within a relatively short time of his death would indicate that he enjoyed a high reputation among devotees of *nianfo*, and so we can assume a certain amount of charisma on his part, although it does not seem to have issued in the organization of his followers into any great *nianfo* societies among clerics and laity. Also, within the history of Pure Land ideas and doctrinal developments, his legacy may

47. ZZ 109: 761a2-8.

48. ZZ 109: 761a15-17.

seem rather meager. After all, he left only one slim text in two *juan* to posterity which deals, as I observed earlier, with only a narrow range of concerns when compared with the wide-ranging reflections of earlier figures such as Yunqi Zhuhong 雲棲祿宏 or Ouyi Zhixu 藕益智旭.

This paucity of literary and philosophical output may well justify scholars in leaving him to one side while they explore the writings of other, more prolific figures. However, it seems to me that he had at least one very original idea that merits allocating some time and energy to the study of his work. That idea is the re-working of “mind-only” thought along Huayan lines as given in section IV above. But how original was this idea? An examination of the Pure Land tradition that preceded Chewu shows that many thinkers before him had written about the non-duality of the Buddha and the practitioner, and of the simultaneous affirmation of conventional and ultimate truth with regard to the Buddha and his land. It may be worth taking a moment to examine briefly some of these antecedents.

The application of mind-only thought to Amitābha and his realm of Sukhāvātī is among the oldest trends in the Chinese Pure Land tradition. The *Pratyutpannasamādhisūtra* (Ch. *Banzhou sanmei jing* 般舟三昧經, T.418), one of the first scriptures to be translated into Chinese in the second century C.E., puts forth this idea. In Paul HARRISON’s translation, the relevant passage says: “Whatever I think, that I see. The mind creates the Buddha. The mind itself sees him. The mind is the Buddha.”⁴⁹ Here, however, the concern is specifically with the vision of Amitābha achieved by an experienced practitioner in *nianfo* as a visualization exercise, and therefore deals with Amitābha as an image, not as an autonomous being. One can easily see this as part of a larger concern within meditative circles about the status of visualized objects generally, as seen in the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*.

Lushan Huiyuan 廬山慧遠 (344-416), upon reading this and related passages in the *Pratyutpannasamādhisūtra*, sensed that it was speaking only of Amitābha as an internally-generated image, and was led to ask the Central Asian monk and translator Kumārajīva to clarify for him how such an internal image could act like an independent being: answering questions, touching the practitioner on the head, and so forth. Kumārajīva’s response hints at the notion of a reciprocity between Buddha and practitioner. One can see the Buddha in the *pratyutpanna-*

49. T.418, vol. 13:905c-906a. The translation is found in HARRISON 1998, p. 21.

samādhi, he says, because while the practitioner's mind is turned toward the Buddha, the Buddha emits light that illumines the ten directions. Thus, seeing the Buddha is similar to a tuning a radio to the frequency of a particular radio station; when tuned correctly, it catches the signal. Just so, when the practitioner's mind is "tuned" to the frequency of a Buddha's light, one achieves a vision of that Buddha, and the image that appears is simultaneously an appearance in the mind and a true representation of an actual, externally-existent Buddha.⁵⁰ While this exchange succeeded in relating an internal vision of Amitābha to an externally-existent Amitābha, it did not place the practitioner and the Buddha in the relationship of parity in the way that Chewu's construction does.

Since Chewu's biography mentions the major impact that Yongming Yanshou 永明延壽 had on his thought, one might reasonably expect to find precedents for the former's Pure Land theology in the latter's writings. One of Yanshou's shorter works, the catechetical tract *Wanshan tong gui ji* 萬善同歸集 (Anthology on the myriad virtues returning to the same [source], T.2017), does have a short series of questions and answers that deal explicitly with the meaning of the term *weixin jingtu* 唯心淨土, or "Mind-Only Pure Land." However, the questions raised regarding this Mind-Only Pure Land and the answers given evince very different concerns from those of Chewu. Yanshou's fictitious questioner wants to know how the visualization of an external Buddha, violating as it does the principle of mind-only, can possibly avoid entrapping the practitioner in delusion and discrimination. Yanshou replies that this is an *upāya*, a skillful teaching device by which all the Buddhas and bodhisattvas lead the unenlightened in the right direction, even though what they teach might not be literally or ultimately true. Beginners on the bodhisattva path, who have not yet realized that all of reality is mind-only, simply cannot grasp the ultimate nature of their own minds and the Buddha that they contemplate. For them, contemplating the Buddha and seeking rebirth in an objectified Sukhāvātī is all right as a provisional measure. With time, they will eventually come to the realization that the Buddha and his land were creations of their minds all along, and they will revise their perception

50. T.1856, vol. 45:134b5-22; 134c7-12. The reader is also referred to KIMURA Eiichi's critical edition of this text found in KIMURA 1960-62, 1:34-36, with a modern Japanese rendering at 1: 165-169.

of reality accordingly.⁵¹ Chewu's concern to validate the practice of *chi ming* 持名 as a means of purifying the mind or to defend the idea of an Amitābha that actually does exist in a manner autonomous from the practitioner's mind appear quite antithetical to Yanshou's claim that such a Buddha appears only as an *upāya*.

Yunqi Zhuhong 雲棲祿宏's most extended doctrinal treatment of Pure Land thought, the long preface to his commentary on the shorter *Sukhāvativyūhasūtra* (*Fo shuo amituo jing shu chao* 佛說阿彌陀經疏鈔, ZZ 33: 326-491) has surprisingly little to say on the subject of *weixin jingtu* 唯心淨土. For the most part, Zhuhong contents himself to affirm the nature of Amitābha and Sukhāvati as mind-only and repeat Yongming Yanshou's exposition of the ultimate truth of mind-only coupled with the need for a provisional discrimination of practitioner from Buddha as an *upāya*. Only once does Zhuhong actually use the technical vocabulary of the Consciousness-Only school (at ZZ 33:356a17-b9), where he brings in the eight consciousnesses and the *ālayavijñāna*, only to reduce them to the "one mind" (*yi xin* 一心) of the phrase "the single, unperturbed mind" (*yi xin bu luan* 一心不亂). In so doing, he demonstrates that his primary doctrinal background is not actually in Consciousness-only thought, but in Tiantai 天台 thought and its concern to show how all phenomena are ultimately grounded in the "one mind" or "absolute mind." It is this mind to which Zhuhong refers when he calls everything "mind-only."

So far, we have not encountered the relationship that Chewu described between practitioners and Amitābha, based on an epistemology that held between two autonomous beings, each holding the other in his gaze. One can find some idea of a mutuality of this sort in the writings of the eighth century Pure Land thinker Feixi 飛錫. Feixi also used Huayan thought to advocate the efficacy of Pure Land practice by showing the non-duality and mutual illumination of the practitioner's and the Buddha's mind. This idea, found in Feixi's *Nianfo sanmei baowang lun* 念佛三昧寶王論 (T. 1967, 47: 141c-142b, section 15, and following sections *passim*), seems similar to Chewu's reasoning on the mutuality of mind-only. However, Feixi's primary concern here appears to be affirming that the practitioner is an instantiation of the Buddha, relating the two in terms of phenomenon (*shi* 事) and principle (*li* 理). In other words, it is an ontological argument relating the inherent but inchoate

51. T.2017, 966b26 ff.

Buddhahood of the practitioner to the realized Buddhahood of Amitābha as if it were a question of relating the many to the one. While Chewu, as seen in one quotation given above (at the end of section III), does in one instance use the language of “the many and the one” to describe the relationship, the majority of his essays present an epistemological analysis of the image of the Buddha that appears in the practitioner’s mind at the same time that an image of the practitioner appears in the Buddha’s mind.

This is far from an exhaustive survey of all Chinese Pure Land literature, and one could go on indefinitely multiplying individual examples of past Pure Land masters. Based on a reading of MOCHIZUKI’s *History*, however, it appears that one would only continue seeing the analyses and concerns given in the previous paragraphs appearing again and again. It is safe to conclude that, in this one instance within his limited literary remains, Jixing Chewu did indeed hit upon an original way of explaining the relationship between Amitābha Buddha and the beings, both unenlightened and enlightened, who contemplate either his image or his name. His analysis went beyond the chorus of predecessors in the tradition whose primary concern was to emphasize the non-duality of this relationship while disparaging the appearance of duality as a delusion that the Buddha exploits as a skillful expedient. Chewu, going against the stream, argues that the distinction between the Buddha and the devotee is a real one, and it will not be overcome or superseded even with the attainment of enlightenment. Buddhas and other beings are independent entities, interrelated as *phænomena* in each other’s minds, as much separate as identical. Their separateness makes a relationship possible, while their identity makes possible the resonance of *ganying* 感應 through which the Buddha saves beings and takes them at death to a really-existent Pure Land in the west.

Because of the originality of this insight, as well as his patriarchal status within the tradition, Chewu deserves more scholarly attention than the half-paragraph accorded him in MOCHIZUKI’s *History*,⁵² and the author hopes that this small study has made a start in his rediscovery.

52. MOCHIZUKI 1932: 534-535.

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ANN HEIRMAN

What Happened to the Nun Maitreyī?

One of the precepts for Buddhist monks¹ stipulates that a monk commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense² if he accuses another monk of an unfounded *pārājika* offense.³ The introductory story preceding the precept⁴ relates why this precept has been laid down: two monks are angry with the venerable monk Darva Mallaputra (Pāli: Dabba Mallaputta) and they want to see him removed. They convince the nun Maitreyī (Pāli: Mettiyā) to help them, whereupon she accuses Darva of having an impure conduct and of having raped her (= a violation of the first *pārājika* precept). The Buddha, however, does not believe her and, after having heard Darva's defense, he starts an investigation against the two monks. Thereupon, the two admit to have incited Maitreyī to accuse Darva. The Buddha then lays down a precept whereby he stipulates that a monk who accuses another monk of an unfounded *pārājika*, commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*. The question what happened to the nun Maitreyī remains however. She too accused a monk of an unfounded *pārājika*.

The introductory story preceding the above precept in the Pāli *Vinaya* says that the Buddha wanted Mettiyā to be expelled: “*tena hi bhikkhave Mettiyaṃ bhikkhuniṃ nāsetha*” (*Vin*, Vol.III, pp.162,38-163,1). This statement created many discussions as to how to interpret it. U. HÜSKEN (1997: 96-98)⁵ points to the fact that the procedure of expulsion cannot have been based on any fixed rule of the *Vinaya* since, until the precept had been laid down, no regulation prohibiting monks or nuns from accusing another of having committed a *pārājika* offense existed. The

1. *saṃ*. 8 for monks: Pāli *Vinaya*, H. OLDENBERG, *Vin*, Vol.III, p. 163,21-26; *Mahī*, p. 16a29-b3; *Mahā*, p. 280c3-6; *Dharma*, p. 588b22-26; *Sarva*, p. 23a21-25; *Mūla*, p. 697c2-5.
2. *saṃghāvaśeṣa*, Pāli *saṃghādisesa*, and variants: an offense leading to a temporary exclusion from the Buddhist order.
3. *pārājika*, and variants: an offense leading to a definitive exclusion from the Buddhist order.
4. The introductory story is analogous in all the *Vinayas*, except for the *Mahā*.
5. U. HÜSKEN (1997), “The Application of the *Vinaya* Term *nāsanā*”, *JIABS* 20.2: 93-111.

1rst
not
punished

first wrong-doer is not punished, but only induces the Buddha to formulate a new precept. Moreover, the expulsion of Mettiyā is, in any case, not (legally) justified since a false accusation constitutes a *saṃghādisesa* offense and not a *pārājika* (leading to an expulsion). Therefore, U. HÜSKEN concludes that her expulsion “must be regarded as an exception, made possible through the personal intervention of the Buddha.” The term ‘*nāsetha*’ is thus not used as a technical term. U. HÜSKEN (1997: 102-105) further refers to the *Samantapāsādikā*, a commentary on the Pāli *Vinaya*,⁶ *Sp* 582,30-584,9. The passage concerned reports a controversy between the Abhayagirivāsins and the Mahāvihāravāsins on the actual reason of Mettiyā’s expulsion. Was it because of her (false) statement (Abhayagiri) or because of another reason (Mahāvihāra). According to the author of the *Samantapāsādikā*, experts considered the latter view to be the right one. In that case, the question remains, however, what kind of offense Mettiyā was actually accused of. According to the *Samantapāsādikā*, it cannot have been a *saṃghādisesa* offense since the precept on the false accusation is valid only for nuns with respect to other nuns⁷ and for monks with respect to other monks, but not for nuns with respect to monks. Nor did she violate one of the *pārājika* precepts. In this way, she only can have committed an offense that is not sanctioned with an expulsion. Yet, she has been expelled. To this, the *Samantapāsādikā* says that she has been expelled because of her bad character, of which she herself was aware. The latter explanation is considered by U. HÜSKEN “to be a provisional solution.”

Also O. VON HINÜBER (1997: 87-91)⁸ gives an account of the controversy between the Abhayagirivāsins and the Mahāvihāravāsins. He too indicates that “at least at the time of the *Samantapāsādikā*, there was no

6. Although attributed to Buddhaghosa, the commentary is probably written by a different author in the fourth or the fifth century AD (O. VON HINÜBER 1996), *A Handbook of Pāli Literature*, Berlin, New York, Walter de Gruyter (Indian Philology and South Asian Studies 2), pp. 103-109).

7. *saṃ.* for nuns: Pāli tradition, M. WIJAYARATNA, *Moniales*, p. 174, *saṃ.* 8; *Mahī*, p. 79a21-25, *saṃ.* 2; *Mahā*, p. 517c4-8, *saṃ.* 2; *Dharma*, p. 718b12-15, *saṃ.* 2; Sarvāstivādins, T.1437, p. 480a29-b3, *saṃ.* 2; *Mūla*, p. 933c20-23, *saṃ.* 2.

The Pāli *Vinaya* and the *Sarva* do not mention those precepts that nuns have in common with the ones for monks. These precepts are, however, enumerated in the respective *bhikṣuṇīprātimokṣas* (*Moniales* and T.1437).

8. O. VON HINÜBER (1997), “Buddhist Law According to the Theravāda *Vinaya* (II): Some Additions and Corrections,” JIABS 20.2: 87-92.

tangible legal argument in the *Vinaya* by which Mettiyā could have been expelled(!).” He further points to *Sp* 583,17 and *Sp* 584,3-5 that state that a monk who accuses a nun, and a nun who accuses a monk commit a *dukkata* (Skt. *duṣkṛta*).⁹

The aim of this paper is to investigate (1) whether the other *Vinaya* traditions¹⁰ equally lead to a similar discussion and (2) whether, throughout the *Vinayas*, a monk who has offended (a monk or) a nun, and a nun who has offended (a nun or) a monk are judged analogously to the above outlined case?

1. *What happened to Maitreyī in the Vinaya traditions that have survived in their Chinese translation?*

All the *Vinayas* have a precept saying that a monk who accuses another monk of an unfounded *pārājika* offense, commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense.^{1*} In all the *Vinayas*, except for the *Mahā*, the precept is introduced by the story of the two monks who, with the help of the nun Maitreyī, falsely accuse Darva Mallaputra of having had sexual intercourse with her. The *Mahā* does not mention a nun helping the angry monks.

In the *Mahī*, Maitreyī hesitates to help the monks, since she is afraid that she will be expelled after having confessed.¹¹ It is not explicitly mentioned what she would confess (the sexual intercourse or the false accusation), but it seems to be the act of sexual intercourse since the two monks answer her that they will testify that Darva did wrong and not she, so that there is no reason to expel her. Nevertheless, Maitreyī still hesitates. She stays afraid that Darva’s expulsion will imply also her expulsion. Yet, she accuses him in order to help the two angry monks. Although the Buddha knows that she is telling a lie, he questions Darva about it. When Darva denies, the Buddha believes him. Whereas no

9. i.e. ‘wrong doing,’ a light offense.

10. Five *Vinayas* have survived in a Chinese translation: the *MahīśāsakaVinaya* (T.1421, *Mahī*), the *MahāsāṃghikaVinaya* (T.1425, *Mahā*), the *DharmaguptakaVinaya* (T.1428, *Dharma*), the *SarvāstivādaVinaya* (T.1435, *Sarva*) and the *MūlasarvāstivādaVinaya* (T.1442 up to and including T.1451, *Mūla* [because of its size, the *MūlasarvāstivādaVinaya* is not edited in one work, but consists of a number of different works]). Of the latter *Vinaya*, there is also a Tibetan translation.

11. *Mahī*, p.15c8: 僧必當作自言擯我.

punishment is thus imposed on him, the nun Maitreyī is definitively expelled from the order with a *jñapticaturtha karman*¹² (*Mahī*, p.15c25-26). She is expelled for having said that Darva had intercourse with her (*Mahī*, pp.15c26-16a3). When the two monks keep on saying that Darva had intercourse with Maitreyī, Darva is again questioned, and again he denies. Thereupon, the Buddha stipulates that a monk who accuses another monk of an unfounded *pārājika*, commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*. The commentary following upon the precept adds that a monk who accuses a nun, a probationer or a (male or female) novice commits a *duṣkṛta*, that a nun who accuses a monk commits a *pācittika*,¹³ and that a nun who accuses a probationer or a (male or female) novice commits a *duṣkṛta* (*Mahī*, p.16b14-17).

The above account leads to a discussion similar to the one mentioned in the *Samantapāsādikā*: there is no legal argument to expel only Maitreyī when she confesses that she has had sexual intercourse with Darva. If it is true, she and Darva should both be expelled (on account of the first *pārājika*). As the Buddha does not believe her, he, consequently, does not expel Darva. However, Maitreyī is expelled. This cannot be on account of her false accusation since, before the precept has been laid down, she cannot be punished. The first wrong-doer is never sanctioned. Moreover, once the precept has been laid down, if a nun falsely accuses a monk, her act constitutes a *pācittika* offense, which is never sanctioned with an expulsion.

The *Dharma* only mentions that Darva denies having committed a *pārājika* offense. It does not say what happened to the nun Maitreyī. No sanction is mentioned. Consequently, it is very doubtful that a discussion arose on the interpretation of a sanction imposed on her.

Finally, in the *Sarva*, the Buddha states that Maitreyī has to be expelled by means of a formal procedure because she herself says that she has committed a (*pārājika*) offense: 是彌多羅比丘尼自說作罪故應與滅羯磨 (p.22c9). In the *Mūla*, we find a similar statement: 友女苾芻尼自言犯罪應當滅擯 (p.696c26). In these two *Vinayas*, Maitreyī is thus expelled after having confessed a *pārājika* offense, even if the

12. A *jñapticaturtha karman* is a formal act consisting of one motion (*jñapti*), three propositions (*karmavācanā*) that concern the acceptance of the motion by the assembly of monks or nuns, and a conclusion.

13. *pācittika*, Pāli *pācittiya*, and variants: an offense that must be expiated.

believed to be untrue. In this way, there seems to be no legal argument for the expulsion.

In addition, all the *Vinaya* traditions equally contain a precept saying that a nun who accuses another nun of an unfounded *pārājika* offense, commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense.^{7*} The question what happens to a nun who accuses a monk of an unfounded *pārājika* offense, or to a monk who accuses a nun remains. In the *Samantapāsādikā*, it is said that a nun who accuses a monk, and a monk who accuses a nun commit a *dukkata* (Skt. *duṣkṛta*) (*Sp* 583,17 and *Sp* 584,3-5). The *Mahī*, p.16b14-17, states that a monk who accuses a nun commits a *duṣkṛta*, but that a nun who accuses a monk commits a *pācittika*. The *Mahā*, p.281a2-3, says that a monk who accuses a nun of a *pārājika* or of a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* commits a *pācittika*. There is no information on a nun who accuses a monk. The *Dharma*, p.589a26-28 – i.e. in the commentary following upon the precept on the false accusation of a monk by another monk – says that a monk who accuses a nun of an unfounded *pārājika* (also) commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*.¹⁴ It adds that (also) a nun [in a similar situation] commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*: 比丘尼僧伽婆尸沙 (p.589b6). In my view, the latter statement is to be interpreted as ‘a nun who accuses a nun [or a monk] of an unfounded *pārājika*, commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*.’¹⁵ This interpretation is confirmed by a precept for nuns: *Dharma*, p.718b12-15, *saṃghāvaśeṣa* 2: if a nun accuses **someone** of an unfounded *pārājika* offense, she commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*. The *Sarva* and the *Mūla* do not give any information on a monk who accuses a nun, or on a nun who accuses a monk.

We thus see that, although there seems to be no legal argument to expel Maitreyī, most *Vinayas* state that she is to be expelled. The *Dharma* does not impose a punishment upon her.

The above mentioned facts also show that

- only two *Vinayas* indicate which offense a nun commits when she accuses a monk: according to the *Mahī*, it is a *pācittika*; according to the *Dharma*, it is a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* (just as when she accuses a

14. *Dharma*, p. 589a26-28: 以八無根波羅夷法謗比丘尼說而了了僧伽婆尸沙。

15. See also A. HEIRMAN (1998), *Disciplinaire voorschriften voor boeddhistische nonnen, Bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga van de dharmaguptaka's* (T.Vol.22, Nr.1428, pp. 714-778) (Ph.D. Universiteit Gent), Deel 2, Vol.1, pp. 53-55, note 288.

monk). The *Samantapāsādikā* supports the opinion that a nun commits a *dukkata*.

- the Pāli tradition, the Mahīśāsakas and the Mahāsāṃghikas judge a monk who accuses a monk and a monk who accuses a nun in a different way. This is not the case for the Dharmaguptakas for whom gender has no influence: regardless whether a monk accuses a monk or a nun, he commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*.

2. *Is a monk who has offended a nun, and is a nun who has offended a monk judged analogously to the above outlined case throughout the Vinayas?*

In order to answer this question, I will consider the other *Vinaya* precepts that (1) regard misbehavior towards a monk or a nun, with the exclusion of the precepts that involve a sexual relation between the two parties,¹⁶ and on which (2) relevant information is found concerning the judgment of a monk for having offended a monk, and of a nun for having offended a nun *versus* the judgment of a monk for having

16. A first investigation of the *Dharma* reveals that the category of precepts that involve sexual or physical contact is to be considered as a separate category with a proper logic: a monk sexually or physically involved with a woman is committing a more serious offense than a monk involved with a man; and a nun sexually or physically involved with a man is committing a more serious offense than a nun involved with a woman. There is one exception: a monk who has sexual intercourse with a man or with a woman commits a *pārājika* in both cases (*bhikṣuvibhaṅga*, *pār.* 1, p. 571a21-24; p. 571c11-12, 21-22). See *bhikṣu-vibhaṅga*, *saṃ.* 2: a monk commits a *saṃ.* if he has physical contact with a woman (p. 580b28-29); he commits a *duṣkṛta* if he has physical contact with a man (p. 581a14); *saṃ.* 3: a monk commits a *saṃ.* if he talks about indecent items [the genital zone] to a woman (p. 581c1-2); he commits a *duṣkṛta* if he talks to a man (p. 581c25-26); *saṃ.* 4: a monk commits a *saṃ.* if he incites a woman to offer her body to him (p. 582b8-11); he commits a *duṣkṛta* if he incites a man (p. 582c1-2); *saṃ.* 5: a monk commits a *saṃ.* if he acts as a go-between between a man and a woman, or vice versa (p. 583a16-18); if he acts as a go-between between men, he commits a *duṣkṛta* (p. 584a1-2); *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, *pār.* 1: a nun commits a *pār.* if she has sexual intercourse with a man (p. 714a14-15); there is no penetration possible between women who have a sexual relation, but the *Dharma* says that nuns who slap on one another's vagina commit a *pāc.* (p. 738c11-12); *pār.* 5: a nun commits a *pār.* if she has physical contact with a man (p. 715b6-10); she commits a *duṣkṛta* if she has contact with a woman (p. 715c23-24); *saṃ.* 8: a nun commits a *saṃ.* if she accepts things from a man who is filled with desire (p. 721c22-24); she commits a *duṣkṛta* if she accepts things from a woman who is filled with desire (p. 722a6-7).

offended a nun, and of a nun for having offended a monk. In this way, we can examine four precepts:

1. a monk commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* if he uses a minor event¹⁷ to accuse a monk of an unfounded *pārājika*; a nun commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* if she uses a minor event to accuse a nun of an unfounded *pārājika*

The precept and the commentary following upon this precept are similar to the above mentioned case on the accusation of an unfounded *pārājika*:

- Pāli tradition:
 - a monk who accuses a monk commits a *saṃ*. (*Vin*, Vol.III, pp.167,38-168,7); the Pāli tradition does not give any further commentary; it is not unlikely, however, that the commentary on the preceding precept on the accusation of an unfounded *pār*. also applies here.
 - *bhikkhunīpātimokkha*: a nun who accuses a nun commits a *saṃ*. (*Moniales*, p. 174).
- Mahīśāsakas:
 - a monk who accuses a monk commits a *saṃ*. (*Mahī*, p.16c10-14); the commentary refers to the commentary following upon the preceding *saṃ*. (*Mahī*, p.16c20) – thus: a monk who accuses a nun commits a *duṣkṛta*; a nun who accuses a nun commits a *saṃ*.; a nun who accuses a monk, commits a *pāc*..
 - *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*: a nun who accuses a nun commits a *saṃ*. (*Mahī*, p.79a29- b5)
- Mahāsāṃghikas:
 - a monk who accuses a monk commits a *saṃ*. (*Mahā*, p.281b21-24); the commentary refers to the commentary following upon the preceding *saṃ*. (*Mahā*, p.281c8-9) – thus: a monk who accuses a nun commits a *pāc*..
 - *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*: a nun who accuses a nun commits a *saṃ*. (*Mahā*, p.517c8-12).
- Dharmaguptakas:
 - a monk who accuses a monk commits a *saṃ*. (*Dharma*, p.589c12-16); the commentary adds that a monk who accuses a nun (also) commits a *saṃ*. (*Dharma*, p.590a27-29); it further says that (also) a nun [in a similar situation] commits a *saṃ*. (p.590b8).¹⁸ The latter commentary is possibly to be interpreted as: a nun who accuses a nun [or a monk] commits a *saṃ*..
 - the *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*, however, only mentions that a nun who accuses another nun, commits a *saṃ*. (*Dharma*, p.718b19-24).
- Sarvāstivādins:
 - a monk who accuses a monk commits a *saṃ*. (*Sarva*, p.23c10-14).

17. A minor event that has no relation with a *pārājika* offense is deliberately misinterpreted in order to falsely accuse an innocent monk.

18. *Dharma*, p. 590b8: 比丘尼僧伽婆尸沙.

- *bhikṣuṇīprātimokṣa*: a nun who accuses a nun commits a *saṃ*. (T.1437, p.480b4-8).
- Mūlasarvāstivādins: – a monk who accuses a monk commits a *saṃ*. (*Mūla*, p.699c24-28).
- *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*: a nun who accuses a nun commits a *saṃ*. (*Mūla*, p.934a9-13).

Similar conclusions can be drawn as with the preceding precept on the accusation of an unfounded *pārājika* offense:

- only two *Vinayas* indicate which offense a nun commits when she accuses a monk: according to the *Mahī*, it is a *pāc.*; according to the *Dharma*, it – possibly – is a *saṃ*. (just as when she accuses a monk).
- the Mahīśāsakas and the Mahāsāṃghikas (and possibly the Pāli tradition) judge a monk who accuses a monk and a monk who accuses a nun in a different way. This is not the case for the Dharmaguptakas for whom gender has no influence: regardless whether a monk falsely accuses a monk or a nun, he commits a *saṃ*.

2. a monk commits a *pācittika* offense if he slanders someone/a monk; a nun commits a *pācittika* offense if she slanders someone/a nun

The different schools further display the following information:

- Pāli tradition: – a monk who slanders someone commits a *pāc.* (*Vin*, Vol.IV, p.6,5); the commentary adds that a monk who slanders a non-ordained person commits a *dukkāṭa* (Skt. *duṣkṛta*) (*Vin*, Vol.IV, pp.10,29-11,2). *Kaṅkhāvitaraṇī*,¹⁹ (D. Maskell (ed.), London, Pāli Text Society) p. 83, says that here also a nun has to be seen as a non-ordained person. This implies that a monk who slanders a nun commits a *dukkāṭa*.
- *pātimokkha* for nuns: a nun who slanders commits a *pāc.* (*Moniales*, p.185: *omasavāde, pācittiyam*).
- Mahīśāsakas: – a monk who slanders a monk commits a *pāc.* (*Mahī*, p.38a11); the commentary adds that a monk who slanders a nun commits a *duṣkṛta* and that a nun who slanders a nun or a monk commits a *pāc.* (*Mahī*, p.38a15-17).
- *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*: a nun who slanders a nun commits a *pāc.* (*Mahī*, p.85b11-12).

19. An anonymous commentary on the Pāli *Pātimokkha*, ascribed to Buddhaghosa (fourth-fifth century) (see O. VON HINÜBER (1996), op. cit., pp. 109-111).

- Mahāsaṃghikas: – a monk who slanders someone commits a *pāc.* (*Mahā*, p.325b28-29); the commentary adds that a monk who slanders a nun commits a *sthūlātyaya*²⁰ (*Mahā*, p.326b4-5).
– *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*: a nun who slanders commits a *pāc.* (*Mahā*, p.527b18: only the key-word ‘to slander’).
- Dharmaguptakas: – a monk who slanders **someone** commits a *pāc.* (*Dharma*, p.635b10 and following); the commentary adds that (also) a nun [in a similar situation] commits a *pāc.* (*Dharma*, p.636a5).²¹
– the above corresponds to the *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* that says that a nun who slanders (**someone**) commits a *pāc.* (*Dharma*, p.734c12).²²
- Sarvāstivādins: – a monk who slanders someone commits a *pāc.* (*Sarva*, p.64b21-22); the commentary adds that a monk who slanders someone who is not a monk (and thus, theoretically, also a nun) commits a *duṣkṛta* (*Sarva*, p.65c28-29).
– *prātimokṣa* for nuns: a nun who slanders a nun commits a *pāc.* (T.1437, p.482c16).
- Mūlasarvāstivādins: – a monk who slanders **someone** commits a *pāc.* (p.765b27 and following); the commentary does not give any further information.
– *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*: a nun who slanders **someone** commits a *pāc.* (p.970a10 and following); the commentary adds many details on a nun who slanders a nun, but not on a nun who slanders a monk.

The above reveals that

- three *Vinayas* indicate which offense a nun commits when she slanders a monk: according to the *Mahī*, to the *Dharma* and to the *Mūla*, it is a *pāc.*. Yet, the commentary in the *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* of the *Mūla* only gives details on a nun who slanders a nun.
- the Pāli tradition, the Mahīśāsakas, the Mahāsaṃghikas and the Sarvāstivādins judge a monk who slanders a monk and a monk who slanders a nun in a different way. This is not the case for the Dharmaguptakas and for the Mūlasarvāstivādins for whom gender seems to have no influence: regardless whether a monk slanders a monk or a nun, he commits a *pāc.*.

20. lit. ‘a grave offense,’ an offense considered to be slightly lighter than a *pārājika* or a *saṃghāvaśeṣa*.

21. *Dharma*, p. 636a5: 比丘尼波逸提.

22. *Dharma*, p. 734c12: 若比丘尼毀訾語波逸提.

3. a monk commits a *pācittika* offense if he tells about someone's/a monk's grave offense [*pārājika/saṃghāvaśeṣa*] to a non-ordained person; a nun commits a *pācittika* offense if she tells about someone's/a nun's grave offense

The different schools further display the following information:

- Pāli tradition:
 - a monk who tells about a monk's grave offense commits a *pāc.* (*Vin*, Vol.IV, p.31,12-14);
 - *bhikkhunīpātimokkha*: a nun who tells about a nun's grave offense commits a *pāc.* (*Moniales*, p.186).
- Mahīśāsakas:
 - a monk who tells about a monk's grave offense commits a *pāc.* (*Mahī*, p.41a17-18); the commentary adds that a monk who tells about a nun's grave offense commits a *duṣkṛta* and that a nun who tells about a nun's or a monk's grave offense commits a *pāc.* (*Mahī*, p.41a21-22).
 - *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*: a nun who tells about a nun's grave offense commits a *pāc.* (*Mahī*, p.85b19-21).
- Mahāsāṃghikas:
 - a monk who tells about a monk's grave offense commits a *pāc.* (*Mahā*, p.338a8-10); the commentary adds that a monk who tells about a nun's grave offense commits a *sthūlātyaya* (*Mahā*, p.338a25-26).
 - *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*: a nun who tells about a grave offense commits a *pāc.* (*Mahā*, p.527b20: only the key-words 'to tell about a grave offense').
- Dharmaguptakas:
 - a monk who tells about **someone's** grave offense commits a *pāc.* (*Dharma*, p.639b26-28); since the commentary that follows upon the precept states that in case a monk tells about a grave offense of a person who is not a monk or a nun, he does not commit a *pāc.*, but a *duṣkṛta* (*Dharma*, p.639c6-7), we can deduce that the term 'someone' mentioned in the precept has to be interpreted as 'a monk or a nun.' The commentary further adds that (also) a nun [in a similar situation] commits a *pāc.* (*Dharma*, p.639c9-10).²³
 - the above corresponds to the *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* that says that a nun who tells about **someone's** grave offense, commits a *pāc.* (*Dharma*, p.734c19-20).
- Sarvāstivādins:
 - a monk who tells about **someone's** grave offense commits a *pāc.* (*Sarva*, p.72c10-11); the commentary only gives details on a monk who tells about a monk's grave offense.
 - *bhikṣuṇīprātimokṣa*: a nun who tells about a nun's grave offense commits a *pāc.* (T.1437, p.482c22-23).
- Mūlasarvāstivādins:
 - a monk who tells about a monk's grave offense commits a *pāc.* (*Mūla*, p.773b28-29);

23. *Dharma*, p. 639c9-10: 比丘尼波逸提。

– *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*: a nun who tells about a nun's grave offense commits a *pāc*. (*Mūla*, p.972b20-21).

The above reveals that

- only two *Vinayas* indicate which offense a nun commits when she tells about a monk's grave offense: according to the *Mahī* and to the *Dharma*, it is a *pāc*.. Consequently, there is no difference between a nun who tells about a monk's grave offense and a nun who tells about a nun's grave offense.
- the *Mahīśāsakas* and the *Mahāsāṃghikas* judge a monk who tells about a monk's grave offense and a monk who tells about a nun's grave offense in a different way. This is not the case for the *Dharmaguptakas* for whom gender has no influence: regardless whether a monk tells about the grave offense of a monk or of a nun, he commits a *pāc*..

4. a monk commits a *pācittika* offense if he accuses someone/a monk of an unfounded *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense; a nun commits a *pācittika* offense if she accuses someone/a nun of an unfounded *saṃghāvaśeṣa* offense

This precept is very similar to the one on the accusation of an unfounded *pārājika* offense. The different schools further display the following information:

- Pāli tradition:
 - a monk who accuses a monk commits a *pāc*. (*Vin*, Vol.IV, p.148,5-6); the Pāli tradition does not give any further commentary; it is not unlikely, however, that the commentary on the precept on the accusation of an unfounded *pār*. offense also applies here.
 - *bhikkhunīpātimokkha*: a nun who accuses a nun commits a *pāc*. (*Moniales*, p.190)
- *Mahīśāsakas*:
 - a monk who accuses a monk commits a *pāc*. (*Mahī*, p.67b12-13); the commentary adds that a monk who accuses a nun commits a *duṣkṛta* and that a nun who accuses a monk or a nun commits a *pāc*. (*Mahī*, p.67b13-15).
 - *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*: a nun who accuses a nun commits a *pāc*. (*Mahī*, p.86b14-15).
- *Mahāsāṃghikas*:
 - a monk who accuses a monk commits a *pāc*. (*Mahā*, p.395a8-9); the commentary adds that a monk who accuses a nun commits a *sthūlātyaya* (*Mahā*, p.395a25-26).
 - *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*: a nun who accuses commits a *pāc*. (*Mahā*, p.527c12: only the key-words 'to falsely accuse of a *saṃ*.').

- Dharmaguptakas: – a monk who accuses (**someone**) commits a *pāc.* (*Dharma*, p.689a21-22)²⁴; the commentary does not say whether ‘someone’ is a monk or a nun; given the above mentioned commentary on the precept on the accusation of an unfounded *pār.*, however, it is likely that we have to interpret ‘someone’ as ‘a monk or a nun’. The commentary further says that (also) a nun [in a similar situation] commits a *pāc.* (*Dharma*, p.689b12-13).²⁵
- the above corresponds to the *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga* that says that a nun who accuses (**someone**) commits a *pāc.* (*Dharma*, p.736b19-20).
- Sarvāstivādins: – a monk who accuses a monk commits a *pāc.* (*Sarva*, p.115b7-8).
- *bhikṣuṇīprātimokṣa*: a nun who accuses a nun commits a *pāc.* (T.1437, p.484a11-12).
- Mūlasarvāstivādins: – a monk who accuses a monk commits a *pāc.* (*Mūla*, p.852a9-10).
- *bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga*: a nun who accuses a nun commits a *pāc.* (*Mūla*, p.991b13-14).

The above reveals that

- only two *Vinayas* indicate which offense a nun commits when she accuses a monk: according to the *Mahī* and to the *Dharma*, it is a *pāc.*. Thus, in these two traditions, a nun commits a *pāc.* regardless whether she accuses a nun or a monk.
- the Mahīśāsakas and the Mahāsāṃghikas (and possibly the Pāli tradition) judge a monk who accuses a monk and a monk who accuses a nun in a different way. This is not the case for the Dharmaguptakas for whom gender has no influence: regardless whether a monk falsely accuses a monk or a nun, he commits a *pāc.*.

We can conclude that

- only two *Vinayas* indicate which offense a nun commits when she offends a monk. The *Mahī* says that a nun commits a *pācittika* if she uses a minor event to accuse a monk of an unfounded *pārājika* (whereas she commits a *saṃghāvaśeṣa* if she accuses a nun). This is analogous to the first precept on a false accusation. Also with regard to the other precepts, a nun commits a *pācittika* if she offends a monk. In these cases, however, there is no difference with

24. *Dharma*, p. 689a21-22: 若比丘瞋恚故以無根僧伽婆尸沙謗者波逸提。

25. *Dharma*, p. 689b12-13: 比丘尼波逸提。

a nun who offends a nun. The *Dharma* makes no difference between a nun who offends a monk and a nun who offends a nun.

- the Mahīśāsakas and the Mahāsāṃghikas (and possibly the Pāli tradition) judge a monk who offends a monk and a monk who offends a nun in a different way. This is not the case for the Dharmaguptakas for whom gender has no influence: regardless whether a monk offends a monk or a nun, he commits the same offense.

Consequently, throughout the *Vinayas*, a monk who has offended a nun, and a nun who has offended a monk are judged analogously to the above outlined case on the accusation of an unfounded *pārājika* offense.

List of abbreviations

<i>Dharma</i>	T.1428, 四分律, trans. Buddhayaśas and 竺佛念 Zhu Fonian (<i>DharmaguptakaVinaya</i>).
<i>Mahā</i>	T.1425, 摩訶僧祇律, trans. Buddhabhadra and 法顯 Faxian (<i>MahāsāṃghikaVinaya</i>).
<i>Mahī</i>	T.1421, 彌沙塞部和醯五分律, trans. Buddhajīva, 慧嚴 Huiyan and 竺道生 Zhu Daosheng (<i>MahīśāsakaVinaya</i>).
<i>Moniales</i>	Wijayaratna, M. (1991), <i>Les moniales bouddhistes, naissance et développement du monachisme féminin</i> , Paris.
<i>Mūla</i>	T.1442, 根本說一切有部毘奈耶, trans. 義淨 Yijing (<i>bhikṣuvibhaṅga</i> of the Mūlasarvāstivādins); T.1443: 根本說一切有部苾芻尼毘奈耶, trans. 義淨 Yijing (<i>bhikṣuṇīvibhaṅga</i> of the Mūlasarvāstivādins).
<i>pāc.</i>	<i>pācittika</i> (Pāli: <i>pācittiya</i>) or variants
<i>pār.</i>	<i>pārājika</i> or variants
<i>saṃ.</i>	<i>saṃghāvaśeṣa</i> (Pāli: <i>saṃghādisesa</i>) or variants
<i>Sarva</i>	T.1435, 十誦律, trans. Punyatrāta / Puṇyatara, Kumārajīva, Dharmaruci and Vimalākṣa (<i>SarvāstivādaVinaya</i>)
<i>Sp</i>	Buddhaghosa, <i>Samantāpāsādikā</i> , J. Takakusu, M. Nagai and (Vols.5 and 7) K. Mizuno (editors) [1924-1947], London, Pāli Text Society, 7 Vols.
<i>T.</i>	<i>Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō</i> 大正新修大藏經, J. Takakusu and K. Watanabe (editors), Tōkyō: 1924-1934.
T.1437	十誦比丘尼波羅提木叉戒本”, compilation 法穎 Faying (<i>bhikṣuṇī-prātimokṣa</i> of the Sarvāstivādins).
<i>Vin</i>	Oldenberg, H. (1964 ²⁻³ [1879-1883]), <i>The Vinaya Piṭakam</i> , London, Pāli Text Society, 5 Vols.

OSKAR VON HINÜBER

Report on the XIIth Conference of the IABS

1. *Report on the Conference*

After an unavoidably long interval following the XIth conference held in Mexico City (24th – 28th October 1994), the very well attended XIIth conference was held at Lausanne between 23rd and 28th August 1999. With 260 participants (members of the Organizing Committee and auditors not included) it was the largest meeting of IABS members ever. During the conference 57 persons enrolled as new members of the IABS.

The conference began on the 23rd (Monday afternoon) with registration and a get-together party. During the opening session T. J. F. Tillemans as the local organizer, M. Pascal Bridel, Vice-rector of the University of Lausanne, and Mme Jacqueline Maurer, *Conseillère d'Etat*, Minister of the Economy of the Canton of Vaud, welcomed the participants to the congress. The president of the Association, C. Caillat, delivered her address "Comparing Buddhism and Jainism". Finally, J. Bronkhorst gave practical advice to the participants.

All contributions were either organized within a panel or a section. The following scholars each initiated one of the 23 panels:

1. Ch. S. Prebish: Recent Works on *Vinaya* Studies
2. J. Newman / G. Orofino: Conservative and Evolutionary Elements in Buddhist Tantra Literature
3. B. Dessein: *Abhidharma*
4. B. Oguibénine: Buddhist (Hybrid) Sanskrit
5. M. Baumann: Buddhism in the West
6. R. Kritzer: *Antarābhava*
7. Ch. Müller: Electronic Texts, Internet and Computer Resources in Buddhist Studies
8. S. Katsura: Buddhist Logic: The Function of Examples (*dr̥ṣṭānta*)
9. L. Schmithausen: The Value of Nature in Buddhism
10. M. Hara: Buddhism and Brahmanism
11. J. Braarvig: New Discovery of Early Buddhist Manuscripts
12. A. Saito: Mādhyamika and Yogācāra

13. R. Sharf: What is a Sūtra? Reflections on the Material Culture of Buddhist Sūtras in China and Japan
14. P. Harrison: Early Mahāyāna and Mahāyānasūtras (I)
15. R. Gombrich: Buddhism and Society in South and South-East Asia
16. S. Batchelor: Buddhist Psychology
17. M. Mohr: Japanese Buddhism since the Seventeenth Century: The Quest for Sectarian Identity
18. J. Silk: Early Mahāyāna and Mahāyānasūtras (II)
19. J. Ducor: Buddhism and Pure Land
20. A. W. Barber: Tathāgatagarbha
21. S. McClintock / G. Dreyfus: Is there a Real Distinction between Svātantrika and Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika?
22. R. Salomon / C. Cox: New Discovery of Early Buddhist Manuscripts
23. S.P. Bumbacher: Buddhist-Daoist Interaction in Traditional China.

The 16 sections were chaired by:

1. S. Yamakami: Logic and Epistemology
2. Ch. Müller: East Asian Buddhism (I)
3. R. Duquenne: East Asian Buddhism (II)
4. J. S. Strong: Early Buddhism
5. C. Gianotti: Mahāyānasūtras (I)
6. C. Dragonetti: Mahāyānasūtras (II)
7. E. Mikogami: Logic and Epistemology
8. F. K. Erhard: Buddhism in Tibet and Nepal (I)
9. B. Steinmann: Buddhism in Tibet and Nepal (II)
10. P. Schalk: Aspects of Buddhism in South Asia
11. Bhikkhu Pāsādika: Pāli and Theravāda Tradition (I)
12. L.S. Cousins: Pāli and Theravāda Tradition (II)
13. H. Ogawa: Philosophy (I)
14. G. Bugault: Philosophy (II)
15. F. Bizot: Vinaya
16. Chr. Cüppers: Contemporary Buddhism

Furthermore, there was a round table discussion chaired by M. T. Kapstein on The Cult of Vairocana.

Tuesday (24th) evening there was a reception by the Rectorate of the University of Lausanne, and on Thursday (26th) evening the participants met in the Hôtel de la Paix for a cocktail dinner.

The excursions on Thursday (26th) were well attended, with participants going either to the castle of La Sarraz and the abbey of Romainmôtier, or to Gruyères, with a visit to the chocolate factory.

The conference, which was universally acclaimed as a great success, first of all due to the excellent local organization by T. J. F. Tillemans and his staff, ended officially with the closing session including the business meeting, and socially with a dinner and farewell party during a magnificent evening cruise on Lake Geneva.

2. Report on the Meeting of the Board of Directors on Wednesday 25th August.

The Board of Directors met on 25th August between 18.35 and 20.55 hours over dinner. The following points were discussed and decided unanimously:

1. Prof. Dr. Cristina Scherrer-Schaub was appointed as *interim* Treasurer until the next election of IABS officers.
2. A suggestion to exempt members of the Board of Directors from paying membership fees was rejected.
3. An invitation by the Mom Rajavong Kalaya Tingsabadh, PhD, Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, to host the XIIIth IABS conference in December 2002 was handed over to the president by Peter Skilling, Regional Secretary for SE-Asia, and accepted with thanks. A further provisional invitation for the XIVth IABS conference to be held in London in 2005 was accepted from Ulrich Pagel, SOAS, London.
4. It was decided by majority vote to make the JIABS available also on the internet for a trial period provided that the IABS incurs no extra costs and that the technical problems involved could be mastered. The JIABS will of course continue to appear in hard copy as well.
5. Jacques May, professor emeritus of the Université de Lausanne, was elected as Honorary Fellow.
6. The proceedings for the business meeting were prepared.

3. Report on the Closing Session and Business Meeting.

The president opened the business meeting, which was attended by about 125 members of the IABS, on 29th August at 14.00 hours. She gave warm thanks to all local organizers and, at the same time, thanked the previous president, D. Seyfort Rugg, and the previous secretary general, A. Macdonald, for their work for the IABS.

T. Tillemans offered his thanks to those assisting him in organizing the conference, especially Johannes Bronkhorst, Toru Tomabechi and Danielle Feller, and to all those who assisted him during the conference: Nicolas Mirimanoff and other students. He pointed out that there will be no comprehensive publication of the papers read. However, organizers of panels are invited to take care of the publication of their respective panels.

The president communicated the results of the business meeting (see separate report) to the audience.

During the meeting the following information was passed to the members of the IABS:

I. Christian Wittern and Tu Aming, acting on behalf of the Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies and the Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association (CBETA) in Taipei, presented two CD-ROMs to the Section de Langues et Civilisations Orientales, Université de Lausanne to express their gratitude to the organizers of the conference. The first CD-ROM containing a computerized version of volumes 5 to 10 of the *Taishō Tripitaka* is the first publication of CBETA.

Moreover, the offer was put forward to all those present and to the readers of this announcement that everybody can register for a free copy of this CD-ROM, which will be mailed in due course. It can be used on almost any computer provided it is equipped with the ability to display Chinese characters. The address for postal orders is: Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies, 276, Kuang Ming Road, Peitou, Taipei, Taiwan. E-mail orders are also accepted <cbeta@ccbs.ntu.edu.tw>. CBETA plans to release a second CD-ROM, which will contain volumes 1-17 and 22-32 of the *Taishō Tripitaka* within the next six months. The second CD-ROM also contains an introduction to the Chung-Hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies as well as an electronic version of the *Chung-Hwa Journal of Buddhist Studies* (including back issues) and other journal articles. It is regularly sent to institutions engaged in Buddhist Studies on the basis of exchange of publications.

II. Jan Nattier announced a new journal, *Buddhist Literature*, designed expressly to provide a forum for publication of primary texts in translation. The subscription is US\$ 25.- (US\$ 30.- outside the US) for individuals, reduced to US\$ 15.- (US\$ 20.-) for students, or US\$ 35.- (US\$ 40.-) for institutions. Subscription orders should be sent to: *Buddhist Literature*, c/o East Asian Center, Memorial Hall West 210,

Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA. The first issue is due in fall 1999. For further inquiries contact: Jan Nattier, Editor, Buddhist Literature, Department of Religious Studies, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA <buddhlit@indiana.edu>.

III. Charles Müller draw attention to the e-mail list called *Buddhist Scholars Information Network* (Budschol) that has been created for the purpose of communication and exchange of information within the Buddhist scholarly community. The list is exclusively for the purpose of posting announcements regarding new publications, book reviews, conference information, internet resources, etc. Therefore, despite a fairly large membership (170, steadily climbing), the average number of messages is fairly small. At present, designated members of Budschol are monitoring and reporting on the Buddhism-related articles contained in over 20 journals. We are also receiving regular publications from several academic publishers. Membership in the network is strictly limited to those possessing an advanced degree in Buddhist Studies, or those enrolled in an advanced degree program. You may subscribe to the list by sending an e-mail message to Dr. Charles Müller at <acmuller@human.toyogakuen-u.ac.jp>. Please include your name, e-mail address, and academic affiliation. If you are not personally known to Dr. Müller, please include also a brief description of your academic background.

IV. Max Deeg announced the formation of a network for scholars working on Sino-Indian Buddhism. This prospective network, which was discussed by a group of scholars during the conference, should enable participants first of all to exchange bibliographical and research information pertinent particularly to Sino-Buddhist terms. For, it was felt that multilingual glossaries (e.g., Chinese-Sanskrit-English) for certain works or translators, badly needed by all who are working in the field of translating Chinese Buddhist texts, should be created in the course of time as one result of the discussions. Access to the network should be given primarily to scholars really doing research in Chinese Buddhist texts, mainly in texts translated or claiming to be translations (apocrypha). Inquiries about the network should be sent to Max Deeg <Deeg-Max@t-online.de>, and about subscription to <dharmarakṣa-subscribe@onelist.com>.

The president, thanking once again all participants for their contributions, closed the meeting and the conference at 14.25 hours.

THE SĀL — AN ALTERNATIVE BUDDHIST HOLY TREE?

John D. Ireland

The sāl tree (*sāla-* or *sāka-rukka*, *Shorea robusta*) played a significant part in the life of the Buddha as recorded in Pāli literature¹, although its role has been overshadowed by the Holy Fig, the Bodhi Tree, beneath which the Buddha is said to have attained Enlightenment. The Bodhi Tree (*Ficus religiosa*) was associated with Indian religion even before the Buddha's time, with *yakkha*-shrines, with local and tribal guardian deities to whom offerings were made and yogins and holy men who meditated beneath its shade. It is appropriate, therefore, that the Buddha should have attained Enlightenment sitting beneath it.

Whereas the Bodhi Tree rarely occurs outside the context of the Enlightenment, the sāl tree is mentioned many times in the suttas. Indeed it is actually the sāl tree that played a more intimate role in the Buddha's life. It was while standing holding a flowering sāl branch that Mahāmāyā gave birth to the Buddha-to-be and it was between two flowering sāl trees that the Buddha lay when he finally passed away. It is appropriate that the sāl tree should figure in these contexts when it is remembered that the Buddha was born in the Sakyan clan, *Sakya* or *Sakiya* meaning 'the people of the *sāka*² forest'. The sāl (or *sāka*) is indigenous to what is called the Nepal Terai, the tract of forest between the foothills of the Himalayas and the plains, the homeland of the Sakyan people. The legendary ancestors of the Sakyans were the sons of King Okkāka, who were banished when the king

1 Cf. E.J. Thomas, *The Life of Buddha as Legend and History*, 3rd ed., London 1949, pp.7, 33, 158.

2 This is to assume *sāka* is a synonym of *sāla*. Although the PED refers to the *sāka* as the teak (*Tectone grandis*), this tree is not indigenous to the Terai forests. See Thomas, *ibid.*, p.7, footnote, referring to Dr Hoey, JRAS, 1906, p.453.

wished to make their younger half-brother his heir. They then went to live on the slopes of the Himalayas by the banks of a lotus pool where there was a grove of sāl trees, hence the name. This place became the site of the chief city of the Sakyans, Kapilavatthu ('Kapila's Place'), said to be named after the brahmin hermit Kapila who was living there in a leaf-hut when the princes arrived. There was still a sāl grove there at the time of the Buddha.

The traditional date of the birth, Enlightenment and passing away (*parinibbāna*) of the Buddha is the full-moon day of Vesākha (April-May). The sāl tree would be in full bloom at this time, which accords with the story of his birth in the Lumbinī sāl tree grove and his mother being attracted by the sight of the flowers. However, in the *Mahāparinibbāna Suttanta*, when the Buddha was to pass away, it is said that the twin sāl trees were flowering out of season while raining their blossoms down upon him in homage. The Parinibbāna probably occurred in December-January, taking into account the chronology suggested by the text. At the end of the last rains-retreat (September-October) spent at the village of Beluva near Vesāli, the encounter with Māra occurred, when the Buddha stated that he would attain final Nibbāna in three months' time. This would, of course, be December-January and too early for the normal flowering of the sāl.

The sāl is a tall forest tree yielding a useful timber, but is chiefly remarked upon for its flowers. In S I 131, Māra speaks of the beauty of the bhikkhuṇī Uppalavaṇṇā as she stands at the foot of a sāl tree as if crowned in blossom. At A IV 259, the Buddha observes that even sāl trees would benefit from keeping the *uposatha* if they had minds — and would be proclaimed *sotāpannas* if they could know what is well-spoken or not (S V 377; also A II 194). These remarks are never said of any other kind of tree and may indicate an affectionate regard for it possibly because of its connection with his original home and people.

* * *

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INJUNCTION TO HOLD ONESELF AND THE DHAMMA AS AN ISLAND AND A REFUGE IN THE BUDDHA'S TEACHING*

Abraham Vélez de Cea

INTRODUCTION

The Buddha frequently used the term *attā* in its colloquial sense as 'oneself', 'myself', 'yourself', 'himself', etc., as required by the everyday linguistic usage of his time, because this did not necessarily contradict the teaching of *anattā*. As Steven Collins has pointed out: 'The linguistic items translated lexically as "self" and "person" (in Pali *attā*, *purisa/puggala*, Sanskrit *ātman*, *puruṣa/pudgala* respectively, are used quite naturally and freely in a number of contexts, without any suggestion that their being so used might conflict with the doctrine of *anattā*'¹.

Similarly, the Buddha used certain current idiomatic phrases involving the term *attā* because this was part of the usual terminology in philosophical and religious circles of his time, and such usage did not imply a philosophical commitment to a particular conception of *attā*, nor an acceptance of *attā* as an ultimate reality.

Just as other teachers did, in order to make themselves better understood, the Buddha resorted to the language currently in use, and saw no problems in putting forward his own ideas in the religious terminology and idiomatic terms that were common in his cultural context. Now the fact that the Buddha occasionally used idiomatic phrases and religious terminology common to other teachers and schools in no way means that he interpreted this language in the same manner. On the contrary, a comparative analysis of religious terms in current use in the cultural context of the times, such as *kamma*, *brahmā*, *brāhmaṇa*, *ariya*, etc., makes it clear that the Buddha

* Translated by the author from his (forthcoming) doctoral dissertation, 'La filosofía del Buddha según los sermones Pali' (Madrid).

1 S. Collins, *Selfless Persons*, Cambridge 1982, p.71.

invested those terms with new meanings more in accordance with his own thinking. Similarly, a comparative analysis of other idiomatic terms that were equally common in philosophical and religious discussions of the times, such as for instance, *brahmacariya*, *brahma-bhūtena attanā*, *brahmavihāra*, *attakāma*, *attānaṃ gavesati*, *bhāvitatto*, *attadīpā viharatha attasaraṇā anaññasaraṇā*, etc., shows that the Buddha used those terms rather as metaphors to convey his own spirituality. As Prof. Gombrich rightly indicates: “the Buddha regularly used the language of his opponents, but turned it into metaphor”².

One of the most famous phrases with the term *attā* in the Pāli discourses is the injunction to hold oneself and the Dhamma, and no one or nothing else, as an island and a refuge³.

Some authors, such as C.A.F. Rhys Davids⁴, I.B. Horner⁵, A. K. Coomaraswamy⁶, K. Bhattacharya⁷, J. Pérez-Remón⁸, etc., claim that this injunction shows that the Buddha accepted the ultimate existence of an unchanging *attā* (as an individual or a universal entity, depending on each author’s philosophical stance) which is literally one’s island and refuge. However, and this is the point of the present study, a close examination of the Pāli discourses shows that this injunction does not constitute an explicit reference to an immortal and transcen-

2 R. Gombrich, *How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings*, London & Atlantic Highlands 1996, p.42.

3 D II 100, etc.

4 Cf. C.A.F. Rhys Davids, *A Manual of Buddhism*, London 1932, first Indian edition, New Delhi 1978, pp.158-9, 166-7; *Buddhist Psychology*, London 1924 — rev. ed. *The Birth of Indian Psychology and its Development in Buddhism*, London 1935, pp.209-10.

5 Cf. I.B. Horner & A.K. Coomaraswamy, *The Living Thoughts of Gotama Buddha*, London 1948, p.177 ff.

6 Cf. A.K. Coomaraswamy, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, New York 1943, p.77.

7 Cf. K. Bhattacharya, *L’Âtman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme*, Paris 1973, p.30.

8 Cf. J. Pérez-Remón, *Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism*, New York 1980, pp.20-6.

dent *attā* which is identical with the Dhamma, but simply uses current everyday language as a metaphor to recommend the practice of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, that is to say, the awareness of an impermanent and dependently originated process which is the result of causes and conditions which are themselves impermanent. As we shall see, this injunction is addressed to persons who are confused and depressed because of someone's illness or death. The purpose of this is, on the one hand, to provide encouragement at times of crisis, so as to help the person to avoid unwholesome mental states that are an obstacle to spiritual practice, and on the other hand to serve as a reminder of the fact that, irrespective of whether this or that teacher may have died or be about to die, it is still possible to go on practising the Dhamma.

We shall also see that when the Buddha declares that he has achieved his own refuge he is far from referring to an immortal *attā* that finds shelter from suffering, and far from suggesting that Nibbāna, Dhamma and *attā* are identical. All he is saying is that he has practised the Four Foundations of Mindfulness and that through this practice he has attained the refuge of Nibbāna, a state defined in the Pāli texts as non-*attā*⁹.

I. POSSIBLE TRANSLATIONS OF THE INJUNCTION AND PROBLEMS ARISING WITH THE ATMANIC INTERPRETATION¹⁰.

The *locus classicus* for this injunction is, of course, the *Mahā-parinibbāna Sutta*, where the Buddha, shortly before expiring, says to Ānanda:

9 For details of the Pāli texts where Nibbāna is defined as *anattā*, see S. Collins, *Nirvana and Other Buddhist Felicities*, Cambridge 1998, pp.141-2.

10 The interpretation just described, which takes idiomatic phrases and compounds including the term *attā* as proving that the Buddha accepted the existence of an immortal *attā*, and therefore tends to translate *attā* as a noun (the *attā* or an *attā*) instead of a reflexive pronoun (oneself). The terms 'atmanic' and 'anatmic' are neologisms coined by Raimundo Panikkar to identify, respectively, traditions which accept or do not accept the reality of *attā*.

*'Tasmātihānanda. attadīpā viharatha attasaraṇā anañña-saraṇā, dhammadīpā dhammasaraṇā anaññasaraṇā'*¹¹.

This is translated by M. Walshe as: 'Therefore, Ānanda, you should live as islands unto yourselves, being your own refuge, with no one else as your refuge, with Dhamma as an island, with Dhamma as your refuge, with no other refuge'¹².

T.W. & C.A.F. Rhys Davids, taking *dīpa* in the other possible sense, translate: 'Therefore, O Ānanda, be ye lamps unto yourselves. Be ye a refuge to yourselves. Betake yourselves to no external refuge. Hold fast to the Truth as a lamp. Hold fast as a refuge to the Truth. Look not for refuge to any one besides yourselves'¹³.

Considering that the term *attā*, in the colloquial and idiomatic usage of the Pāli discourses, is a reflexive pronoun that refers back to one's own person, or to oneself, it may be agreed that both the Walshe and Rhys Davids translations are not only philologically correct but, in my view, consistent with the philosophy of the Pāli discourses.

Nevertheless, the Spanish Jesuit father Joaquín Pérez-Remón has queried these translations, maintaining that the compounds *attadīpā* and *attasaraṇā* are: '*Bahubbihi* compounds containing two nouns in apposition, and therefore to be explained as, "those who have the self as an island", "those who have the self as a refuge", etc.'¹⁴.

In consequence, he argues that the most accurate translation of this passage would be: 'Therefore, Ānanda, stay as those who have the self as island, as those who have the self as refuge, as those who have no other refuge; as those who have *dhamma* as island, as those who have *dhamma* as refuge, as those who have no other refuge'¹⁵.

11 All Pāli quotations refer to the Pali Text Society edition, in this case D II 100.

12 *Thus Have I Heard, The Long Discourses of the Buddha*, London 1987, Boston 1995, p.245.

13 *Dialogues of the Buddha II*, PTS, p.108.

14 Pérez-Remón, *op. cit.*, p.20.

15 *Ibid.*, p.20.

Vélez de Cea — The Significance of *Attā* as Island and Refuge

Without getting into a philological debate as to whether it is legitimate to translate *attā* as 'the self', instead of simply 'oneself', or into hermeneutic dispute about whether the 'self' supposedly referred to in this passage is meant to be a permanent and eternal individual 'I' (as Pérez-Remón seems to believe on the basis of Christian philosophical premises) or a universal 'I' (as A.K. Coomaraswamy and S. Radhakrishnan maintain from a neo-Vedantic point of view), let us admit, for argument's sake, that the atmanic translation is, at least, philologically acceptable and consider some of the problems it raises.

The atmanic translation of the passage in question assumes that Dhamma is the same as *attā*¹⁶.

The atmanic interpretation would seem to maintain that if the Buddha exhorts his disciples to take *attā* and Dhamma as an island and refuge, those two terms, Dhamma and *attā*, denote the same reality. Now this identity or equivalence assumed in the atmanic translation is highly problematic because it makes the Pāli texts contradict themselves. If the passage, *attadīpā viharatha attasaraṇā anaññasaraṇā, dhammadīpā dhammasaraṇā anaññasaraṇā*, implies that Dhamma and *attā* are one and the same thing, this means that there is at least one dhamma which is *attā*, which is in clear contradiction of the Buddha's other statement that '*sabbe dhamme anattā*' (all dhammas are non-*attā*).

To claim that Dhamma and *attā* are identical or equivalent renders the teaching of Dependent Origination unnecessary. In effect, Dependent Origination explains suffering and the nature of things on the basis that there is no such thing as an *attā* that might constitute the essence, or substantive foundation of the impermanent processes that constitute a human being. But if it is assumed that in the ultimate analysis there exists in fact an *attā* that is the same as Dhamma, what would be the point of Dependent Origination?

The identification of *attā* and Dhamma is in direct contradiction to the Buddha's explicit identification of Dependent Origination with

16 See, for instance, K. Bhattacharya, *op. cit.*, pp.79-114. See also A.K. Coomaraswamy, *op. cit.*, pp.72-3.

the Dhamma when he declares that he who sees the one sees the other, and vice versa¹⁷. If to see the Dhamma is to see that things arise dependently, and Dependent Origination does not need to postulate a real, essential *attā*, it does not make much sense to claim at the same time that Dhamma and *attā* are the same.

What is explicitly stated throughout the Pāli Canon is that to see the Dhamma is to see Dependent Origination, but nowhere is anything said to the effect that seeing the Dhamma is equivalent to seeing *attā*. Rather the opposite: what is explicitly declared is that the concept of *attā* is the consequence of an inadequate perception of the psychophysical aggregates which constitute human reality¹⁸ and that, if an *attā* existed, liberation from suffering would not be possible (not be perceived)¹⁹.

Now, since the passage we are examining is to be found in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, which narrates the Buddha's last days, an atmanic interpreter might argue that, before dying, the Buddha meant to reveal the esoteric meaning of the *anattā* doctrine, so as to make everything clear before his disappearance and prevent any misunderstanding about the ultimate meaning of the *anattā* doctrine, i.e. — according to this interpretation — he would not have been questioning the ultimate reality of an *attā* but the mistake that would consist in confusing this *attā* with the physical and mental aggregates that make up the individual.

Firstly, however, this interpretation may easily be countered by recalling that the injunction under consideration is also found in many other texts of the Pāli Canon, and there is no reason to assume that it appears for the first time in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*.

Secondly, it would not seem to be at all consistent to believe that the Buddha, just before his disappearance, decided to enjoin his

17 *Yo paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passati. So dhammaṃ passati. Yo dhammaṃ passati. So paṭiccasamuppādaṃ passatīti* — M I 191, etc.

18 S III 46.

19 S III 144.

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disciples to hold the *attā* as their island and refuge in a literal, rather than an idiomatic or figured sense, when he had previously spent forty-five years tirelessly repeating that nothing is to be regarded as 'I am' or as 'this is my *attā*'.

Thirdly, the esoteric interpretation is untenable in the light of what the Buddha says just before: 'I have preached the truth without making any distinction between exoteric and esoteric doctrine; for in respect of the truths, Ānanda, the Tathāgata has no such thing as the closed fist of a teacher who keeps things back'²⁰.

If the Buddha has just been saying that he has been preaching the Dhamma without making any distinction between exoteric and esoteric teaching, it would be absurd for him to reveal, shortly afterwards, a secret meaning of the *anattā* doctrine. If the Buddha had wanted to teach that there was such a thing as a real *attā* he would have said so clearly in the course of his long life, without waiting for his dying day to reveal a supposedly true esoteric, occult meaning of his often repeated teaching of non-*attā*.

Fourthly, the context (in D II 100) does not justify the inference that the Buddha is advising his disciples to turn to an unchanging, eternal *attā* as an island and a refuge. Rather, the context makes it clear that what the Buddha is saying is that no one needs to be appointed to succeed him at the head of the Order, as a refuge for others, after his death. In fact, in the context we see that the Buddha is very ill. Ānanda says that he feels purposeless (*madhurakajāto*) and unable to make sense of things (*me na pakkhāyanti dhammā*) because of the Lord's sickness, but he derives some comfort from the thought that the Master would not attain final Nibbāna until he had made some statement about who would be his successor and lead the Order of monks after his death. It is at this point that the Buddha says to him that he has preached the Dhamma without making any distinction between open and occult teachings and that he does not think it necessary to say anything further about the Community of monks, i.e., that

20 D II 100; trans. in *Dialogues of the Buddha I*, *op. cit.*, p.107.

he does not think it necessary to appoint anyone to succeed him as the leader of the Community. He then adds that he will soon die, that he is old and frail and that he can only overcome physical suffering by dwelling in certain meditative states.

It is at this point that the Buddha exhorts Ānanda and all his disciples to live 'as those who have the self as island, as those who have the self as refuge, as those who have no other refuge; as those who have Dhamma as island, as those who have Dhamma as refuge, as those who have no other refuge'²¹.

Since the Buddha has already taught everything that is necessary to make oneself free from suffering, what the disciples have to do is simply to protect themselves from unwholesome mental states, i.e., to be their own island and refuge and to have the Dhamma as an island and refuge, which means practising the Dhamma.

In the past, as stated elsewhere in the Pāli discourses²² the disciples could turn to the Buddha as their island and refuge. But once the Buddha is gone, they themselves and the Dhamma must be their own island and refuge, i.e., they must concentrate on practising the Dhamma and not place their expectations in any successor of the Buddha as head of the Community and future preacher of the Dhamma that has already been taught. That is to say, they must practise the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, thereby eliminating all unwholesome mental states: 'And how does a monk live as an island unto himself. . . with no other refuge? Here, Ānanda, a monk abides contemplating the body as body earnestly, clearly aware, mindful and have put away all hankering and fretting for the world, and likewise with regard to feelings, mind and mind-objects. That, Ānanda, is how a monk lives as an island unto himself. . . with no other refuge'²³.

This confirms that to live 'as an island unto oneself, being one's own refuge, with Dhamma as an island, with Dhamma as one's refuge'

21 D II 100.

22 S IV 315.

23 D II 100; trans. Walshe, *op. cit.*, p.245.

does not presuppose a Dhamma/*attā* identity as an unchanging and eternal entity, but refers simply, in the context of an impermanent and dependently originated process, to the need to protect oneself from unwholesome states (taking oneself as island and refuge) by practising the Four Foundations of Mindfulness (taking the Dhamma as island and refuge)²⁴.

II. THE MEANING OF THE 'ATTADĪPĀ VIHARATHA ATTASARAṆA' INJUNCTION IN THE LIGHT OF OTHER TEXTS, AND SIMILES.

There are other passages in the Pāli texts where the Buddha similarly stresses the relationship between the practice of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness and the fact of living with oneself or the Dhamma as an island and refuge. See for instance the beginning of the *Cakkavatti Sihanāda Sutta* (D III 58), which parallels the passage in the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta* (D II 100), and follows it with a further simile for the practice of the Foundations of Mindfulness, recommending to 'keep to one's own pasture, to one's own home range, and not to leave them'.

If one does so, the Buddha goes on to explain, Māra (the personification of evil and of unwholesome mental states) will not be able to seize his prey²⁵.

Now, in the *Makkato Sutta* of the Saṃyutta Nikāya (S V 149), 'one's own pasture' is defined as the practice of the Foundations of Mindfulness. At the same time, we have seen that 'living with oneself and the Dhamma as an island and refuge' is also defined in terms of the Foundations of Mindfulness. It is therefore perfectly legitimate to equate the two similes as referring, both of them, to the practice of the Foundations of Mindfulness.

Māra's own home range or territory is defined as the five strands of sensual pleasure: 'Objects cognizable by the eye, objects desirable,

24 See A. Solé-Leris, *Tranquillity and Insight* (London & Boston 1986; Kandy 1992, 1999).

25 In other discourses, e.g. M I 174, Māra is compared to a hunter.

pleasant, delightful and dear, passion-fraught, inciting to lust. . . There are sounds cognizable by the ear. . . scents cognizable by the nose. . . savours cognizable by the tongue. . . tangibles cognizable by the body, objects desirable, pleasant, delightful and dear, passion-fraught, inciting to lust. This, monks, is the range that is not yours, that belongs to others'²⁶.

In the *Āneñjasappaya Sutta* (M II 261-2) Māra's domain is described specifically as the realm where unwholesome mental states prevail: 'Bhikkhus, sensual pleasures are impermanent, hollow, false, deceptive; they are illusory, the prattle of fools. Sensual pleasures here and now and sensual pleasures in lives to come, sensual perceptions here and now and sensual perceptions in lives to come — both alike are Māra's realm, Māra's bait, Māra's hunting ground. On account of them, these evil unwholesome mental states such as covetousness, ill will, and presumption arise, and they constitute an obstruction to a noble disciple in training here'²⁷.

So we can see that both injunctions — to live having oneself and the Dhamma as an island and a refuge, and to remain within one's own pasture and home range — refer to the Four Foundations of Mindfulness and to the prevention of unwholesome mental states. So when the Buddha exhorts his disciples to take themselves and the Dhamma as an island and a refuge he is not talking about an immutable, eternal self or *attā* to which one turns as a refuge, but simply about the practice of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness to eliminate and prevent unwholesome mental states.

As we have seen, the oft-quoted advice from the Buddha to Ānanda follows immediately upon the latter's admission that he has been feeling purposeless and confused because of the Lord's sickness. That is to say, Ānanda has been experiencing unwholesome mental states which are not conducive to mindfulness, and the Buddha advises him accordingly.

26 S V 149; trans. F.L. Woodward, *The Book of Kindred Sayings* V, PTS, p.128.

27 M II 261-2; trans. Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli & Bhikkhu Bodhi, *The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha*, Boston 1995, p.869.

The first unwholesome mental state is a sense of purposelessness (*madhurakajāto*) which undermines one's motivation and the zeal and effort that are necessary for proper practice. The second unwholesome state is mental confusion (*me na pakkhāyanti dhammā*) which makes it impossible to see things clearly and accurately. It is not for nothing that the standard passage on the practice of mindfulness always specifies that the monk should dwell 'ardent, clearly comprehending and mindful' (*ātāpī, sampajāno, satimā* — M I 56), i.e., that he should at all times endeavour to cultivate mental states that are favourable to practice, and avoid purposelessness and confusion, which are unfavourable to it.

It is important to note that the injunction to be an island and a refuge unto oneself usually follows upon the loss of a respected teacher or of a loved one and the states of purposelessness and mental confusion arising on that account. The significance of that advice is not that there is an essential *attā* where one may seek refuge as an island in the stream of Saṃsāra, but that even if a great and beloved teacher dies, one should remain strong-minded, ardent, clearly comprehending and mindful, and not allow oneself to be discouraged or confused by his disappearance. You no longer have the dead or dying teacher as an island or refuge to turn to, but what this means is that you have to rely on yourself and the Dhamma as an island and refuge, that is to say, that you have to practise the Four Foundations of Mindfulness and avoid unwholesome mental states.

This can clearly be seen in the *Cuṇḍa Sutta* of the Saṃyutta Nikāya (S V 161-3), when Ānanda reports to the Buddha that Sāriputta has died and states that he, Ānanda, had been discouraged and confused on learning the news.

The Buddha points out to him that, in dying, Sāriputta has not taken away with him either the practice of the Path that leads to liberation (morality, concentration, wisdom) or the possibility of liberation through knowledge and vision. He then goes on to recall that separation from what one loves is inevitable, that everything is subject to arising and becoming, that things are conditioned and impermanent, and this is why it is not conceivable that they should give us satisfaction. It is at this point that the Buddha advises

Ānanda to live with himself and the Dhamma as an island and refuge and again explains this as the practice of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness.

Elsewhere again, the advice to have oneself as an island and refuge is brought up in connection with the death of two leading disciples to whom the other monks usually turned, as islands and refuges, for explanations of the teaching.

For instance, in the *Ceḷa Sutta*, the next discourse in the Saṃyutta Nikāya (S V 163-5), the Buddha, speaking to the monks about the deaths of Sāriputta and Moggallāna, agrees that they leave a great vacuum behind them and praises their excellent qualities, but adds that, despite this, he does not experience sorrow (*soka*) or lamentation (*parideva*)²⁸ because it is not conceivable that whatever is born, becomes, is conditioned and impermanent should be satisfactory. He concludes that, in consequence, now they will have to live with themselves and the Dhamma as an island and refuge, and again defines this as the practice of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness.

So we see that time and again the Buddha advises his disciples not to give in to depression and sorrow when someone dies, because this is inevitably inherent in the impermanent nature of things, but to carry on practising the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, i.e. dwelling with themselves and the Dhamma as their island and refuge. Only thus will they transcend birth, becoming and death and achieve the final liberation from suffering. The solemn utterance at the beginning of the *Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta* makes this quite clear: 'Bhikkhus, this is the direct path for the purification of beings, for the surmounting of sorrow and lamentation [*sokapariddavānam*], for the disappearance of pain and grief, for the attainment of the true way, for the realisation of Nibbāna — namely, the four foundations of mindfulness'²⁹.

28 S V 164.

29 Trans. Bh. Ñāṇamoli & Bh. Bodhi, *op. cit.*, p.145.

III. WHAT DOES IT MEAN, 'TO MAKE ONESELF ONE'S REFUGE'?

When the Buddha, a few moments before dying, says that he dwells 'having made myself my refuge' (*katam me saraṇam attano*)³⁰, he is not suggesting that he has somehow made for himself a refuge to shelter an immutable, eternal *attā*, but he is simply saying that by practising previously the Four Foundations of Mindfulness he has definitely put an end to suffering. He has followed the Path that leads to the extinction of suffering (by practising the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, i.e., by having made himself and the Dhamma his island and refuge) and thus attained Nibbāna, that is, the total extinction of unwholesome mental states.

This statement of the Buddha must not be isolated from its context. Just before, he has been urging his disciples to practise those things which he had discovered for himself (*abhiññā*) and proclaimed: the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, the Five Spiritual Faculties, the Seven Factors of Enlightenment, the Noble Eightfold Path, etc. Then he announces that he will take his final Nibbāna within three months, and only then does he speak the verses where this phrase appears:

'Ripe am I in years. My life-span's determined.
Now I go from you, having made myself my refuge.
Monks, be untiring, mindful, disciplined,
Guarding your minds with well-collected thought.
He who, tireless, keeps to law and discipline,
Leaving birth behind will put an end to woe'³¹.

As can be seen the phrase 'having made myself my refuge' (literally, 'having made a refuge for myself' — *katam me saraṇam attano*) is preceded and followed by references to what needs to be done to attain liberation, and the successful conclusion is clearly stated in the last two verses. He who practises the Dhamma makes himself free from Saṃsāra and attains the refuge of Nibbāna.

30 D II 119-20. Trans. Walshe, *op. cit.*, p.253.

31 D II 120-1; trans. Walshe, *op. cit.*, pp.253-4.

As we have seen, the atmanic interpretation might, and does, claim that in this text, since Nibbāna is referred to as the refuge, this means that it is identical with *attā* and Dhamma, which are to be taken as one's island and refuge. K. Bhattacharya³², for instance, maintains that Nibbāna, *attā* and Dhamma are three designations for one and the same thing because the Buddha uses the same phrase, 'island and refuge', for all three.

However, the use of the same simile for all three does not imply that they are all one. Nibbāna is the end of suffering and the end purpose of the holy life. But to have oneself (*attā*) and the Dhamma as island and refuge is the means for attaining that end. So Nibbāna on the one hand, and *attā* and Dhamma on the other cannot be the same, even though the simile is used for them.

If the atmanic interpretation were correct, *attā* and Dhamma would be the island and refuge where one is safe from the ocean of Samsāra. This would mean that they were the same as Nibbāna, i.e., ends in themselves rather than means to an end. But since having oneself and the Dhamma as island and refuge refers in fact to the practice of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, *attā* and Dhamma clearly cannot be identical with Nibbāna, since the latter is the end and the former are the means to attaining this end.

In the *Dhammapada* there is a passage (Dhp 236) that makes this very clear: 'Make an island unto yourself. Strive quickly; become wise. Purged of stain and passionless, you shall enter the heavenly stage of the Ariyas'³³.

It is important to pay attention to the contrast in the verbal tenses in the earlier and later parts of the verse: first, imperative (make — *karohi*; strive — *vāyama*), then future (you shall enter — *ehisī*). Shortly after we find another verse (Dhp 238) where the Buddha urges the same, with an explicit reference to freeing oneself from

32 K. Bhattacharya, *op. cit.*, pp.79-114.

33 Trans. Bhikkhu Narada, *The Dhammapada: Pali Text and Translation*, Kuala Lumpur 1978, pp.197-8.

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birth and old age (here we recall that the various stages of sanctity (*ariya*) mentioned in the previous verse culminate in *arahantship* which, being the attaining of Nibbāna, involves precisely the freedom from birth and old age mentioned here): 'Make an island unto yourself. Strive without delay; become wise. Purged of stain and passionless, you will not come again to birth and old age'³⁴.

In this verse we again see the contrast between the imperative (what has to be done, i.e., the means) and the future (what will be attained, i.e., the end). The same pattern can be observed in the standard passage from the *Mahāparinibbāna Sutta*, except that in the early part the verbs are in the present ('he who abides contemplating', i.e. practising the Four Foundations of Mindfulness), and then in the future ('those. . . who shall live. . . will become'): 'Here, Ānanda, a monk abides contemplating the body as body earnestly, clearly aware, mindful and having put away all hankering and fretting for the world, and likewise with regards to feelings, mind and mind-objects. That, Ānanda, is how a monk lives as an island unto himself, . . . with no other refuge. And those who now in my time or afterwards shall live³⁵ thus, they will become³⁶ the highest, if they are desirous of learning'³⁷.

As the following quotation shows, the same point about ends and means, and oneself and the Dhamma as island and refuge (being the means) is made in the *Attādīpa Sutta* of the *Saṃyutta Nikāya* (S III 42): 'Do ye abide, brethren, island unto yourself, refuges unto yourself: taking refuge in none other; islanded by the Norm, taking refuge in the Norm, seeking refuge in none other.

34 Dhp 238; trans. *id.*, *ib.*

35 *Viharissanti*. The use of the future tense in this case reflects the conditional character of the phrase and does not mean that it is something to be done in the future, i.e., if they live in this manner, then they will become the highest.

36 *Bhavissanti*. This truly refers to the future result of practising the Four Foundations of Mindfulness 'earnestly, clearly aware and mindful' here and now.

37 D II 100-1.

By themselves who are islands unto themselves, brethren, who are a refuge unto themselves, who take refuge in none other; who are islanded by the Norm, take refuge in the Norm, seek refuge in none other — by them the very source of things is to be searched for: thus — What is the source of sorrow and grief, of woe, lamentation and despair? What is their origin?³⁸.

This understanding of the Dhamma as the means to the end that is Nibbāna, but not as an end in itself (and therefore identical to Nibbāna) is abundantly confirmed in the famous raft simile in the *Alagaddūpama Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*³⁹, where the Buddha compares the Dhamma to a raft to be used for crossing over the waters of suffering, but that is not to be clung to after its purpose has been served. The raft is the means for crossing over, the end is the extinction of suffering on the far shore.

CONCLUSIONS

— To live with *attā* and Dhamma as an island and refuge is defined as the practice of the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, that is, as an impermanent process subject itself to Dependent Origination and whose final aim is precisely to realise that all is non-*attā*. Therefore the injunction to have *attā* and Dhamma as island and refuge cannot be interpreted as meaning that there is an immutable, eternal *attā* which is identical to Dhamma.

— The atmanic translation of *attādīpa viharatha attāsarāṇa*, etc., cannot prove anything beyond the fact that the Buddha at that point simply resorts to a metaphor to urge his disciples to practise the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, which means to avoid unwholesome mental states and persevere in practising the Dhamma.

— When the Buddha declares that he has made a refuge for himself, the meaning is not that he has found shelter in a permanent, eternal *attā*, but merely that he has previously practised the Four Foundations

38 S III 42; trans. F.L. Woodward, *op. cit.*, III, p.37.

39 MI 134-5.

of Mindfulness and has, through this practice, attained the refuge that is Nibbāna.

— The metaphorical reference to Nibbāna as a refuge does not imply its identification with Dhamma and *attā*. It is simply a case of the Buddha using the same simile for two different things: on the one hand, the means (practising the Four Foundations of Mindfulness, which is equated with having oneself and the Dhamma as island and refuge) and on the other hand the end (attaining the ultimate refuge that is Nibbāna).

Abraham Vélez de Cea

* * * * *

TWO SMALL REMNANTS OF 'PRE-HĪNAYĀNIST' BUDDHISM IN THE PĀLI NIKĀYAS

Eric Fallick

As is well known, the *Aṭṭhaka-* and *Pārāyana-vaggas* of the Sutta Nipāta represent texts of the greatest antiquity and present a teaching significantly different from that of most of the later strata of the bulk of the Pāli texts¹. These texts, or their Prakrit or Sanskrit equivalents, are quoted or referred to by name in the later texts of several different schools, and thus would appear to have circulated widely and been esteemed in the Buddhist world in the earliest period to which we have access². At present, if we wish to read more teachings such as these, integrally combining 'forest' asceticism with a direct, non-conceptual meditation approach to the Undying, we are forced to turn to Mahāyāna texts such as the *Samādhirājasūtra*. Here, however, I would like to call attention to two brief, isolated verse passages that clearly belong to the same teaching as the *Aṭṭhakavagga*, but somehow managed to slip by the editors/authors of the Theravādin Canon, perhaps by being disguised as the concluding verses of otherwise more ordinary, mild-mannered Pāli suttas. Possibly, the existence of these verses (in addition to their intrinsic spiritual value) could add to the suggestion that the teaching genre of these texts may once have been much more widespread, if not the norm of earliest Buddhism, than it might now appear from the extremely limited sample of surviving texts of 'Hīnayānist' Buddhism (which may, after all, be mostly just late products of the cenobium) to which we currently have access.

1 Cf., for example, Luis O. Gomez, 'Proto-Mādhyamika in the Pāli canon', *Philosophy East and West* 26, 2, April 1976, pp.137-65.

2 See P.V. Bapat, *Arthapada Sutra* (Santiniketan 1951), pp.1-3, and R. Salomon, *Ancient Buddhist Scrolls from Gandhāra* (Seattle-London 1999), pp.27, 158-63. Also K.R. Norman, *The Group of Discourses II* (PTS 1995), pp.xxviii, xxxiv and xxxv.

The first passage occurs at Aṅguttara Nikāya II 24 and, according to the Chatṭha Saṅgāyana edition (as presented in the Dhammagiri-Pāli-Ganthamālā Series) which differs slightly from the PTS ed., runs as follows:

*yam kiñci ditṭham va sutam mutam vā
ajjhositam saccamutam paresam /
na tesu tādi sayasamvutesu
saccam musā vāpi param daheyya //
etañca sallam paṭikacca disvā
ajjhositā yattha pajā visattā /
jānāmi passāmi tatheva etam
ajjhositam natthi tathāgatānan ti //*

For more Sanskrit-oriented readers, I would, ignoring metrical considerations, offer the following (tentatively rendered) chāyā:

*yat kiñcid dr̥ṣṭam vā śrutam matam vā
adhyavasitam satyamamatam pareṣām /
na teṣu tādr̥k svayam samvṛteṣu
satyam mṛṣā vāpi param dadhyāt //
etam ca śalyam pratikṛtya dr̥ṣṭvā
adhyavasitā yatra prajā visaktā /
jānāmi paśyāmi tathaiva etad
adhyavasitam nāsti tathāgatānām iti //*

One possible translation:

Whatever (is) seen, heard or thought (is) grasped (as) a true thought by others. Such a one (as the sage), among those tied up by themselves, would not take (these), whether true or false, as the Beyond³. And having previously seen this stake, stuck on which are

3 Cf. *Vajracchedikā*, ed. Max Müller, p.32, lines 13-14/p.37, lines 11-12: . . . yas tathāgatena dharmo 'bhisambuddho deśito nidhyāto na tatra satyam na mṛṣā / . . . yaś ca subhūte tathāgatena dharmo 'bhisambuddho deśito vā tatra na satyam na mṛṣā // ' . . . that dharma fully-awakened to, shown, (and) meditated on by a tathāgata — there (there is) neither true nor false / . . . and that, O Subhūti, dharma (which is) fully-awakened to or shown by a tathāgata — there (there) is neither true nor false'.

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people attached, — ‘Thus I know, I see’; there is not this grasping for tathāgatas⁴.

The other passage in question is verse 786 (sutta 230 (IX 10)) of the *Sagāthavagga* of the Saṃyutta Nikāya. According to the critical edition by G.A. Somaratne (PTS 1998), the text runs:

*ahū pure dhammapadesu chando
yāva virāgena samāgamimha
yato virāgena samāgamimha
yaṃ kiñci ditṭhaṃ va suttaṃ mutaṃ vā
aññāya nikkhepanam āhu santo ti //*

Chāyā (again ignoring the metre):

*abhūt puro dharmapadesu chando
yāvad virāgeṇa samāgamāma
yato virāgeṇa samāgamāma
yat kiñcid dr̥ṣṭaṃ vā śrutam mataṃ vā
ājñāya nikṣepaṇam āhuḥ santa iti //*

Translation:

Formerly, there was desire for verbal expressions⁵, until we met with dispassion. Since we met with dispassion, having understood whatever (is) seen, heard, or thought, the good say ‘putting down’.

Both of these passages contain the key repeated phrase and theme of the *Aṭṭhakavagga* (also expressed in the same way in the ‘Nandamāṇavapucchā’ of the *Pārāyanavagga* at Sutta-Nipāta (Sn) 1082-3) of abandoning whatever is ‘seen, heard or thought’ and any belief in their ultimate validity (that they are true or false), seeking purity through them, or constructing further verbal conceptualisations upon them. In order to cross the flood of repeated rebirth and becoming (see, e.g., Sn 779, 803, 877, 901, 902) and reach the Beyond, direct contact with or knowledge of the Absolute, the end of

4 Tathāgata is here, presumably, in its use as an epithet of any fully accomplished sage, not just of the periodically appearing Buddhas as in the later texts.

5 Here I follow E. Conze’s entry for *dharmapada* in his *Materials for a Dictionary of the Prajñāpāramitā Literature*, Tokyo 1967, p.210.

diversification (*papañca* or *prapañca*, Sn 874) and perception (*saññā* or *saṃjñā*, also, e.g., Sn 847), the yogi must abandon all involvement with the realm of sensory experience (*saṃjñā* and *prapañca*), which includes all thoughts and verbal conceptualisations. Far from containing ultimate truth and being a place to seek purity and the basis of spiritual practice (as apparently was assumed by the other systems of the Buddha's time that would form the milieu of these texts), thoughts and verbal understanding are just conditioned sensory experience no more real than the objects of the other five senses and belong entirely to the relative (*saṃvṛti*) world. Only the non-diversified realm of the Absolute, known only by the direct non-verbal *prajñā* of the sage is actual truth (*paramārtha*). The *Aṭṭhaka* and these related verses use words to point directly or re-orient us to this totally other dimension of the Absolute, and this is also the purpose of much of the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, *Mādhyamika* texts, etc. At the same time, the *Aṭṭhaka* clearly and integrally sets forth the ascetic, renunciant, yogic life and practice which is essential to and inseparable from the process of going from the suffering realm of diversified sense data (including thoughts!) and perception to the non-diversified, perception-free *mokṣa* of the Absolute. Such close combination can also sometimes be found in *Mahāyāna* texts such as the *gāthās* of Chapter 19 of the *Samādhirājasūtra*.

It appears that the above two passages derive from the same contemplative (and, in this case, also 'textual') tradition as the *Aṭṭhaka* and *Pārāyana-vaggas*. This tradition, or at least derivatives of it, has left more abundant literary remains in later, rather less clean and more problematic forms, such as the *Prajñāpāramitā*, *Samādhirāja*, *Mādhyamika*, the *Satya*- (or *Tattva*-) *siddhiśāstra* of Harivarman, etc., but sources for its 'original' form, apparently suppressed by the development of 'Hīnayānistic' Buddhism, are presently more sparse. These two surviving, isolated passages may suggest that they were once more copious. It only remains to be regretted that all such historical discussion, whether true or false, is just something seen, heard, or thought, not the Beyond.

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background paper for The Cornell Conference on

RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
Ideology, the Rhetoric of Hate and the Languages of Reconciliation

THE DEPENDENT CO-ORIGINATION
OF
IDENTITY, SELFISHNESS, & VIOLENCE

In most discussions concerning “Buddhism & Human Rights,” writers and speakers generally try to show how Buddhism is consonant with a human rights perspective or how Buddhist teachings and values can underpin a human rights orientation. Some writers have used the traditional and basic Buddhist teaching of the “three poisons” or “three roots of unwholesomeness” — namely, greed, hatred, and delusion — to examine the causes of human rights problems. I am in general agreement with both approaches and therefore will not revisit already familiar ground for socially engaged Buddhists. Instead, this talk will propose a more detailed analysis of the motivations and identities that power human rights violations and will suggest strategies for diffusing such motivations.

The perspective emphasized here will be the Buddha’s teaching of *paticca-samuppada* (dependent co-origination), in particular, Buddhadāsa Bhikkhu’s reading of it.¹ Although a fair amount of controversy remains concerning his and other alternative readings of dependent co-origination, I will not spend time on them here. I think that the testable validity of the analysis offered here is its own best defense; along with plenty of textual sources from the old Suttas (discourses of the Buddha) that back it up (although not unequivocally). Further, supporting evidence provided by recent research in cognitive science is accumulating.

In this short paper, I will sketch the main causal factors (*nidana*, conditional modes, supports) within the process called “dependent co-origination.” These, in turn, will be the basis for the observations and suggestions made in my talk on Friday. This background information will fill in some of the details that I will not be able to cover in the talk.

¹ Buddhadāsa Bhikkhu has been my primary teacher since my ordination as a bhikkhu in 1985. Up to his death in 1993, he was the most important reformer of Thai Buddhism in the last half of the past century and the most significant exponent of applying Buddhist principles to social issues. I remain his principle English language editor and translator. I am working on various translations that explore his understanding of *paticca-samuppada* in detail and depth. Currently, the only English text on *paticca-samuppada* by Buddhadāsa Bhikkhu is *Practical Dependent Origination*, tr. Steve Schmidt (Vuddhidhamma Fund, Bangkok: 1992).

Mahanidana Sutta

A classic teaching of the Buddha directly relevant to our topic is found in The Great Discourse on Causation (*Mahanidana Sutta*, #15 of the *Digha-nikaya*). Within a larger discussion of *paticca-samuppada*, the Buddha describes a causal process leading to “various evil, unwholesome phenomena — the taking up of clubs and weapons, conflicts, quarrels and disputes, insulting speech, slander, and falsehoods.”

The causal sequence begins with craving. “In dependence upon craving there is seeking;

in dependence upon seeking there is gain (acquiring);

in dependence upon gain there is consideration (decision-making);

in dependence upon consideration there is lusty satisfaction (desire and lust);

in dependence upon lusty satisfaction there is infatuation;

in dependence upon infatuation there is possessiveness;

in dependence upon possessiveness there is stinginess;

in dependence upon stinginess there is safeguarding;

and because of safeguarding the various evil, unwholesome phenomena originate — the taking up of clubs and weapons, conflicts, quarrels and disputes, insulting speech, slander, and falsehoods.”

In teachings like this, the Buddha makes it clear that violent behavior is causally linked with certain psychological and emotional states, particularly those associated with self-centeredness. Craving, which begins the above sequence, is a key support within the classic formula describing the genesis of *dukkha* (suffering, alienation, inner conflict). The inner states and attitudes just listed parallel those listed in the classic presentation of dependent co-origination, the key supporting elements of which are craving, clinging (attachment), identity, egoism, selfishness, and the afflictive emotions (*kilesa*, defilements). Using the standard formula of *paticca-samuppada*, I will explore these elements in more detail, especially as they are implicated in violence, exploitation, and other human rights abuses.

Experience, Craving, & Clinging

This analysis of human motivation and action is empirical, psychological, and spiritual; it only works when we apply it experientially to our own ego structures. It begins with our experience of the world, the interacting of our senses (the nervous system) with the sights, sounds, odors, etc. that stimulate them. Light reflected off a flower stimulates the eye; the sound of a gunshot strikes the ear; the odors of a freshly cooked meal stimulate the nose; sweat running off a farmer's face stimulate the tongue; a mosquito probing the skin awakens the sense of touch; the thought of a loved one or of danger stimulates the mind-sense. Note that the mind too acts as a sense, being stimulated by thoughts, feelings, emotions, dreams, and memories just as the other senses are stimulated by their physical objects. A moment's reflection points out that our six senses are constantly bombarded by their six kinds of objects for the duration of life. We live in a sensual world, we are sensual beings, sense activity is our life. How do we cope with all that action?

“Dependent on sense organ and sense object consciousness arises.” The nature of human experience is such that whenever any one sense is stimulated strongly enough by a sensual object, consciousness of that object will occur. Here, consciousness or sentience (*viññana*) means simply the most basic and primitive level of mental function; a stimulation of the organism, which was only a moment ago just physical-sensual, becomes conscious. Thus, we “know” the sense object, not intellectually or by thought, but on the bare level of awareness. The organism's functioning is no longer merely automatic or instinctual. Intentionality now finds an opening; with it choice and conscious activity, that is *karma*, become possible. The degree of awareness depends on other factors, but the object appears in consciousness as a discrete entity.

“The meeting together of these three is sense contact.” When these three factors — sense organ, sense object, and sense consciousness — work together, there is a mental impression, an experience impacts the mind. This may be more or less conscious; may have little or no self-awareness in the experience, or it may happen in full awareness. (The later possibility is of great importance and is a central part of Buddhist training.) In Buddhist terminology, the experience is called *phassa*, sense contact or impression. The mind has made contact with or has touched the meaning or value (once again, not yet intellectual) of the object.²

² The Pali term *arammaṇa* is like a “perch” on which consciousness rests and grasps (like the feet of a parakeet); it does not imply the duality of subject-object as strongly as our English “object.”



This basic experience, sense contact, underlies all human thought and activity. There are deeper layers to the dependent co-origination beneath *phassa*, but contact is the lowest layer of activity easily and directly accessible to ordinary people (those who have not trained deeply in meditation). Out of and in response to sense contact arise all the varieties of human activity and thought, all of which, in turn, may become the objects of subsequent contacts. This stream of experience flows on and on throughout life.

In the Buddhist analysis, “due to contact, there is feeling.” As with most translations of key Pali terms, “feeling” does not quite capture the meaning of the Pali *vedana*; still, it is good enough for our purposes here.³ *Vedana* or feeling is a mental phenomenon. Although it may arise in response to physical stimuli, it itself is mental and, thus, does not include physical sensations like itchiness, relaxed muscles, or heat. It is, rather, the hedonistic tone or the pleasure-pain quality of an experience.

Feeling is classified into three types: pleasant (*sukha*, agreeable, nice, attractive, happy), unpleasant (*dukkha*, disagreeable, repulsive, painful), and neither-pleasant-nor-unpleasant (*adukkha-ma-sukha*). The easiest way to explain feeling is through examples: the deliciousness of some food and the foulness of other, the beauty of some visual objects and the ugliness of others, the harmoniousness of some sounds and the harshness of others, the softness of some touches and the roughness of others, the fragrance of some odors and the foulness of others, and the agreeableness of some thoughts and the disagreeableness of others. In between these more clear-cut examples are the middling zones that one can't feel or classify one way or the other. The sense of beauty, harmony, deliciousness, fragrance, softness, and pleasantness we have in certain experiences is called “pleasant feeling” and the sense of ugliness, discordance, rankness, repugnance, harshness, and disagreeableness we have in other experiences is called “unpleasant feeling.” And sometimes the feeling is unclear, ambiguous, indistinguishable, rather than clearly pleasant or painful. In short, *vedana* are positive, negative, and ambiguous.

“Due to feeling, craving occurs.” If something feels nice, we want to get, have, keep, and own it. If something feels unpleasant, we want to get rid of, push away, block out, destroy, or obliterate it. If something falls in between, we want to figure out what the hell to do with it: should we keep it or kill it, pull it in or push it away. The term here translated as craving, *tanha*, is sometimes

³ Pali is the canonical language of Theravada Buddhism. The Sanskrit equivalents of Pali terms are usually recognizably similar, if not identical.

translated “desire, hunger, thirst.” The significance of such craving is that it is foolish and unhealthy desire. Often, even when wanting something wise and healthy, we want it in a foolish way. Generally, our cravings are in conflict with the reality of things; we can’t actually have things the way we want them. It involves projections into the future and objectification of experience. Such craving puts us in conflict with Truth (Dhamma). Positive feelings stir up positive cravings, negative feelings stir up negative cravings, and uncertain feelings stir up confused cravings.

“Due to craving, clinging occurs.” Clinging or attachment (*upadana*) is the habit we have of taking things to be what they aren’t, that is, to be “me” and to be “mine.” Clinging assumes there is an isolated, individual agent who acts, owns, or receives, and discreet, permanent, desirable objects on which one acts. In Buddhism, concepts such as “me” and “mine” are merely conventions, tools of thought, over-simplifications of the reality beyond words. When we take our perceptions, conceptions, and words too seriously we get caught in them. Such entrapment is called “*upadana*” (clinging, attachment, grasping). The main activity of attachment is to mistake craving for something “I” have done or made. We regard craving as having a “craver,” which we assume to be “me.” (We also impute such personhood on others.) This attachment to the “person who” craves, or seems to be doing whatever is happening, exacerbates the conflict started with craving. Our mental process begins to twist and contort into something destructive. The Buddha distinguished four kinds of attachment: clinging to sensuality (especially pleasures), to views and opinions (theories, dogmas, ideologies), to rules and practices (methodologies), and to words concerning self (“I,” “mine,” names).

Identity, Egoism, & Suffering

Craving and clinging plant the seeds of egoism and violence; these ripen in the succeeding stages of identification, ego-birth, and selfishness. Craving and clinging create inner conflict; through ego-birth and selfishness conflict is projected outward into inter-personal, social, and environmental relationships. To avoid such conflict and violence, we must channel the energies focussed and released by craving, clinging, identification, and selfishness in more wholesome directions. This, in turn, requires that we understand the process through which they arise.

“Due to clinging, there is identity (identification occurs).” The Pali *bhava* is usually translated as “existence” or “becoming,” more simply “being”

and “having.” The point here, often missed, is one of mental existence rather than biological or physical existence. The confused, clinging mind identifies with an experience, activity, or mental state as “being it”; thoughts take the forms “I am this” and “this is mine” as well as the negative “I am not that” and “that isn’t mine.” To conceptually and emotionally become or own something is what psychologists call “identification.”

This provides an important insight into many of the conflicts found in the world today (as well as in the past). The problem isn’t so much one of actually belonging to a group as one of identifying with a group and forming fixed notions about such identities. To explore this, we can ask:

- How strongly, rigidly, and narrowly is one’s identity defined by a group to which one belongs?
- How much are people emotionally dependent upon such identities?
- To what degree is a group’s identity conceived against another group?

How groups develop and hold identity is a crucial element in the genesis of violence. Thus, identity is also an important area for creative peace work. I admit the distinction is subtle and that most people do not distinguish between the two. Peace workers, however, need to find ways to introduce this distinction. Healthy belonging is important; defining ourselves with rigid group identities is destructive.

“Due to identity, ego-birth occurs.” By clinging to an experience, situation, activity, or mental state, we become it and are fully identified with it. The self or ego⁴ is then born in relation to it, being it or owning it, and thus dominates the mind. Here, self refers to a fully developed and isolated sense of individuality that has lost track of the myriad ways that one is related to and dependent upon others. Everything in life now revolves around the ego, “Me.” The mind is obsessed with its experience and itself in such a way that it has surrendered its freedom. Tibetan Buddhists refer to this as self-cherishing. It is thoroughly ego-centric and thus fundamentally selfish.

Again, this isn’t about physical existence or birth. Physical birth, which happened long ago, is not our problem. Our problem is in the present workings of the mind. Is it working smoothly, healthily, peacefully? Or is it working raggedly, sickly, violently, painfully? With the term “birth” we must avoid the

⁴ I am not using terms like “self” or “ego” to refer to philosophical concepts or theoretical psychological terms. I use them to refer to the often vivid sense that “I Am.”

human obsession with materiality. We are so consumed with our physical needs that we interpret everything in a material or literal way. Doing so has obscured all spiritual teachings and rendered them close to useless for the majority of human beings.

“Birth” in its spiritual sense, the meaning required here, is a psycho-emotional birth. Growing out of craving and attachment, something is born. There is clinging to self, then identification in terms of self, and finally the full-term, full-blown birth of ego — “I AM.” Metaphorically, attachment is like conception, existence is like gestation, and birth is like physical birth. Like physical birth, but it happens in the mind. Thus, we are dissatisfied, bored, angry, greedy, afraid, excited, lonely, jealous, hateful, indolent, arrogant, guilty, and on and on. These egoistic afflictive emotions are the real significance of birth and “rebirth.”

Suffering & Ignorance

“Due to birth, there is *dukkha* (suffering, pain, conflict).” Once ego takes over the show, everything is appropriated by it and is judged accordingly. Life, death, illness, health, aging, work, play, success, failure, happiness, etc. are all claimed by ego. Once something is owned in this way, it becomes heavy, it becomes a burden for the mind. The conflict of craving had resulted in hurt, conflict, and stress. All the natural events and experiences of life are made limited, stressful, and painful rather than being free, fluid, and satisfying. Thus, we suffer and sorrow. Thus, life gets cramped up and dehumanized. All of these unsatisfying experiences fall under the term *dukkha*, that which is “difficult to bear.” Although the emphasis here is on mental or spiritual pain, we should note that attachment and ego-birth also exacerbate and create much physical pain. Further, we often mindlessly project our personal *dukkha* outward onto others and into society. “Due to birth, *dukkha* occurs.”

Another aspect of *dukkha* is conflict. The processes described in this article lead to inner conflict and conflict among people and groups. Being and feeling oppressed, exploited, or abused is also *dukkha*. In other words, *dukkha* is what we experience when getting caught up in conflict, oppression, and violence. Conversely, the absence of these emotions and experiences is peace, well-being, and happiness. In such peace, the inherent wisdom and compassion of our humanity express themselves naturally and fully.

The most important factor underlying this process has only been implied. So far, we have followed one of the simpler expositions of *paticca-samuppada*

given by the Buddha. In more detailed discussions of this process, he traced the co-origination process back to ignorance (*avijja*, not knowing, wrong knowing). Because we don't really know what's going on from moment to moment, we respond blindly and incorrectly to the things that strike the senses. In the shorter discussion we have used above, ignorance is implied from beginning to end. The insight that is very hard for us to accept is that almost all human beings are operating under the power of ignorance almost all of the time. The ubiquity of *avijja* is the reason it can be assumed to underlie the entire perceptual, experiential process (with regular and important exceptions).

Forgetting ignorance leads to dire consequences. Forgetting that *avijja* underlies the entire process, some people think that the only way to escape the pain with which it ends is to physically destroy the sense organs or commit suicide. Others seek to escape its consequences in trance states. And others seek to escape the pain by trying to change the world, although the ultimate source of their pain is within. It is obvious that such attempts are still mired in the ignorance that started things off in the first place. Replacing ignorance with wisdom is a crucial aspect of freeing ourselves from painful egoistic rebirth, conflict, and violence. Experientially understanding the process discussed here is one of the ways wisdom grows.

This analysis does not attempt to describe everything in the process of experience, perception, and its concatenations. Rather, it tries to point out the milestones along the way. For the sake of discussion, the process may be dissected into more or fewer nodes according to our needs. As the whole thing happens extremely fast — it can't really be timed — these milestones whiz by before you know it. Nonetheless, with constant attention and scrutiny we begin to notice the milestones, see their connections, and understand the process. This reveals to us the nature of mind. This is the personal egoistic mind, constantly giving birth to stress, tension, and pain.

While the earlier section discussing the causal factors of sense contact, feeling, craving, and clinging contains very little that is controversial, my reading of the later stages will be controversial. This is not the place to enter into that debate, but readers should be forewarned that the understanding of *bhava* (identification, existence) and *jati* (birth) used here disagree with the standard commentaries, though not with the original Suttas of the Buddha.

Above, I have described concepts and insights that are central to the conceptual framework behind my talk. In the talk itself, I will more directly link these causal elements with the themes of this conference. The causal elements of

paticca-samuppada described above can be extrapolated to the psychology of groups, communities, cultures, and nations. My thesis, here, is that this approach can provide important insights into the motivations of persons and groups involved in violence and other human rights abuses, whether they identify themselves as “victims,” “perpetrators,” both, “mediators,” “bystanders,” or whatever.

Responses

If this analysis is psychologically valid, as I believe from personal experience and study, interventions within circumstances of human rights violations and the cultivation of a “human rights culture” will require attention to the details of the ego-building process described above. Such an investigation then leads to the question: How can the ego-building and conflict-creating process be released, short-circuited, or weakened?

One strategy is to analyze how these causal factors are operating within the individuals and groups caught up in violence, oppression, and other violations of human rights. We can ask:

- What kinds of craving are operative among the various parties?
- To what are the actors clinging?
- In which identities are they trapped?
- What are the dominant forms of egoism and selfishness at play (fear, anger, apathy)?
- To what degree are their desires, identities, and “selves” ignorant and selfish?
- What can they/we learn from the pain of all this?

Once these factors are identified, we can look for “antidotes,” corresponding desires, identities, and mental states that are more wholesome, healthy, and peaceful. For example,

- The desire for security can be extended to encompass the security and safety of “the other.”
- Clinging to fixed, rigid goals, expectations, and demands can be softened by diffusing the sense of “us” and “ours” inherent in them. This can be brought about by practices such as reflecting on mutual realities like suffering and shared aspirations such as cultural integrity and happiness.

- Identification with ones group is shifted away from characteristics, narratives, and values that support being against another group (e.g. “they did such-and-such to us”) towards positive characteristics that do not require opposition and conflict to sustain them.
- Wholesome mental states can be cultivated in place of violent and selfish ones, e.g., kindness instead of anger, compassion instead of hatred, sharing instead of possessiveness and greed, simplicity instead of sensual lust, and nurturing instead of power lust.
- Groups can develop an ombudsman mechanism that keeps track of excessive egoism within the group and reflects that back to the group.
- The genuine spirituality of love and compassion, service, self-sacrifice, and self-transcendence can supplant to many debased forms of religion that are used to petrify unhealthy religious identities.

The logic here is that of traditional Buddhist spiritual practice. The new twist here is that we are exploring how to apply these principles and practices on the inter-personal and group levels. I concede that these practices may not be easy, but solving the many conflicts in our societies has never proven to be easy either. I propose that the insights offered by Buddhism can help make difficult peace work somewhat easier and more effective.

This is a brief discussion of the Buddhist teaching called “dependent co-origination” (*paticca-samuppada*). Although there are many more details that we could bring in, this much is sufficient background for my talk at this conference. As it deals with the primary issue of all spirituality — self-transcendence — it offers a spiritual perspective with corresponding strategies for dealing with conflict and violence. By analyzing how we give birth to self/ego and then generate “sin,” lack of love, fragmentation, alienation, unwholeness, separation from Nature, violence, lust, idolatry, and all the forms of selfishness, it shows the way to salvation. Not just a psychological theory, it is intended for liberation. True liberation can never be limited to the individual and thus involves all the relationships in which we participate, live, and love.

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